Wondering whether people here all think of utilitarian as normative, or whether you think it's compatible with a normless world.

If I understand the concept of a norm correctly, I believe in one norm: one should help happiness to prevail over suffering.

I don't believe that there are any non-trivial normative facts (in the sense that they would provide reasons to act for any agent). This of course is a radical claim, since epistemic norms are included.

There are many definitions of norms. One recent proposal of norms for ecologically responsible behavior is by:
Thøgersen, J. (2006). Norms for environmentally responsible behaviour: An extended taxonomy. Journal of Environmental Psychology 26 (2006) 247–261. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2006.09.004

I would say that descriptive norms (descriptions of what people actually do in morally relevant situations) is neither necessary or unnecessary but an epiphenomenon of human existence. If you are asking if it is a necessary part of the decision-making process, it should be: sometimes you need to consider the possibility that doing the morally right thing will result in physical harm to you if what you are doing is violently opposed by the masses (e.g., help runaway slaves on the old South, helping Jewish people in Nazi-controlled areas, defending gay marriage or interracial marriage in Mississippi). This type of consideration might not be what you intended.

Injunctive social norms (what society says is morally correct) might lead me to at least consider the possibility that I should explore that topic to see if there is any validity to it. I can also have personal norms that I rationally think are correct, but sometimes I find it difficult to act in accordance with them (introjected norms).

So I guess my answer is that the survey question lacks the clarity that would enable results to have reliable meaning.

Jesper, what would you consider a trivial normative fact (or rather, specifically one you do believe in)?

Rehoot, how would you give the question greater clarity?

I'm a utilitarian and I think the concept of norms fundamentally changes the concept of utilitarianism, but there's still two philosophies that result in similar acts.

Arepo wrote:Rehoot, how would you give the question greater clarity?

You might want to look at the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ). It is probably not exactly what you want, but you can use it as an example of how to construct a survey that addresses the issue of norms more completely. The survey itself is online (there is only one minor difference from the original survey):
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~dfor ... thics2.htm

I am assuming that your original survey refers to prescriptive norms of what people should or should not do. If I had to make a survey that is similar to yours, I would split complex questions to reduce the number of concepts in each question. I would also use a 5-point Likert scale to allow people to express the degree to which they have adopted the beliefs in question. This typically improves predictive ability and correlations with other variables.

Instead of asking if the respondent is or is not utilitarian, split it into 2 questions to see how well the respondent purports to understand utilitarianism and then query attitudes toward utilitarianism. Bothe #1 and #2 address these points on a 5-point scale instead of a false dichotomy. #3 below is close to your survey, although it provides a definition (you can alter that as you see fit). I'm not sure if #3 can really answer your question because it is vague, so I included an updated version of #4 to provide the respondent with an opportunity to deviate from prescriptive norms.

the following survey is intended to be administered anonymously (i.e., the identity of the respondent is not recorded or linked with the responses)

Questions for the survey:
========================
1) Check one of the following that best describes you:

a) I have studied utilitarianism extensively.

b) I have a good understanding of utilitarianism and how it differs from other systems of ethics.

c) I have a general idea of what utilitarianism is, but I am not familiar with all the details.

d) I know only one or two things about utilitarianism.

e) I don't know anything about utilitarianism.


2) What is your attitude toward utilitarianism (check one):

a) I am an enthusiastic utilitarian

b) I generally have a positive attitude toward utilitarianism, but I am unsure about some issues or I oppose some issues.

c) I don't have any posiitive or negative opinion of utilitarianism.

d) I am somewhat opposed to utilitarianism.

e) I am fully opposed to utilitarianism.


3) Prescrptive norms (OR MORAL IMPERRITIVES...) are guidelines for ethical behavior that
are stated in the form of laws (OR YOU CAN ALTER THIS DEFINTION HOW YOU SEE FIT). An example
is: "It is wrong to tell lies." To what degree are prescriptive norms necessary for ethical reasoning:

a) They are an absolutely necessary part of ethical reasoning.

b) They are very useful but not necessary for ethical reasoning.

c) They are useful only in some situations.

d) They are rarely useful.

e) They are entirely unnecessary.

