I have been pondering a broader perspective of ideologically-motivated behavior that is vaguely related to a recent post that I made about Liberty (and the Tea Party movement). I see strong connections between deontology (rule-based ethics) and what I will call intuitionism (similar to old-style rationalism), and I do not like what happens when both ideas are (implicitly) adopted at full strength. I am defining "intuitionism" as the (possibly implicit) belief that intuition leads to truthful insights into complex realities (e.g., a gut feeling or intuition leads to an accurate conclusion about vastly complex issues like social problems or economic problems). I see consequentialism as an opposing philosophy with an important difference being the increased tendency to at least attempt to evaluate evidence. I suspect that the combination of deontology and intuitionism is a prerequisite for some types of extreme ideology or otherwise counterproductive ideology (I have not tested this).

The consequences of ideology are important because ideologically-motivated behavior often diverges from what is truthful--ideology taken to an extreme can become authoritarianism or totalitarians. Examples are Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Pol Pot, and the various Mid-East leaders who are the targets of the recent demonstration (some of whom exploited ideology to attain power or maintain it). One example of how ideology works is from Hamilton (2009; http://alturl.com/ifdd7): higher education among "strong" Democrats (in the U.S.) is associated with belief in higher risk in climate change, but higher education in "strong" Republicans is associated with belief in lower risk of climate change (Fig. 3). Higher self-rated knowledge of climate change follows the same, diverging results (Fig 2).

Regardless of who is correct in an ideological debate, ideology will drive a large group of people to make bad decisions while they rationalize their actions to fit their ideology. My view of the Hamilton study is that a large group of people (conservatives), without access to data and without the skills to analyze it, implicitly claim insight into vastly complex phenomena--they assume that their gut feelings are precise enough to refute scientific data and analysis. In my experience, ideologues do not admit reliance on gut feelings but instead interpret selected pieces of information using their intuition to judge how that piece of information can refute an entire body of evidence (e.g., some claims against global warming are judged as sufficient to invalidated a large body of scientific evidence without integrating that piece of information into a coherent climate prediction model). On the other side are people with little alternative then relying on reports of scientific findings as proxies for understanding truth directly (and theoretically some powerful lobby could manipulate this evidence). Many people on both sides rely on what I am calling intuitionism--belief that their intuitions lead them to truthful insights into complex realities.

In the Tea Party example (a libertarian political movement in the U.S.), a common theme is a belief in inalienable rights to liberty combined with a long list of more specific rules and principles that derive from that general rule. I see this reliance on inalienable rights as a deontological approach that both derives from intuitionism and reinforces it. In contrast, consequentialism can facilitate a more grounded approach that forces people to at least look at evidence. It is evidence that is the enemy of ideological fanaticism. (Note that I am not associating the Tea Party with right-wing authoritarianism, but the TP often employs deontology and intuitionism, which started this thread).

Here are some of my thoughts on the manifestation of ideologically-motivated behavior:

1) The vast majority of humans rely on intuition for many of the decisions that they make every day. This includes seemingly trivial things like choosing clothes to wear, and extends to other things like choosing a profession, choosing activities that might or might not adversely affect others or the environment, communicating with others via non-violent communication or violence (where intuition is at least a substantial part of the decisions).

2) Humans lack the quantitative skills to answer many of the important questions that affect their daily lives, so reliance on intuition, biological or psychological predispositions, trust, or other non-rational processes often drive behavior. In other words, I do not have all the skills needed to make scientific choices about everything I do even if there are thousands of people who each have great skill in one particular area.

3) Humans exhibit a variety of cognitive biases that lead them to accumulate beliefs that are consistent with (a) their predispositions and (b) their existing beliefs. Examples are belief bias, selective exposure to information, selective scrutiny, selective recall, and appeal to Moorean facts. In other words, we distort our exposure to and interpretation of knowledge to suit what we already believe (Google 'cognitive bias').

4) Humans exhibit individual differences in psychological characteristics that reflect differences in motivations for behavior (e.g., aggression, need for power, need for security, openness to new experience, neuroticism, empathic concern, egoistic concern—often phrased as differences in personality or values). Clusters of these differences are associated with ideological stances (Adorno et al., 1950; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).

