Hi, guys. I'd like to bring up the time-honored question of free will. Our actions follow from the laws of old-fashioned science with some randomness from modern physics. So how on earth can we call ourselves free?

Well I've found the complete opening chapter of Daniel C Dennett's book Elbow Room online. I think Dennett might have been wise to stop writing his book there. Because in my opinion, this chapter really closes the book on the free will problem. It definitively puts the question to bed. But I'd love to hear your take on things. You can view the entire opening chapter here:
[img]pp1-10[/img]
[img]pp11-19[/img]

You can preview the book here:
Daniel C Dennett's Elbow Room: The varieties of free will worth wanting

When I look at it, I only see intermittent pages, not the whole chapter.

Good point. It cuts off the preview once you read about 20 pages. I've worked around that problem. Here is his chapter:

[img]pp1-10[/img]
[img]pp11-19[/img]

I expected better from Dennett to be honest. It's not that I particularly disagree on any point, just that there are so few points and so much waffle.

A cynical friend of mine recently derided the question of free will on the grounds that as soon as you define sensibly, it becomes obvious that we don't have it. I mildly disagree, but only because it's not clear what a sensible definition would be. On the point that the question has obvious answers as soon as you ask it properly, I can't see any reason to disagree:

1) Did the laws of physics dictate our every action from the start of the universe?
Yes if the quantum world is fundamentally ordered, no if it's fundamentally random.

2) Does a world with random events allow us to generate some sort of metanatural decision process?
No (what would yes even mean?)

3) Are we compelled to act against our will?
No.

4) Would the existence of perfect souls allow us to control our thoughts better than we can in this one?
Not in any meaningful sense - you can't decide what to decide ad infinitum. Eventually a decision must just 'happen' to you - or you'll be stuck in an eternity of analysis paralysis.

5) Does the above mean we're not responsible for any of our actions?
Rinse and repeat the above clarification process, this time for 'responsibility'.

I agree with you Arepo. I think you've given the logically correct answer. I think, however, that what it means to answer a philosophical question such as the "free will problem" is not just to give people the facts but also to help people to come emotional acceptance of them.

For the question of whether any gods exist, it's not enough just to say that the evidence suggests no. What's also needed is to dissolve this religious person's reservations about atheism. We have to address issues like "can you be moral without god?". "Should I choose to believe in a god even if the evidence points otherwise?" "Is atheism responsible for 20th century genocide?"

That's what I really admire about Dennett's treatment of the free will problem. His answer in a sentence is that the laws of physics hold true. But I love that he has dismissed all that is scary about living in such a world

I don't really want to read all of that. I will comment on free will, though.

I am a compatibilist. I consider it free will to be able to do something because that's the kind of person I am. Also, I don't consider myself to just be my conscious mind, so I have no problem with the idea that much of what I do is decided on a subconscious level.

Is that philosophy really any different than pessimistic compatibilism? I wonder if I believe all the same stuff, but just have a different definition of free will.

I'm inclined to believe that the question of free will is unimportant if you're a hedonistic utilitarian. The metaphysical question of free will is usually connected to practical matters through responsibility. Many are inclined to believe that people who have commited certain actions should be inflicted punishment (pain or otherwise). They also believe that if there is no such thing as "free will" no one should be inflicted punishment.

However, if you're a utilitarian the metaphysics of free will (whatever it might be) completely factors out of the punishment equation. Roughly, we should punish acts if the punishment has good consequences and refuse to punish acts otherwise.

I am not completely settled on this issue myself. I read an interview with Galen Strawson recently in "A Very Bad Wizard" and afterward I felt like I was a hard-determinist, or something stronger than a compatibilist, but then I read a couple interviews with Peter Singer and parts of Parfit's new book "On what matters" and they both seem to hold convincingly that compatibilism is true.

Here are two Singer quotes on the subject of free will I found. He doesn't write too often on the subject; having read his entire "Peter Singer Under Fire" it is not mentioned even once:


first December 2000
Reason: Could it be that our behaviors are constrained so that we really aren't able to choose? Are we deluding ourselves into thinking that we can actually choose to do one thing or another?

Singer: Darwinian theory suggests that choices are constrained in a sense that statistically you can predict what most people will do under some circumstances. But that's different from the sort of first-person sense of freedom that we have, where we're facing a question and we have this strong sense that we are free to choose what to do. Really, we are free to choose in the sense that if I decide that this is what I'm going to do, I can get up and do it, even if statistically it's going to be rare for people to do that. The sense of freedom there is genuine. I'm what has been called a "compatibilist" or a "soft determinist"-I think determinism is true, but it doesn't eliminate the claim that we have a choice and that we are responsible for our choices. Determinism is true in the sense that if you knew everything about the world at state A, you would be able to predict what it would be like in state B later. But freedom is also real in the sense in which the world confronts us as a real capacity for choice. It's a mistake to simply dismiss it as an illusion. The kind of choice required for responsibility and for saying that someone is free is not something that is incompatible with the belief that their actions are caused. Think about the conditions for holding someone responsible: If they did something because they'd been drugged, then we say they're not free, they're not responsible. But if they did something because they sat there, they thought about it, and in the end the reasons and the values that they held led them to choose A rather than B, well, we say they're responsible. You could also say that if we'd known everything about them, we could have predicted that they would choose A rather than B. But they made a choice because they were free from all of those other factors which diminish responsibility.

and then in September 2006
Questioner: Does free will exist and if so, is it restricted to human beings, or can other animals have it?