*[edit: I modified number 4. the purpose of number 4 is to allow the respondent to demonstrate willingness to tell a lie. This forces people to think of possible exceptions to prescriptive norms and also might allow you to see if people who said that norms are necessary above discard them here]*

4) For each of the next questions, specify how likely you would be to tell a lie to escape the given situation. Answer with a number from 1-6 where

1 = I would not lie in this situation.

2 = There is a small probability that I would lie in this situation

3 = There is a moderate probability that I would lie in this situation

4 = There is a high probability that I would lie in this situation

5 = I would definitely lie in this situation

(6 = I would not reply even if my silence is perceived as incriminating evidence)

a) A homeless person confronts you and asks for money in a place where you cannot easily ignore the request.

b) While in front of your friends, someone accuses you of something that is not serious in a legal sense but that is quite embarrassing. You are quite sure that nobody would know if you told a lie.

c) Somebody who you do not particularly like asks for your help doing yard work for several hours over the weekend.

d) Your significant other has been accused of a crime, and you know that you can dismiss the charges if you lie.

e) While walking through a small town you see three children run past you and down an alley. About a minute later a man who appears to be drunk and who has a gun asks if you saw any children run by.

edit: I removed 'hijab' on April 20 to simplify it and temp more utilitarians to approve one or more
5. Assume that you live in a country in which a minority of the population is Muslim. A survey in that country revealed that many people want to ban the burka (full body covering worn by some Muslim women) in public. Under what conditions would you endorse banning the burka and hijab (check all that apply):

a) If 0.1% (one tenth of one percent) of the population were Muslim and 95% of the population wanted to ban the burka, would you you say that banning burkas is morally justifiable.

b) If 1% (one percent) of the population were Muslim and 90% of the population wanted to ban the burka, would you you say that banning burkas is morally justifiable.

c) If 5% of the population were Muslim and 80% of the population wanted to ban the burka, would you you say that banning burkas is morally justifiable.

d) If 20% of the population were Muslim and 67% of the population wanted to ban the burka, would you you say that banning burkas is morally justifiable.

e) If 40% of the population were Muslim and 55% of the population wanted to ban the burka, would you you say that banning burkas is morally justifiable.

I substantially revised my post that contains my version of the survey. I just added #5 to really test the degree to which people are willing to follow utilitarianism when it implies infringing on the *rights* of others. I don't think a single yes/no question about being or not being a utilitarian can describe the degree to which people adopt utilitarian beliefs, but questions like #4 and #5 help to identify the strictest adherents and the most liberal rejectors. Similar questions might help to clarify other beliefs of interest.

My question #5 above leads me to ask if there is a footnote in utilitarianism that says that utility that stems from ignorance can be discounted in some way.

1. b
2. a
3. Define "ethical". It's very different if you believe in norms, but you could still claim your personal preferences count as ethics.
4.
a. 1
b. 2
c. 1
d. 3 (depends on the crime, how likely I am to get caught, how much the punishment would be if I was caught, my will-power, etc.)
e. I don't know.

5. There's a lot more to it than just wanting people to wear it and not wanting people to wear it. It seems more likely that they want to discourage fundamentalist Muslims. If it would work, I'd be for it, but I'm not sure if it would.

Also, how much of the population is fundamentalist? I don't think the rest would really care.

Questions for the survey:
========================
1) a
2) a
3) b (my only moral norm is "you should maximise happiness")
4a) 5
b) 3
c) 2
d) 3, although I don't trust the stem. I doubt I could know that with certainty.
e) 5
5. a-e) no, in all instances. Banning the burka will make moderately muslim people upset, it will swell ethnic and religious conflicts, it will promote fear and discrimination. Banning the burka is not going to be condusive to the group's happiness, if the population of islamists is at, or more than 0.1%. If it was 0.001%, then banning the burka still might not be conducive to happiness.

To be honest, intentionally or not, I think question 5 conveys a misunderstanding of utilitarianism - that it's just a matter of just carrying out people's prejudices democratically. That's a misunderstanding of utilitarianism. It reminds me of a medical ethics exam question I once read. Along these lines: "The council is considering creating a needle exchange program. Most of the residents don't want drug users in their suburb. Would a utilitarian favour the construction of such a needle exchange program?" Naive students would answer no. They suppose that the largest interest group - residents - should have their way. However, a sophisticated utilitarian sees that the residents will not suffer greatly from the construction of a needle exchange program. Residents are always opposed to this sort of thing, this is normal when a needle exchange program is constructed. The net effect of needle exchange programs is always that they alleviate a lot of suffering by reducing drug-related crime, while arousing only a little discontent among residents. I hope that's a helpful example.