5) Other: social influences of parents, peers, culture, subculture, and advertising.

The process: humans in different ideological groups might begin life with approximately equal philosophical short-comings (items 1-3 above), but their psychological dispositions take them in different directions. Some people feel aggression, a need for power, a need for people to be submit to authority, and these traits are clustered on the opposite side of a dimension for openness to new experience, beneficence, and similar traits that I correlate with empathic concern (see Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Mavor et al., 2010). Individual differences in empathic concern (especially when the opposite end of the dimension is need for power and authority) reflects a fundamental (implicit?) philosophy: empathy is a connection with others while need for power is (implicitly) opposition to others (others must obey authority). Various cognitive biases lead people to strengthen their ideological stance, with some people having motivation to continue to develop the ideology.

The empathic disposition (a disposition to have empathy or otherwise care for others or the environment) would seem to lead to consideration of evidence of how others are affected by action, and the authoritarian approach would (philosophically) seem less attached to the need for evidence. A person who, perhaps implicitly, adopts an intuitionist approach and also has the personality trait-cluster of strong conservatism or authoritarianism could easily associate their need for power with an ultimate truth. In other words, intuitionist are inclined to believe that ideas in their heads are ultimately correct despite lack of (legitimate) evidence, and if biological, psychological, and social forces lead people to feel a need for power and obedience, then they will be inclined to think that this is the correct way for the universe to be (once again, without feeling a need to assess evidence to confirm the beliefs). To the deontological/intuitionist/ideological conservative, people who oppose the acquisition of power are not to be considered as negative utility, but are instead to be considered obstacles to the higher need (which is power). When a higher need (power, or maybe even liberty) is held above the need to assess consequences according to how living organisms are affected, ideological tragedy can follow.

(Note that ideology can also lead to the opposite extremism, as in eco-defense terrorism, but this has historically been less prevalent and has resulted in less loss of life than totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Perhaps the different observed prevalence of the two supports my speculation about the links between deontology, intuitionism, and right-wing authoritarianism).

References

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., Betty Aron, R. N. S. with, Hertz-Levinson, M., & Morrow, W. (1950). The authoritarian personality (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Science Editions.

Mavor, K. I., Louis, W. R., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). A bias-corrected exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of right-wing authoritarianism: Support for a three-factor structure. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 28–33. DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2009.08.006

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–62). San Diego: Academic Press.

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19–45.

Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(5), 878–891.

A very very interesting post. I can't find anything I disagree with among what you've said, though I'd have to reread it before providing detailed feedback. Overall, I agree that ideology, including toxic ideology can flourish much more easily under intuitionist and deontological systems. It's hard to maintain a hardline ideology and utilitarianism at the same time. Have you posted this passage elsewhere?

Have you posted this passage elsewhere?

No. My post above is something that developed over the past few weeks, and I wrote it here when I finally made sense of the jumbled thoughts in my head. My background is not philosophy, but maybe you can refine this and I'll coauthor an article on it. I would like to explore it from a psychology perspective (or would it be experimental philosophy?).

The so-called Tea Party has a considerable amount of scapegoating. The financial crisis of Sept. 2008 has very little to do with "government spending" and yet that is what the Tea Party focuses on. The financial crisis was caused by reckless banking, by casino banking, however you want to call it. I think that's a pretty straightforward interpretation.

There's also scapegoating against individual human beings, namely undocumented workers (illegal immigrants). Of course, people are crossing a border in pursuit of better economic opportunity. People have done so throughout all human history. And yet, among Republicans there has been somewhat of a chorus of blame against illegal immigrants. Now, in some industries, like construction, sure, undocumented workers have bid down the wages (I'm still not sure why we don't blame the companies rather than the workers). But undocumented workers having to do with the financial crisis of Sept. 2008? Hardly a thing.

People have focused on what they're familiar with. It's as if a person staying in a hotel was treated in a borderline dismissive, disrespectful way by someone leading a tour, but that's hard to put into words. In fact, it's even embarrassing to complain about that. But if there's something wrong with the room, ah, now you have something you can peg your hat on.

