I just found this post by Alonzo Fyfe, making the above claim. Without wanting to start another thread on what DU entails, I wonder if faithlessgod will agree?

It seems to me that you have to stretch the definition of either util or virtue ethics (or both) to breaking point to make this claim. I've only skimmed Alonzo's piece so far, so I'm not sure yet which he does.

I notice in his first comment he errs, though:

Alonzo wrote:There are two ways to divide utilitarian theories; (1) into different views on what counts as utility (preference satisfaction, happiness, pleasure), and (2) into different objects of evaluation (act, rule).

This is quite an oversimplification - there are several more ways to divide utilitarianisms as described in Toby Ord's post. While I've heard the claim that one could blend virtue and util ethics (which I disagree with), I don't think I've heard the claim that positions between the standard (and pretty well defined - see Utilitarianism subsection) axes of util necessarily class your views as virtue ethics.

[ETA by Arepo] Bollocks. What follows in this post is my reply to the original contents of this post, accidentally pasted over Daniel's.

Daniellc wrote:I still think that desire utilitarianism is the same as desire fulfillment act utilitarianism, but I think it's supposed to be virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is that you're supposed to have good desires. Desire utilitarianism says that a good desire is one that tends to fulfill other desires, and that you're supposed to have good desires. Which definition am I stretching to breaking point?

[the following paragraph is by Arepo]

Depends on how I interpret what you've said. If you mean DF tells you personally to have a certain set of desires, then it's not really utilitarianism, since it's not universalisable (saying you should have desire x ~= saying you should try to get everyone to adopt desire x). If you mean it in a universalisable way, ie. that the more people who adopt a certain set of desires the better then it's not really virtue ethics (since the most effective way to get the most people to adopt a certain set of desires might not involve you adopting those desires yourself).

Arepo wrote:I just found this post by Alonzo Fyfe, making the above claim. Without wanting to start another thread on what DU entails, I wonder if faithlessgod will agree?

Yes I do. Part of why DU makes sense is that it incorporates what makes sense from consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics.

Arepo wrote:It seems to me that you have to stretch the definition of either util or virtue ethics (or both) to breaking point to make this claim. I've only skimmed Alonzo's piece so far, so I'm not sure yet which he does.

Not at all it comes striaght out of "the right act is the act that a person with good desires would do", so a desire is good (bad) to the extent that there is a universal reason to promote (inhibit) it, and such universally good (bad) desires can be called virtues (vices).

Arepo wrote:I notice in his first comment he errs, though:

Alonzo wrote:There are two ways to divide utilitarian theories; (1) into different views on what counts as utility (preference satisfaction, happiness, pleasure), and (2) into different objects of evaluation (act, rule).

This is quite an oversimplification - there are several more ways to divide utilitarianisms as described in Toby Ord's post.

Well on this broad level Toby offers three ways not two:

* Welfare - corresponds to Alonzo's (1) above
* Population Axiology
* Structure - corresponds to Alonzo's (2) above

Surely reading Alonzo's post it is clear that "Population axiology" is not relevant to the topic at hand. And anyway I would rank the two higher than this third category which is a debate held between utilitarians and which as I have commented before DU provides some novel answers. So is this "quite an oversimplification"? Not for the purpose at hand AFAICS.

Arepo wrote: While I've heard the claim that one could blend virtue and util ethics (which I disagree with),

On what basis do you disagree? Ord talks about motive evaluation focus, others talk about virtue consequentialism (I used to call DU this) so on what basis do you think you cannot or are you using a narrow definition of virtue ethics to make them non-overlapping?

Arepo wrote: I don't think I've heard the claim that positions between the standard (and pretty well defined - see Utilitarianism subsection) axes of util necessarily class your views as virtue ethics.

Well this mentions five dimensions

* evaluation focus - as since you indicate familairity with Ord's work is built into his global consequentualism formulation. DU iit is desires
* universalism - yes
* welfarist - yes and no, yes as in the DF theory of value but no as DF theory of welfare is a sub-set of the DF theory of vlaue and is used to determine rights
* consequentialist - yes
* aggregative - yes and no - no in the sense of Mackie's indeterminancy of utility argument and the non-existence of intrinsic value, yes in the 1st/2nd order derivative sense I have discussed before.

