It was requested that I attempt to define right and wrong in naturalistic (and non-circular) terms, so here goes.

To start off, I think we should define happiness. I attempted this at richarddawkins.net a couple years ago, and someone here alerted me to this forum after seeing that particular thread. Here's that:
http://richarddawkins.net/forum/viewtop ... 555#p27555

I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole, and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve. However, the particular sort of happiness that is closest to human happiness occurs when the entity has the capacity to learn, since "true" happiness might be considered to be the process of reinforcing successful decision paths (and our internal perception thereof). Since a simple thermostat doesn't learn from experience, there is no actual mechanism of reinforcement. Still there is a strong conceptual parallel, and there is a good reason someone might say "the thermostat is happy when the temperature is 70 degrees". The thermostat has a goal, and the goal has been achieved, a.k.a. it is happy.

(if you want to talk about the "qualia" of happiness -- i.e. the internal, subjective experience -- I can go into detail about that as well....but I'll save that for a future post)

Ok, with that out of the way.....the concept of right and wrong, to me, comes down to altruism -- having your motivations take into account the happiness of others -- especially within the bounds of social contracts. Social contracts are those implicit agreements that are in everyone's individual self interest to try to encourage others to adhere to.

That is, if you act in ways that others want you to act (i.e. ways that make others happy), you are doing the "right" thing. Killing others because you get a kick out of killing people would be "wrong". Stealing from others would be wrong. Lying is (generally) wrong. All of those harm others, and it is in people's self interest to discourage their peers from doing such things by labelling such actions as "wrong" and punishing people for doing them (even if punishment is something like choosing not to be altruistic toward that person... e.g. "you lied to me, so I am less likely to invite you to dinner").

There are things that are altrustic, but are not considered "wrong" to not do. For instance, giving your property or money to those less fortunate than you might be seen as "more right" than keeping it all for yourself, but most people would not consider it "wrong" to keep your own property. Our implicit social contracts do not (generally) expect altruism to such a degree, being rather unrealistic. In other words, it may not be in one's self interest to encourage that level of altruism in others, because the difficulty of successfully doing so might outweigh the potential benefits. Still, the more altrustic an act, the more "right" it is (right and wrong being a continuum).

I think there is a tendency of people to overthink this stuff and try to find exceptions, but sometimes I think those people just like to hear themselves talk. Essentially the "golden rule" tries to summarize this concept, although it does so rather crudely.

I would also say that religion tends to agree with this general concept of right and wrong. Many people think that what is "right" is what god wants us to do, and luckily, in most cases those things align pretty well with the golden rule concept above. However, it lends itself to distortion, such as when you think the diety doesn't want you to work on sunday or eat cloven footed animals. The more "universal" sense of right and wrong, though, is tied closely to altruism, and "what others want you to do".

Another place where ambiguity results is when one party doesn't want you to do things, even though doing so doesn't cause them (or anyone else) tangible harm. For instance, people having sex with those of the same sex might be against the wishes of others, and therefore could be considered "wrong" in that sense. However, since doing so does not actually cause tangible harm to those other people, some people (including myself) consider than an invalid expectation, so it is not wrong.

And by the way, I consider "right" to be essentially synonymous with "moral" and "ethical". There are subtleties in the differences in meaning, of course, just as there are differences in meaning between "happiness" and "pleasure", but concentrating on these differences is (in my opinion) splitting hairs and is likely to result in missing the point.

Hi Rob, interesting post. I could either just reply with my own take or question your points here. I will do the latter first ,you can tell me if I/we are better off writing my equivalent as well. This is not mean to be a fisk of your post but is obviously critical and questioning within the space of constructive debate and the principle of charity (i.e. I am not deliberately misunderstanding you, if that is what occurs to you).

rob wrote:It was requested that I attempt to define right and wrong in naturalistic (and non-circular) terms, so here goes.

We are in agreement that this can be done

rob wrote:To start off, I think we should define happiness.