I think that question 5 can do a few things, but to confirm what it is doing the survey would need more questions and some testing. I created that version of the survey for Arepo as an elaboration of the survey at the top of this page--I didn't create it for myself.

One thing that question 5 does is allow people an opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to act in opposition to a moral imperatives (by checking one or more items). It also allows people the opportunity to demonstrate their irrational prejudices. I'm not sure of Arepo's intent for the original survey, but scientific objectivity would compel a researcher to include items that allow for a full range of responses, even if it makes some people or institutions look bad.

Question #5 also raises a question. The question that it raises is whether utilitarians will hold their belief in utilitarianism to a falsifiable standard. Just as prejudiced people can string some words together to justify checking 5d from seemingly rational motives, utilitarians can rationalize why they aren't checking one of the options for #5. From what I know of the psychology of reasoning, humans have poor insight into the origins of their beliefs. This is why you can point to millions of political ideologists who claim that their arguments stem from reason when the other half of the nation makes the same claim for opposite positions.

If I took the following argument and showed it to three philosophers (without your name on it), I would suspect that they would rate this as an argument from somebody making an implicit appeal to moral imperatives or human rights (and that this has more weight than your subsequent comments about percents and utility):

RyanCarey wrote: Banning the burka will make moderately muslim people upset, it will swell ethnic and religious conflicts, it will promote fear and discrimination.

I say that it looks like an implicit appeal to human rights because only one side is discussed and no weighting of the utility vs. disutility is made. A person appealing to human rights would not need to look at the other half of the equation because the "rights" settle the issue automatically.

Claims about the anti-burka law might be testable, especially considering that the burka is banned in France and Turkey. Let's take an objective look at this statement: "it will swell ethnic and religious conflicts." I'm not sure how to quantify the effect, but from what I understand Turkey survived banning the burka and they have a much higher population of Muslims than the 0.1% in 5a. My point is that if utilitarians are going to deny or minimize the role of moral imperatives, then issues like this would need to be scrutinized carefully to see if utilitarians unconsciously revert to moral imperatives in tough situations.

Let's look at the last part of the last quote "it will promote fear and discrimination." Once again, this sounds like an appeal to a moral imperative instead of a utilitarian argument. First, if the issue were considered from a utilitarian viewpoint for option 5a, then 95% of the population obviously doesn't care that you think religious discrimination is bad. Note that I am not denying the validity of your abhorrence to religious discrimination but stating that in the utilitarian view, the label of 'discrimination against Muslims' evidently wouldn't create disutility for the 95% of people who support banning the burka and hijab--right? That disutility can't really be added to the disutility of the 0.1% who are now oppressed by the law because those effects would have been counted under the direct, immediate effects of the law. A person making the "it will promote fear and discrimination" argument would seem to be arguing that a moral virtue prohibits such action.

From option 5a:

0.1 % are Muslim

50% of them are female

10% of female Muslims actually wear the burka or hijab (hypothetical, remember that young girls don't wear it either)

50% of the female Muslims who wear it really hate it.

= 0.0025% of the population will not be allowed to wear the burka in public who wants to wear it, but they can wear it at home and in the Mosque (and maybe to and from the Mosque?)

For every female who cannot wear the burka in public who wants to, an estimate 38,000 people oppose its use in option 5a. Before you discount the legitimacy of the disutility experienced by the 38,000 (as was my initial reaction), consider the possibility that (as far as I know) utilitarianism grants stupid bigots equal standing with other people who experience disutility. I might not agree with the motives for their disutility, but they experience it and I have not been elected to a position to cure the 95% majority of the population of their irrational thinking. Likewise, they can't ignore my disutility when I experience it.

I think the utilitarian case would at least accept 5a, although I am not aware of any political issue that obtains 95% agreement, so it is purely fictional.

