Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

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Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Brian Tomasik on 2009-04-04T16:33:00

In theory, utilitarians ought to maximize the expected value of their donations, without regard to risk, proximity of those helped, or other factors that may affect how good the donation feels. We also expect others to live up to this standard.

But we are still humans with tribal motivations and finite empathy, so perhaps it's expecting too much to demand that people shut up and multiply when deciding where to give every last cent. Eliezer Yudkowsky proposes an alternative in his piece, "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately":
If I had to give advice to some new-minted billionaire entering the realm of charity, my advice would go something like this:

* To purchase warm fuzzies, find some hard-working but poverty-stricken woman who's about to drop out of state college after her husband's hours were cut back, and personally, but anonymously, give her a cashier's check for $10,000. Repeat as desired.
* To purchase status among your friends, donate $100,000 to the current sexiest X-Prize, or whatever other charity seems to offer the most stylishness for the least price. Make a big deal out of it, show up for their press events, and brag about it for the next five years.
* Then - with absolute cold-blooded calculation - without scope insensitivity or ambiguity aversion - without concern for status or warm fuzzies - figuring out some common scheme for converting outcomes to utilons, and trying to express uncertainty in percentage probabilities - find the charity that offers the greatest expected utilons per dollar. Donate up to however much money you wanted to give to charity, until their marginal efficiency drops below that of the next charity on the list.

The main idea here is that
all three of these things - warm fuzzies, status, and expected utilons - can be bought far more efficiently when you buy separately, optimizing for only one thing at a time. [...] Trying to optimize for all three criteria in one go only ensures that none of them end up optimized very well - just vague pushes along all three dimensions.

A similar point about trying to optimize too many criteria at once optimizing none of them may apply in other domains as well, like career choice, ethical purchasing, and investments.

Even if we don't feel we need it ourselves, Eliezer's approach could be an effective suggestion to make to others. Donating 95% of your money to high-risk high-expected-value causes and 5% to directly observable forms of helping is nearly as good as donating 100% to the former, but doing so may be much easier and more psychologically rewarding for the donor. People don't need to accomplish that much direct good to feel warm and fuzzy -- that's the whole problem behind scope insensitivity -- so it doesn't cost all that much to buy these fuzzies and satisfy our primal urges. The rest can then go to the projects with highest expected returns. In some sense, we can have our cake and eat it too.
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Re: Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Arepo on 2009-04-20T17:42:00

It's a nice idea, though I'm not sure who it's aimed at. Those who're utilitarian tend not to worry about the warm fuzzies too much, and those who aren't are unlikely to think in sympathetic enough terms to make this argument relevant. Still, if it only works for one philanthrope...
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Re: Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Brian Tomasik on 2009-04-20T20:06:00

I have to admit, I may very well take the advice myself. It's tough to go through life knowing that all of your efforts will almost certainly (with probability >99.9%) make no difference, which is what a lot of low-probability, high-expected-payoff pursuits amount to. I have some desire to know that I at least accomplished something that actually reduced suffering in the world, even a small amount. (It's awesome if you don't have that irrational sentiment!)

I can think of at least 2-3 utilitarian-ish friends who have told me explicitly that they shy away from highly speculative projects because they're risk-averse, and I bet a large fraction of charitable risk aversion actually stems from this source (namely, diminishing marginal fuzzies as a function of utilons). Ask a ordinary person why she donates to more than one charity, and she may tell you, "I want to diversify my portfolio." Translation: My fuzzies would take a hit if I donated everything to one cause that didn't work out. Or perhaps: I get more fuzzies from seeing 5 utilons in area A and 3 utilons in area B than from 10 utilons in area A alone. Either way, it's probably about fuzzies rather than utilons, except in the rare case when a person donates enough to worry about the marginal returns dropping below those of a second charity.
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Re: Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Arepo on 2009-04-22T12:45:00

I found your essay on wild animal suffering via that first link, which I've bookmarked to read later.

One thing strikes me though, that if the thesis is correct, then it's not obvious that existential risks to the whole world should concern us much.
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Re: Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Brian Tomasik on 2009-04-23T00:27:00

if the thesis is correct, then it's not obvious that existential risks to the whole world should concern us much.


I think the opposite is arguably true, as I pointed out here. In particular, since I suspect that empathy for the suffering of others is so rare throughout the multiverse, it may be a shame for humans -- who have both the motivation and the capacity to ameliorate vast amounts of suffering in the cosmos -- to go extinct. Of course, I do hope humans will consider wild-animal suffering before they engage in terraforming, directed panspermia, sentient computer simulations of nature, or lab-universe creation.
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Re: Yudkowsky on "Purchase Fuzzies and Utilons Separately"

Postby Jesper Östman on 2010-01-18T19:24:00

I know several utilitarians who have some (or many) conscious selfish concerns that they prioritize more than maximizing utility (for everyone). In these cases the ideas in the mentioned thread will also be useful.

More generally I think utilitarians (selfish or not) ought to use the best methods from happiness studies. That could free money resources among the more selfish for optimal utilitarian uses as well as improve their productivity in other ways.

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