Is this of the Bentham or Mills variety?

rob wrote:I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole, and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

rob wrote: However, the particular sort of happiness that is closest to human happiness occurs when the entity has the capacity to learn, since "true" happiness might be considered to be the process of reinforcing successful decision paths (and our internal perception thereof).

How is success determined and happiness reinforced. These are key questions that imply happiness is only part of the process surely?

rob wrote: Since a simple thermostat doesn't learn from experience, there is no actual mechanism of reinforcement. Still there is a strong conceptual parallel, and there is a good reason someone might say "the thermostat is happy when the temperature is 70 degrees". The thermostat has a goal, and the goal has been achieved, a.k.a. it is happy.

I agree you can state this as having a goal, a goal derived by people who already have the capacity to be happy amongst other capacities. So it is a derivative goal one could say and one fulfilled when it reaches the right temperature, determined by the relevant persons.

rob wrote:(if you want to talk about the "qualia" of happiness -- i.e. the internal, subjective experience -- I can go into detail about that as well....but I'll save that for a future post)

I think this irrelevant to the task at hand. That is the thermostat not having qualia is irrelevant to my points above

rob wrote:Ok, with that out of the way.....the concept of right and wrong, to me, comes down to altruism -- having your motivations take into account the happiness of others -- especially within the bounds of social contracts. Social contracts are those implicit agreements that are in everyone's individual self interest to try to encourage others to adhere to.

First how do motivations work? Second no-one has ever signed up to such a social contract, true it is a popular analogy but why posit this as well, why not just say "your motivations take into account the happiness of others... [these] are things that are in everyone's individual self interest to try and encourage others to adhere to". I fail to see how adding social contracts disambiguates this. Third what do you mean by "self interest". How does interest work (how does it relate to motives?) and by "self interest" do you mean 'interests of the self' or 'interests in the self'? (The former includes the latter). Self interest as popularly understood (the latter version) conflicts with altruism, so I presume you mean the former version - interests of the self - including the happiness of others i.e. altruism, in which case why state "everyone's individual self interest" rather than "everyone's individual interest" or even "everyone's interest"?

rob wrote:That is, if you act in ways that others want you to act (i.e. ways that make others happy), you are doing the "right" thing. Killing others because you get a kick out of killing people would be "wrong". Stealing from others would be wrong. Lying is (generally) wrong.

So rights = what makes others happy (is this only relevant when you might be unhappy)? And wrong= what makes other unhappy. Hmm...

rob wrote: All of those harm others, and it is in people's self interest to discourage their peers from doing such things by labelling such actions as "wrong" and punishing people for doing them (even if punishment is something like choosing not to be altruistic toward that person... e.g. "you lied to me, so I am less likely to invite you to dinner").

I agree moral wrong is primarily associated with harming others, certainly for most discussions over morality that concerns most people. However harm is a value-laden term so you cannot use harm as the basis for determining what makes people unhappy - without circularity. Surely this is a restatement of wrong not the basis of it, that is harm=wrong = makes people unhappy?

rob wrote:There are things that are altrustic, but are not considered "wrong" to not do. For instance, giving your property or money to those less fortunate than you might be seen as "more right" than keeping it all for yourself, but most people would not consider it "wrong" to keep your own property. Our implicit social contracts do not (generally) expect altruism to such a degree, being rather unrealistic. In other words, it may not be in one's self interest to encourage that level of altruism in others, because the difficulty of successfully doing so might outweigh the potential benefits. Still, the more altrustic an act, the more "right" it is (right and wrong being a continuum).

Right and wrong are scalar not binary. I agree. Lets leave the rest of this for now but note that how does one determine what is "unrealistic"?

rob wrote:I think there is a tendency of people to overthink this stuff and try to find exceptions, but sometimes I think those people just like to hear themselves talk. Essentially the "golden rule" tries to summarize this concept, although it does so rather crudely.

Agreed

rob wrote:I would also say that religion tends to agree with this general concept of right and wrong. Many people think that what is "right" is what god wants us to do, and luckily, in most cases those things align pretty well with the golden rule concept above. However, it lends itself to distortion, such as when you think the diety doesn't want you to work on sunday or eat cloven footed animals. The more "universal" sense of right and wrong, though, is tied closely to altruism, and "what others want you to do".