Okay, now on to philosophy. A hundred and one dilemmas, utilitarianism vs. Kantian ethics. Should we sacrifice the smaller group for the sake of the larger group? And I suppose this is intended to bring to the surface the differences between utilitarianism and Kantianism. And perhaps okay up to a point. But do we do anything besides 'dilemma'? Some, but not a whole lot. 'Dilemma' has taken over a bigger part of philosophy than it should have. In many cases in real life, we are interested in better alternatives so we can help both the smaller group (including the group of one person) and the larger grouper. And better alternatives seems like it should be a mainstay of the development of the utilitarian approach. I'd also like to see philosophers involved in active projects like community arts centers, like community health centers, independent radio stations and so on. I think we could learn a lot through the interplay of theory and practice. Not it might be said, we have neither particular qualifications in this regard nor particular disqualifications. Except, philosophy does tend to attract more cerebral types (and nothing wrong with that!). And the very doing of philosophy that is more cerebral, less immediately engaged in the here and now, less engaged in immediate social skills and social back and forth, perhaps. There are many skills, there are many ways of contributing, there are many ways of being smart. I think it would be a gift to ourselves to consider these kind of practical experiments.

And, winding back to the everyday. Really, both utilitarianism and Kantianism are on one side that we should care about other people in realistic ways, without preconditions, and accepting the people as they are, without blaming them. On the other side, in political discourse is authoritariansim. So, I view this as the main distinction in the real world: as utilitarianism/Kantianism/humanitarianism on one side, and various forms of authoritarianism on the other.

Snow Leopard wrote:Really, both utilitarianism and Kantianism are on one side that we should care about other people in realistic ways, without preconditions, and accepting the people as they are, without blaming them. On the other side, in political discourse is authoritariansim. So, I view this as the main distinction in the real world: as utilitarianism/Kantianism/humanitarianism on one side, and various forms of authoritarianism on the other.

I agree with what you say here, but I see Kant as a special exception to deontology in general. I also think that people who share the idea of a virtue-based or rule-based ethic can diverge sharply from Kant's apparent interest in the overall well-being of all. The problem that I see is a different, special case: combining rule-based ethics and a strong belief that their intuitions are correct (and I'll add a third here), and also a low level of dispositional empathy. The results of these three things lead to behaviors that are much different than what utilitarians or strict Kantians would find ethical.

A few comments on Kant from The Online Library of Liberty copy of "Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Ethics [1796]"...

Although I dislike some of the foundations of his thoeries, I would say that his heart is in the right place and he sure strives to find ways to acheive ethical thought and behaior. His idea to "ACT FROM A MAXIM AT ALL TIMES FIT FOR LAW UNIVERSAL" (caps in original) is one that I use (within a framework of utilitarianism). Kant had the insight to see that some qualities lead to bad outcomes. He said that qualities like courage, determination, and more can become harmful (wait! is he a closet rule-based consequentialist by seeing the outcomes of these?). He then denies consequentialism: "A GOOD WILL IS ESTEEMED TO BE SO, not by the effects which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but BY ITS MERE GOOD VOLITION,i.e.,IT IS GOOD IN ITSELF" (caps in original).

Here is where the problems start. Somebody who uses this principle and has an underlying temperament toward egocentrism and lack of concern for others can claim that a reasonable-sounding goal (in this case, liberty) is good "not by the effects which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but BY ITS MERE GOOD VOLITION,i.e.,IT IS GOOD IN ITSELF" (in Kant's words). Now we have a problem--people pursuing a goal with a strong belief that their higher principle is correct even if they see examples of people being hurt by it (I'm saying that some modern Americans do this, not that Kat was immune to the injuries of others).

Also, Kant explicitly denies all utilitarianism. He says that if humans were created for the purpose of "welfare and felicity," then we would not have been given reason as the tool to achieve it "for the whole rule and line of action necessary to procure happiness would have been more securely gained by instinct than we observe it to be by reason." Once again, instinct (intuition) should be weighed more heavily than reason (and I say some use this theory implicitly by ignore evidence). A few paragraphs later Kant says it is a duty for people to secure their own happiness--so his theories are complex (he said earlier to deny consequences).

