Do you think that a secular, material explanation for the universe is more likely to lead to a hedonist view rather than a preference one? I think it would, because I don't understand how someone can accept a completely natural, materialist basis for the universe yet argue that anything really "matters" beyond it's effect on our emotional state of mind. I resent the idea that materialism leads to nihilism (I don't believe that consistent nihilists even exist but that's another topic) but a material explanation for the universe does destroy the idea of objective value or meaning. Since value is subjective, how can you argue that there's value in fulfilling someone's preference if they will never be subjectively aware of their preference being fulfilled? I just don't see how materialism is compatible with non-hedonist moral views.

I think it would be disrespectful for someone to make fun of their dead mother or gossip about the unpopular people at their workplace/school, and this is bad because empathy requires respect, but I can't see how doing these things can be considered contrary to the victim's interests or 'harmful'.

Interesting post. It raises a few questions.

Firstly, does materialism lead to nihilism? I don't really know. I rate moral nihilism as possible. However, even if I granted that it was likely to be true, this would not influence my decisions. For it is essential to nihilism that if it is true, no action that I can take would make the world better or worse. That is, I find no point in considering the possibility of nihilism.

Secondly, where should morality come from? This is challenging. Morality doesn't seem to fit in a mechanical model of tiny orbiting particles. It isn't needed to explain things. Morality seems absent from physical explanations of the universe. In this way, morality is similar to consciousness. "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?" This question appears deeply mysterious, so it is known as the hard problem of consciousness. The question of how morality arises has been similarly named the "very hard problem" by the philosopher Owen Flanagan.

So how would I seek to answer the very hard problem? The approach of McDowell resonates with me. Maybe you will find something you like in this excerpt from his wikipedia page:

moral agents form beliefs about the moral facts, which can be straightforwardly true or false. However, the facts themselves, like facts about colour experience, combine anthropocentricity with realism. Values are not there in the world for any observer, for example, one without our human interest in morality. However, in that sense, colours are not in the world either, but one cannot deny that colours are both present in our experience and needed for good explanations in our common sense understanding of the world.

Or from Peter Railton:

"Value might be akin to … color. Of course color attribution is linked to a sensibility on our part, but this need not in itself impugn our familiar ways of talking about color – that objects indeed are colored, that their colors can guide our color judgements, and so on. Perhaps we could be led to question these familiar ways of talking about color if we could be convinced that color perception or color discourse somehow systematically misrepresents the world. But such claims… do not follow simply from the observation that rationally optional sensibilities are implicated in color perception.

To put it crudely, I think that pleasant experience has value. However, I can't describe why. But if you experience them, then you will agree!

Can we reconcile concern for preferences with materialism? It'd be rude to dismiss this possibility without a convincing account for the value of experiences. At this stage, I'd happily be persuaded by a contrary argument. However, I can't see where such an argument might come from.

Good post, Ryan. Another thing I was thinking of is that if the brain is just a physical object and the mind/self is an illusion, something that the brain experiences rather than an actual entity, than can we even say that the brain has 'preferences'?