Singer: In a deep metaphysical sense, I don't think free will exists. But we, and some animals, can make choices, and that's real enough, whatever the causes of our choices.


So after reading these two quotes I would say that I agree with what he is saying, but that his position strikes me as a little stronger on determinism than a "soft-determinist", his statement in 2006 seeming even stronger than it did in 2000. Maybe he was just playing to his libertarian interviewer in Reason. I mean, often I feel like compatibilists are talking about something totally different when discussing free will than are libertarians. I've seen the word "neo-compatibilist" used by Owen Flanagan in "The Problem of the Soul," which I have heard is close to Dennett's view in "Elbow Room", but seems much stronger to me. He says:


The compatibilist, meanwhile, if he thinks free will is compatible with determinism, must have changed the subject. He cannot be saying that the Cartesian conception of free will is compatible with determinism because, well, it isn't. And indeed if one looks at the literature one will see that compatibilists invariably mean something different by free will than what the orthodox concept says it is.

The hard determinist, unlike the compatibilist, accepts the terms of the exercise as they are set and sees correctly that determinism is incompatible with free will, as the Cartesian conceives it. But both the compatibilist and the hard determinist make the same mistake. They both claim to know that determinism is true. But if what I have said about causation — there being both deterministic and indeterministic causes — is plausible, then neither can sensibly be said to know that determinism is true. Causation is ubiquitous. Ours is a causal universe. But no one yet knows the exact range of deterministic and indeterministic causation — assuming the universe contains some of each.

What to do? My proposal is this: Change the subject. Stop talk--a about free will and determinism and talk instead about whether and how we can make sense of the concepts of "deliberation," choice," "reasoning," "agency," and "accountability" (scorecard items) within the space allowed by the scientific image of minds. This is, I Hasten to admit, just what I accused the compatibilists of doing. Since they cannot be saying that free will is compatible with causation, either deterministic or indeterministic, they must be claiming that something else—hopefully something similar to free will—is compatible with causation.

It would be misleading to call my position compatibilism, however, since compatibilism seems to accept the terms of the standard debate about "free will and determinism." Since I have been trying to frame the pressing question in terms of the compatibility of "rational deliberation and choice and causation," or as the problem of the voluntary and the involuntary, it will be best to call my view neocompatibilism. I do claim that we can make sense of rational deliberation and choice in a causal universe. (The Problem of the Soul, pp.124-127)


Sorry for the long post, but this topic really rattles my brain. What do you all think?

I've always thought it a trivial subject, where the answer to the question depends on what meaning we attach to the question.

It's certainly not an issue that utilitarians need worry about, since we have no need for concepts like 'accountability' and 'agency'. The questions which other philosophers apply them to are ones we answer simply (in principle) by seeing which answer leads to the better consequences. Most people think this is a dodge away from the 'real' question, but I see it as properly epistemological. There's no such thing as knowledge - which the free will debate requires - only beliefs which guide our behaviours in ways we might judge better than others.

I agree with Arepo. "Judgment" is something we do to encourage or deter future acts of a given sort, depending on whether we expect those acts to be harmful or helpful.

As far as I can tell, compatibilism is probably true. Determinism, far from disallowing free will, actually makes it possible.

The classic argument against compatibilism is that if the universe is deterministic, then every action we take is inevitable. Therefore, if a man murders someone, he never had the power to do otherwise. But as a compatibilist I would argue that free will only requires that one has the power to do otherwise *if one had wanted to*. The man wanted to murder his wife, so he did it of his own free will.

Sometimes people bring up the idea of "La Place's Demon", a hypothetical being who could know everything and predict people's actions. Suppose this demon decided to send you a letter telling you exactly what one would do over the next week. In order for this information to be true, the demon would have to be predicting that this would do something that he would *want* to do. For example, it would have to say something like "The winner lottery ticket number is_____; you will go out and buy the winning lottery ticket." It may be inevitable that the recipient of the message will fulfill the prediction, but in order for that to be the case his desire to win the money would have to be greater than any desire to prove the demon wrong. Therefore, his decision would be in accordance with his desires--it would be voluntary and free. The incompatibilists will of course disagree because it was "impossible" for him to do otherwise, but their objection is wrong-headed.

One must make a distinction between two types of possibility:
1) psychological possibility: the potential for one to do otherwise given one's current desires.
2) Physical possibility: the potential for one to do otherwise given the full range of logically possible desires.

In the example, it is psychologically impossible for you to choose not to buy the ticket. Your desire to win the money would ensure that you did. But *if you wanted to do otherwise*, then you would do otherwise; that is, it is physically possible for you to do otherwise. The only thing required for free will is to have multiple, physically possible options.

This issue is not necessarily trivial for a utilitarian. I think a utilitarian should give more weight to the pleasure/interest satisfaction of good people than bad people. This is only justified if free will exists, and I think it does.