I lean towards presentism. That is, I would assign the greatest credence to that view. My reason is that I can intellectually grasp a worldview according to which everything that existed was just the elementary particles (or fields etc) that compose our current universe. I believe such a view could dispense with a basic metaphysical notion of time and only keep a basic notion of 'change' (or determinates of change such as motion). Furthermore, it would be compatible with human experiences and views on change, a "now" etc. (I stress this reason less, since I believe that human experiences of change are compatible even with a changeless universe, but discussing that point would lead us astray.)
Some people believe that presentism is refuted by special relativity. My reason for not accepting that standard objection is that I believe that it depends on an implicit verificationism (the inference from the premise that we cannot measure absolute simultaneity to the conclusion that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.) There are also considerations from philosphy of language against presentism, but those are just silly.
(if anyone thinks otherwise I could elaborate). Related to this objection is the possible fact (I have no study as support) that the majority of physicists don't believe in presentism. Through considerations of expertise that could be a serious objection. However, if my previous reply that such resistance to presentism would be based on a philosophical view is correct and it is true that physicists aren't experts in philosophy the force of this objection could be lessened.
The other alternative I could consider would be what one could poetically a "frozen river" view of time. I take such a view to be extremely counterintuitive, since it would imply that all change is just an illusion. However, as it seems compatible with our experiences (althought not our beliefs) and that it would also be constructed without any notion of a flowing time
Of course, since philosophy of time is not an area of expertise for me and I neither haven't studied the full formalism of the relevant physics nor have spent much time investigating these philosophical issues I believe fairly confidently that my analysis may be relevantly incomplete.