I think that in France, the issue should have been reframed. An alternative proposal could have been to restate existing laws and remind the public that nobody can harm a person for violating a religious doctrine that is not a violation of the law. The only recourse for violations of religious law would be loss of membership in a church. In other words, if the French people are saying that the burka oppresses rights of the women who are forced to wear it, then they could instruct the police to arrest the husband for punishing his wife who failed to wear the burka. If somebody want's to wear the burka, they can do it. If a girl goes away to school and her dad visits the college and punches her teeth out for not wearing the burka, then existing laws should handle the matter. I'm not sure about alternatives to making laws prohibiting the hijab for school girls.

95% of the population obviously doesn't care that you think religious discrimination is bad.

Religious discrimination isn't bad because people think it is. Non-Muslims would be slightly happier if they weren't upset by Muslims, and the Muslims would be significantly happier.

For every female who cannot wear the burka in public who wants to, an estimate 38,000 people oppose its use in option 5a.

They have nothing against the burqa. They just don't like Muslims. Hurting Muslims might cause them a small amount of utility in the sort-term, but it will make them tend to dislike Muslims more, causing them grief in the long run.

Or maybe it's an attempt to make Mulims less fundamentalist, as having women wear burqas more often correlates with treating women badly. I doubt this would work.

DanielLC wrote:Religious discrimination isn't bad because people think it is. Non-Muslims would be slightly happier if they weren't upset by Muslims, and the Muslims would be significantly happier.

It is by definition that somebody who is less upset is happier. Perhaps what you wanted to suggest is that not banning the burka would make the 95% of the population in example 5a discard their prejudice. I would suggest a variation that countries could work toward reducing all kinds of prejudice before they get to the point where many countries are today.

DanielLC wrote:They have nothing against the burqa. They just don't like Muslims. Hurting Muslims might cause them a small amount of utility in the sort-term, but it will make them tend to dislike Muslims more, causing them grief in the long run.

Your point here about people not directly opposing the burka but merely using that in response to their hatred of Muslims is probably correct, but I'm not sure that we should count that only as a small amount of positive utility experienced by the ignorant masses in response to their jab at a religious minority. Perhaps we should also count their relief of disutility that would arise upon removal of their emotional distress that occurs when they see people who are (unjustly) perceived as bad. Our approach toward analyzing question #5 seems to lead to many important questions.

I would frame a broader question: How should utilitarians count the utility of people whom they dislike or the utility of people who experience positive or negative states because of their ignorance? The answer might produce an outline of steps to take to ensure that we make full consideration of factors that our prejudices might otherwise lead us to ignore (in this case, our prejudices refer to our dislike of bigots that might lead us to overlook their situation). If ignorant bigots are the overwhelming majority in a society (from option 5a) and they experience high levels of emotional distress upon seeing religious minorities, an objective utilitarian can't simply discard that distress. If you want to discard that distress, then you would have to leave utilitarianism and adopting something like a human rights position or moral imperatives that would patently disallow religious discrimination of this kind.

Once again, I would suggest alternatives based on education. If I were king, that education would be infused with lots of analytic philosophy, meditation, a Buddhist-style cultivation of compassion, utilitarianism (even though I sometimes rely on moral imperatives), and a full reading of felicifia.org (and maybe some Battlestar Gallactica videos )!

If ignorant bigots are the overwhelming majority in a society (from option 5a) and they experience high levels of emotional distress upon seeing religious minorities, an objective utilitarian can't simply discard that distress. If you want to discard that distress, then you would have to leave utilitarianism and adopting something like a human rights position or moral imperatives that would patently disallow religious discrimination of this kind.

Firstly, I should acknowledge some of your points
1. bigots do have preferences. To ignore those is to leave utilitarianism
2. Some would regard the comment about 'swelling of conflict, fear and discrimination' to be a post-hoc rationalisation, an application of rights ethics, or something otherwise utilitarianism. That's not an unfair accusation to make, but I'm willing to defend this comment to the hilt. I simply think that we can estimate the outcome of banning the burka by using principles of sociology.

> When you ban a person from expressing their identity, they will feel resentment. This will impair the wellbeing of oppressed individuals. Furthermore, it will worsen the country's sense of community. Community, by the way, is one of the great determinant's of a country's happiness.
> Extremist muslims know and associate with moderate muslims. When moderate muslims see their friends oppressed, they are radicalised
> People fear what is unfamiliar. If burkas remain in our society, then the misinformation surrounding them will decrease. People don't, by and large, use burkas to hide bombs. They use burkas to express an aspect of their culture.