I disagree, most popular conceptions (unlike theologians that not even their co-religionists follow) are about making god happy not others. These may coincide to some degree but when there is a clash between making god happy and others happy, in both xianity and islam god wins (interestingly in judaism it is supposedly the other way around - I do say supposedly - but at least that is stated there and is absent from xianity and islam)

rob wrote:Another place where ambiguity results is when one party doesn't want you to do things, even though doing so doesn't cause them (or anyone else) tangible harm. For instance, people having sex with those of the same sex might be against the wishes of others, and therefore could be considered "wrong" in that sense. However, since doing so does not actually cause tangible harm to those other people, some people (including myself) consider than an invalid expectation, so it is not wrong.

Now you are I think struggling over your own definitions - what is "tangible harm"? Why not just be consistent? Why is it only and always just tangible harm not any other harm? How does this relate to intangible happiness, is this ignored? How can you determine this?

rob wrote:And by the way, I consider "right" to be essentially synonymous with "moral" and "ethical". There are subtleties in the differences in meaning, of course, just as there are differences in meaning between "happiness" and "pleasure", but concentrating on these differences is (in my opinion) splitting hairs and is likely to result in missing the point.

So where does good and bad fit in? And surely there are many things that are right and wrong that are clearly not moral? e.g. answering a question right in math class etc.

Hi Rob, I was the person who PMd you on RDForum (under the pseudonym theduffman). I hope we can create at felicifia.org a forum where utilitarians are always welcome without excluding non-utilitarians and non-utilitarian discussion.

Now while I value the discussion of this thread, I don’t think it overlaps or intrudes on the territory of that Brights project at all. If I can explain, the Brights are looking to document the origins of a sense of right conduct. They are looking to explore how motives, intentions, and/or actions. We, on the other hand, are discussing what conduct is right. To put it another way, it is like they are studying why people become hungry and we are contending that salt and vinegar chips are tastiest.

NB. Don’t read in to that analogy too much. I’m no moral subjectivist.

On topic, I’m a utilitarian. I think that we should do what is best for people. Does that mean maximising pleasure, happiness, fulfilment, wellbeing, or preference satisfaction? I agree that this can become a game of semantics, emphasis and hair-splitting. But two points: Firstly, I think that utility occurs at a high-cognitive level. For example, if you enjoy some unusual sexual routine which involves physical pain but psychological wellness, I think that there’s probably positive utility there.

rob said:when one party doesn't want you to do things, even though doing so doesn't cause them (or anyone else) tangible harm.

Secondly, I think that utility must involve experience. I think that having gay sex is not wrong on the basis of it violating the preferences of conservative Christians unless they know that you’re doing it. When you start to let them know that you are having gay sex, there can be negative utility.

To respond to two particular issues:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole,
and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

Faithlessgod, I protest! Rob makes a good point. We don't - or at least I don't - know what causes happiness in a human brain, let alone know whether similar happiness might be possible in an animal, a robot, a plant, or even a magnet. You can only experience directly the emotion that is your own. With respect to other people and animals, we observe that they must be happy because they behave appropriately to their emotion. How would a magnet behave if it were happy? Who knows! Might each atom in the universe increase entropy, leading us towards a big freeze because this is what makes it happy?

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:However, the particular sort of happiness that is closest to human happiness occurs when the entity has the capacity to learn, since
"true" happiness might be considered to be the process of reinforcing successful decision paths (and our internal perception thereof).

How is success determined and happiness reinforced. These are key questions that imply happiness is only part of the process surely?

Well happiness is pretty integral to incentive and motivation, clearly. It is no coincidence that those evolutionary imperatives, food and sex, are pleasurable.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:To start off, I think we should define happiness.

Is this of the Bentham or Mills variety?

You tell me. I think if they need to differentiate, they are probably missing the point.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole, and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

Well, it is an important enough analogy that probably everything I have to say from here on won't be understood if we can't agree on that one.

