This might be interesting:
http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/5f ... alism_faq/

(I've cross-posted my comment)

Fairly good summary. I don't mind the FAQ structure. The writing style is good, and the subject matter suggests obvious potential to contribute to the upcoming [Wiki Felicifia](viewtopic.php?f=7&t=375) in some way. Now as good as the essay is, I have some specific feedback:

In section 2.2, I wonder if you could at put your point more strongly...

you wrote: if morality is just some kind of metaphysical rule, the magic powers of the Heartstone should be sufficient to cancel that rule and make morality irrelevant. But the Heartstone, for all its legendary powers, is utterly worthless and in fact totally indistinguishable, by any possible or conceivable experiment, from a fake...

I would suggest: Metaphysical rules are like a kind of heartstone that one can wear when they make moral decisions. It is reputed to rule our moral considerations. But despite its reputation, the heartstone is utterly worthless and..."

If you're going to use a metaphor, you might as well get full value from it!

2.61: I understand the point you're making here. I couldn't agree with it more. Still, if you're trying to reduce the amount of words in the way between the reader and the later sections - as you should be - then this section is one you could consider abbreviating or removing. The whole phlogiston analogy is not obvious to a layperson.

Your line of thought seems to get somewhat deraied at 3.5. I don't quite understand why 'signalling' fits in 'assigning value to other people'.

4 is extremely good. The trolley discussions are reminiscent of Peter Unger's Living High and Letting Die. It's a shame it takes so long to get there.

5.3 misses the point. Firstly, the opium analogy misleading at best. Being drugged with opium would not be desirable from a classical utilitarian point of view. This kind of interference in one's life could be traumatising, it could derail one's work life, it could promote addictive behaviours and so on. The writer seems to think that the distinction between classical and preference utilitarianism is not about low and high pleasures. It's not. Classical utilitarians can believe in high, sophisticated pleasures. The main point of difference is that they require pleasure to be conscious. If something falls outside of a person's experience, it's none of their business, to a clasical utilitarian. I can only devise a crude example at the moment, so it'll have to do: Suppose that a man sexually admires a woman. 1. She is oblivious. 2. She would prefer this not to occur. A preference utilitarian says that this is wrong, because her preference is violated. A classical utilitarian sees nothing wrong, as she does not experience any suffering.

5.31 is tricky considering you say you're aiming for a naive audience. I don't understand Desire Utilitarianism either. And I'm not convinced that anyone truly does. Y couldn't be blamed for omitting this section, considering the strength of your others.

6 is good.

There is a corrolory to 8.2 that political effort may be a waste of time to a utilitarian.

8.4 You could correct "a almost militant approach" to "an almost militant approach", but I'd go further! Really, do you think it's going to be constructive, to call GWWC 'almost militant'? I think Toby Ord does some of the most important possible work there! Just describe what he does, and let your readers decide whether or not they like it IMO.