Anyway you know this and your point is what? Semantics? If you dont want to call DU a utilitarian theory fine, then make it a friend like prioritism so what, I am not interested in semantics nor defending the meaning of a term - these alll subjective issues anyway - I am only in how it helps describe and explain the empirical interactions that are domain of moral examination.

[EDIT] Fixed my response to the second post that was fixed by Arepo[/EDIT]
Hi Arepo

Look like you pulled the full quote of DianielC's that triggered this new thread and remind me of the old confusion in evaluation focus.

DanielLC wrote:I still think that desire utilitarianism is the same as desire fulfillment act utilitarianism, but I think it's supposed to be virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is that you're supposed to have good desires. Desire utilitarianism says that a good desire is one that tends to fulfill other desires, and that you're supposed to have good desires. Which definition am I stretching to breaking point?

To clarify here DU is not act-consequentialist, it is desire-consequentialist and this can be formulated as utilitarian virtue ethics. DU is such a theory not because it can be but because it is the only one that makes best sense of the empirical data.

Depends on how I interpret what you've read. If you mean DF tells you personally to have a certain set of desires, then it's not really utilitarianism, since it's not universalisable (saying you should have desire x ~= saying you should try to get everyone to adopt desire x).

How do you conclude this? DU (i think you mean not DF) does not tell you anything, rather it provides the framework which when anyone applies it they will most likely come to the same provisional and defeasible conclusion about what desires to universally promote and what to universally inhibit. If it ain't universal it ain't moral (DF might still apply in those other areas - could be a good model for psychotherapy maybe - actually it is quite congruent with CBT and REBT anyway)

If you mean it in a universalisable way, ie. that the more people who adopt a certain set of desires the better then it's not really virtue ethics (since the most effective way to get the most people to adopt a certain set of desires might not involve you adopting those desires yourself).

Virtue ethics is about honouring values - the virtues and (for consistency must be a better way of saying it) dis-honouring dis-values - the vices. DU shows which are which and promotes virtues and inhibits vices which includes using praise, honour and reward for the virtuous and blame, condemnation, punishment and censures for those who display the vicious characters. The more the merrier and does not stop this being virtue ethics. Why do you think it does not ? You say "since the most effective way to get the most people to adopt a certain set of desires might not involve you adopting those desires yourself" yes well this is not a virtuous disposition and would be condemned and discouraged. This does nothing to showing that DU is not VE. (I will try and avoid TLAs for now and just stick to 2LA apart from that one which is a TLA).

Oh fuck, I've done it again. The second post in this thread is what I wrote after clicking what I must have thought was the 'post reply' button but was actually the 'edit' button. So I've managed to delete Daniel's entire contribution (what's left is the quote in the second post, which was quoting his original second post) and overwrite it with my reply!

Sorry to both of you.

Arepo wrote:Oh f***, I've done it again. The second post in this thread is what I wrote after clicking what I must have thought was the 'post reply' button but was actually the 'edit' button. So I've managed to delete Daniel's entire contribution (what's left is the quote in the second post, which was quoting his original second post) and overwrite it with my reply!

Sorry to both of you.

So I am not sure if I am following this. The quote in the second post is from Daniel not you and the second is by you and not authored by Daniel as it appears?

Yeah - I've edited it to at least make it clearer what's going on.

Arepo wrote:Yeah - I've edited it to at least make it clearer what's going on.

Good now can we get back to the actual conversation then?

faithlessgod wrote:Surely reading Alonzo's post it is clear that "Population axiology" is not relevant to the topic at hand.

It wasn't the 'relevant' divisions I was talking about. I was just observing that Alonzo erred, uncharitably perhaps.

FG wrote:On what basis do you disagree? Ord talks about motive evaluation focus, others talk about virtue consequentialism (I used to call DU this) so on what basis do you think you cannot or are you using a narrow definition of virtue ethics to make them non-overlapping?

If you like. As you say, it's just terminology. But it seems to me that there's a pretty well defined and pretty fundemental difference between virtue and utilitarian ethics.

In the usual division of moral theories there are three facets - ends E, means M, and motives O. What distinguishes the classical consequentialist/deontological/virtue views from each other is how they weight each one. To the utilitarian, E has infinitely more weight than M or O. M and O might well be useful and worth promoting, but only if they generate a higher value of E. Generally the distinction for others is blurrier - they might say M or O are worth more, or perhaps an equal amount as E.