(wait! is he a closet rule-based consequentialist by seeing the outcomes of these?)

You wouldn't be the first to think so. I think Mill suggested this, though I can't remember where. RM Hare certainly did.

(an interesting URL... I wonder if the domain is David Pearce up to some mischief? )

I've read that Kant has a 'rigorist' strain. And in some of the above passages, you can kind of see him debating with himself.

And yes, if someone has a rule-based approach combined with a strong belief that their intuitions are correct, that can lead to actions that miss the mark or that are besides the point.

But, here's where I'm a little optimistic. A series of medium actions and observing feedback, a person can often still get pretty close to optimum course of action. In fact, this method is perhaps more robust than big step all at once. Speaking personally, I tend to be on the far nerd side of the spectrum, and so with my social skills, I have gradually learned imperfection (zen acceptance, it's not even mistakes necessarily , it's just texture), ping-ponging it back and forth, etc. Rather than big clunk all at once.

So, some people who are ideologues can do medium steps, adjust course as they go. Some can't. So things aren't necessarily as bad as they might at first seem.

Now, on the third point, a low level of dispositional empathy. On this one I might hold in reserve and not yet come to a conclusion. For example, if someone really believes in a particular rule-based theory, even if he or she is somewhat above average in empathy, they may view empathy as a "temptation" to not do the "right" thing. And possibly, this may describe Immanuel Kant. And as you say, you like his principle to act from a maxim one can make universal. I like that principle, too. I also like, never use a person purely as a means, for a person is always also an end. And can I cherry-pick, take the parts I like and casually leave the rest behind? Well, since I'm neither an ideologue nor a religionist, I think I can!

So, some people who are ideologues can do medium steps, adjust course as they go.

How? It's not like you can do a test to see if a given action is moral.

If someone believes gay sex is wrong because an ancient religious text says so, it won't matter to them how things work out. (even though this ancient religious text also says a lot of other things)

But, on the theme of coalition building and appealing to the 70% majority, for most people utilitarianism is part of what they care about.

Okay, now here's kind of what I really want to say:

You have an infection. The doctor hits it with one broad-band antibiotic. If it doesn't work, he or she hits it with another broad-band antibiotic. I used to think this was terrible medicine. I thought it was sloppy medicine. I thought it was lazy medicine. But I've kind of come round. Depending on how involved the test it, whether or not you respond to the first antibiotic is itself diagnostic. In the time you arrange a long, involved (expensive) test, you could perhaps already be treating for the most likely cause.

Or anemia, perhaps the original Heinz 57, a variety of possible causes. From the patient's history, a doctor can begin treatment for the most likely cause and whether or not the patient responds, again, is itself diagnostic.

On influenza, whether H1N1 or plain old seasonal flu, a more serious disease then often regarded. Flu is usually self-limiting, but it occasionally causes pneumonia. And this pneumonia can be either direct viral or secondary bacterial pneumonia. So, what's a doctor to do? Well, if flu is circulating in the area, a patient has symptoms, and a chest X-ray shows probable pneumonia, you treat for both! You give both an antibiotic and an antiviral agent (such as Tamiflu, or a different hospital version of a somewhat different antiviral that can be given intravenously). This from the New England Journal of Medicine, Nov. 12, 2009.
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NE ... #t=article

I AM NOT A DOCTOR. <--just to be very clear about that.

But I was kind of pleased at how much I could learn with just a medium bit of research. All the news coverage, and it comes down to almost zen simplicity: If you start having trouble breathing, get help pronto! The other highly useful bit of information was from a New York Times article, Sept. 3, 2009: "In children without chronic health problems, it is a warning sign if they seem to recover from the flu but then relapse with a high fever, Dr. Frieden said. The relapse may be bacterial pneumonia, which must be treated with antibiotics."
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/healt ... .html?_r=2
And presumably, this is the case for grown-ups, too.

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Now, winding back to economics. Well, I love this idea of best effort (medium attempt), honest observation, and then based on this feedback, asking what is the next best attempt. And this is often sorely lacking in public discussion of economics. Too much of this discussion is ideology and firmly held beliefs.