I don't understand the rejection of hedonism on the basis that it justifies killing someone in their sleep if doing so would cause no distress, it generally does not. It might, in some very unlikely circumstances when not doing so would have even worse consequences, but any utilitarian theory might. Killing someone in their sleep would not be harmful but it would be unkind/unethical because you are depriving someone of wanted happiness. The moral actor in this scenario should not regard his pleasure as being any more important than the pleasure of the being he is killing.

This doesn't mean that we're obligated to create as many people who will experience pleasure as possible but preventing someone from experiencing pleasure and not creating someone who will experience pleasure are two different things. If being dead is a harmful or bad state of existence, then how can non-hedonists go about their daily lives not in a constant state of anxiety and grief over the fact that they are going to die? Shouldn't we mourn for all the sentient beings who will not come into existence and experience happiness (or acquire knowledge, autonomy, have their preference fulfilled etc. for all the preference/pluralistic utilitarians) if not being alive is a bad thing?

I think this should go on the Common objections to consequentialism tread.

preventing someone from experiencing pleasure and not creating someone who will experience pleasure are two different things

How so? They both have the marginal consequence of one less person experiencing pleasure. Is it just that the latter tends to be much more expensive? Also, I'd add that not preventing someone from dying would also be the same as those two.

DanielLC wrote:I think this should go on the Common objections to consequentialism tread.

preventing someone from experiencing pleasure and not creating someone who will experience pleasure are two different things

How so? They both have the marginal consequence of one less person experiencing pleasure. Is it just that the latter tends to be much more expensive? Also, I'd add that not preventing someone from dying would also be the same as those two.

Good point but even killing someone and letting someone die are not equally blameworthy (they are in terms of someone having bad character but you can't punish non-aggressors in the same way). Existing sentient beings have established identities and personalities, they have a set of memories that give them the illusion of a continued existence. We can also practically avoid killing people, we can't practically go out of our way to create every sentient being that could exist. There's no moral reason to kill someone in their sleep (most scenarios), even if we did have a moral obligation to create as many people as possible

You should blame people based on the consequences of you blaming them, not on what they did.

Existing sentient beings have established identities and personalities, they have a set of memories that give them the illusion of a continued existence.

So?

We can also practically avoid killing people, we can't practically go out of our way to create every sentient being that could exist.

That doesn't mean it's less important. I suppose that you might have meant that the best action won't involve killing people (because that can be avoided easily) but it will involve making fewer people than strictly possible (because that would involve ignoring everything else). Is that correct?

DanielLC wrote:I think this should go on the Common objections to consequentialism tread.

I think this should go there as well.