I think that these arguments are utilitarian, even if they have parallels that are rights based. You seem to think that there is a strong argument for the banning of burkas that is of the format "X% of people want burkas banned in Y country". I think that this argument is weak. Rather, I think that this is not even the strongest argument for the banning of the burka. Rather than being democratic, I think the strongest argument for the banning of the burka is also sociological. This argument states that burkas should be banned because they allow the oppression of muslim women by muslim men. Interestingly, this argument gets more powerful the more prevalent extremist Islam is.

I hope that helps clarify my position, and I daresay it might even challenge you to rethink your own! :p

RyanCarey wrote:I think that these arguments are utilitarian, even if they have parallels that are rights based.

That argument might be part of a utilitarian argument, but question #5 asks if banning the burka would by morally justified not if it would be the optimal choice. Maybe the "morally justified" part causes and additional challenges for utilitarians. Would you say that something that is not utilitarian optimal is not morally justified? Does utilitarianism even allow for the phrase "morally justifiable" or "morally unjustifiable?"

If 95% a populace wants to do something stupid, like legalize "sticking your hand in the fire," and they have a strong emotional need to do the stupid thing, should utilitarians allow them to do it to reduce their negative utility or should utilitarians act as parents and prevent the populace from their stupidity? The question relative to RyanCarey's comment might be this: should utilitarians allow the stupid masses to fulfill their will and thereby reduce their disutility related to seeing people wear burkas and at the same time allow them to accept the high risk of radicalism or terrorism in response to the proposed law?

Resolution requires clarification of "greatest good" being evaluated from my point of view or from the point of view of the stupid massess. When I impose law based on my point of view in contradiction to the will of 95% of the masses, that makes me a dictator. I think the utilitarian position would be to evaluate the utility and disutility of the stupid masses at face value. I guess that is a libertarian-utilitarian idea. Is there literature on this topic from a utilitarian view? I like the idea of innundating Tea Party ideology with a libertarian-utilitarian ideology that grounds their thinking on evidence instead of allowing it to free-float on unexamined assertions about property rights.

(note that I allow myself to depart from the utilitarian position because I retain the freedom to act on rights-based or dictator ethics if I see fit. I'm now inclined to accept 5a despite my objections to religious discrimination and ignorance).

RyanCarey wrote:You seem to think that there is a strong argument for the banning of burkas that is of the format "X% of people want burkas banned in Y country".

I wrote the argument with all the percentages as an outsider's view of what a utilitarian woud do even though I did not accept the utilitarian conclusion when I started writing it. Later I started to see that it is undemocratic and (in the non-utilitarian part of my brain) immoral to ignore the will of 95% of the people because I don't like them. Their disutility is real and I can't ignore that. As of right now (subject to change) I am now inclined to accept 5a because rejecting it seems to force me to give a biased preference to one person's suffering to another persons suffering (is that a moral imperative forcing me to follow utilitarian rules? I say it is my commitment to truth that forces me to use the utilitarian view).

Would you say that something that is not utilitarian optimal is not morally justified?

Yes. You can't justify taking option A if option B is better.

If 95% a populace wants to do something stupid, like legalize "sticking your hand in the fire," and they have a strong emotional need to do the stupid thing, should utilitarians allow them to do it to reduce their negative utility or should utilitarians act as parents and prevent the populace from their stupidity?

Which ever one results in higher utility. I can't really see why an option would be stupid if it increases your net utility. That's the whole point of doing anything. As such, keep them from being stupid.

I think the utilitarian position would be to evaluate the utility and disutility of the stupid masses at face value.

I agree. The problem is when you start accepting their opinions on what increases their utility. You should consider them as evidence of what does, but nothing more.

Arepo:
I think something like "One should pursue one's ultimate aims." could be an example of a trivial "normative fact".

I disagree. One's ultimate aims could be bad. For example, if my ultimate aim was to increase misery, I shouldn't pursue it.

It's a big and complex question of course. I'd say that it's only bad relative to your current aims. Relative to the aims of your counterfactual evil self it would be good.