So - insofar as categorisation as a utilitarian theory is concerned - the only thing that I can see that matters is whether you think the value of O or M in DU can ever outweigh E. If so, it doesn't matter to anything - it just explains why other utils might be confused!

(i think you mean not DF)

Yes, sorry.

DU does not tell you anything

This feels like an unfinished claim. I don't know what 'does not tell you anything' means? I can think of several possible propositions it might be expressing, and I can't tell which (or which combination you have in mind) - saying it provides 'a framework' is a metaphor that I can't decipher. To suggest those interpretations that spring immediately to mind:

1) Does not give you a single goal to work towards above all others.
2) Does not imply (or more strongly does not admit to) the idea that one path towards your goal(s) is better
3) Does not prescribe (or proscribe) any path or paths through the future - though it offers a way of evaluating something.
4) Does not prescribe (or proscribe) any path or paths through the future - and offers no guidance at all.
4) Does not contain any informative claims about the universe.

Of these, only 4) seems to negate my comments above - if 4 doesn't apply then DU does offer a perspective which can be opposed or aligned to the other normative views. In that case, they're subject to the same categorisation as above.

Virtue ethics is about honouring values - the virtues and (for consistency must be a better way of saying it) dis-honouring dis-values - the vices. DU shows which are which

But it can't show which is which in a vacuum. You have to give a reason for calling something a virtue or vice, and that reason will either be justified solely by ends, or it won't.

faithlessgod wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:Virtue ethics is about honouring values - the virtues and (for consistency must be a better way of saying it) dis-honouring dis-values - the vices. DU shows which are which

And then you asked:

Arepo wrote:[But it can't show which is which in a vacuum. You have to give a reason for calling something a virtue or vice, and that reason will either be justified solely by ends, or it won't.

But I had already provided an answer that in exactly that fashion!!!! To repeat DU provides the grounds for identifying virtues (good desires) and vices (bad desires).

I do think we've discussed this elsewhere, but that's not an answer to my question, which is 'what grounds does DU provide for identifying good and bad desires?' I know you feel like we're going round in circles, but I think part of that is that your posts are still jargon-heavy - I have to go on Wikipedia just to understand half your sentences, and then I often find that they mean something quite straightforward. Please put a little more effort into translating your thoughts into sentences us plebs can understand!

[ETA] I think another reason I have trouble following your arguments is that they can read like a stream of consciousness - it can be hard to tell where one proposition ends and the next begins, and still harder to spot the logical connection between them. I struggle with the same problem, but I do feel like I'm trying harder to address it (hence the long pauses between many of my replies).

Arepo wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:To repeat DU provides the grounds for identifying virtues (good desires) and vices (bad desires).

I do think we've discussed this elsewhere, but that's not an answer to my question, which is 'what grounds does DU provide for identifying good and bad desires?

A desire is a good desire in virtue of the fact the most everyone has reason to promote it. A desire is a bad desire in virtue of the fact that most everyone has reason to inhibit it. That is it. And that is if you want to use the optional terms good and bad, they are not needed. So one could talk about desires that most everyone has reason to promote or inhibit and that is all the possible realistic grounds that there could be. What is it that you are not getting?

Arepo wrote: I know you feel like we're going round in circles, but I think part of that is that your posts are still jargon-heavy - I have to go on Wikipedia just to understand half your sentences, and then I often find that they mean something quite straightforward. Please put a little more effort into translating your thoughts into sentences us plebs can understand!

Part of the appeal of DU to me is the jargon free basis of it and the minimal amount of entity and real ones that are used in it compared to any other moral theory I have seen. .There are only two slightly technical terms "fulfil"and "thwart" needed to disambiguate the meanings of "satisfy" and "frustrate" and that is it! Where is the jargon you percieve and maybe I can see what your problem is?

Arepo wrote:[ETA] I think another reason I have trouble following your arguments is that they can read like a stream of consciousness - it can be hard to tell where one proposition ends and the next begins, and still harder to spot the logical connection between them. I struggle with the same problem, but I do feel like I'm trying harder to address it (hence the long pauses between many of my replies).

Well I certainly would like to see where this is happening. I want my arguments to flow but still have recognisable stages. Then there is the challenge of brevity and conciseness versus detail and length of replies. You are not giving me enough detail to improve this. How about you fisk one of my posts and we can zoom in on the problem?

My previuos reply to Arepo's previous post has been lost ... by Arepo. Lets carry on from my last reply?