Let me ask this: do you consider the word "attract" is an anthropomorphism when applied to magnets? When I am attracted to someone or something, being in proximity to that thing makes me happy. Why do we use the same word to describe magnets?

I am a programmer, and such anthropomorphisms are used all the time, and are immensely useful. No one ever has asked "do you really mean the program is 'happy' when the hash tables are balanced?" They understand what is meant, for good reason.

It sounds like you have defined the word happiness so it can only apply to biological entities, which to me, is simply going to be a barrier to understanding the underlying concept. (it reminds me of the question of why an airplane can fly but a submarine can't swim)

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:(if you want to talk about the "qualia" of happiness -- i.e. the internal, subjective experience -- I can go into detail about that as well....but I'll save that for a future post)

I think this irrelevant to the task at hand. That is the thermostat not having qualia is irrelevant to my points above

Then why is it an "anthropomorphism"? What is it that humans have that mechanical objects such as thermostats don't?

(note that I *did* mention something with a more sophisticated sort of happiness, a learning robot or computer program)

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:Ok, with that out of the way.....the concept of right and wrong, to me, comes down to altruism -- having your motivations take into account the happiness of others -- especially within the bounds of social contracts. Social contracts are those implicit agreements that are in everyone's individual self interest to try to encourage others to adhere to.

First how do motivations work?

I think if you consider the analogies, your question about motivations would be obvious. A thermostat is motivated to make the temperature match that which is set. An ameoba is motivated to gobble up nutrients. We are motivated to do things which, in general, are in our Darwinian interest to do (i.e. get genes into future generations).

faithlessgod wrote:Now you are I think struggling over your own definitions - what is "tangible harm"? Why not just be consistent? Why is it only and always just tangible harm not any other harm? How does this relate to intangible happiness, is this ignored? How can you determine this?

Let me explain my use of "tangible". Eating a tasty hamburger is in my "tangible self interest", as it satisfies a basic Darwinian motivation to put nutrients in my body. Buying a tasty hamburger for a friend is somewhat less tangible, but it can be said to be in my self interest in the sense that it is a favor that is likely to be repaid (having friends who like me is probably in my Darwinian interest as well). Buying a hamburger for a hungry homeless person while my friends are watching is somewhat less tangible still, but still may be in my Darwinian interest (having friends think I'm a nice guy is a good thing). Buying a hamburger for a homeless person when no one is watching is the least tangible....it satisfies my internal desire to make others (tangibly) happy, but in other senses does not benefit me, that is, it is intangible.

It is a continuum, and I use the word "tangible" to avoid the trap where (overly pedantic) people might say something like "donating to charity is a selfish act if it makes you happy to do so". Maybe true, but now you've redefined "selfish" so it isn't useful anymore.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:And by the way, I consider "right" to be essentially synonymous with "moral" and "ethical". There are subtleties in the differences in meaning, of course, just as there are differences in meaning between "happiness" and "pleasure", but concentrating on these differences is (in my opinion) splitting hairs and is likely to result in missing the point.

So where does good and bad fit in? And surely there are many things that are right and wrong that are clearly not moral? e.g. answering a question right in math class etc.

You are mixing meanings of "right". There is self-interested "right" ("it was the right decision to buy google stock when it was low" or "it was the right decision to kill the witness before he identified us") vs. ethically right ("stopping to help the injured pedestrian was the right thing to do")

Sorry I didn't address everything that you said, I have to get to work.

RyanCarey wrote:Now while I value the discussion of this thread, I don’t think it overlaps or intrudes on the territory of that Brights project at all. If I can explain, the Brights are looking to document the origins of a sense of right conduct. They are looking to explore how motives, intentions, and/or actions. We, on the other hand, are discussing what conduct is right. To put it another way, it is like they are studying why people become hungry and we are contending that salt and vinegar chips are tastiest.

Well I find the previous problem more interesting...understanding the scientific basis. I'm not at all impressed with the Brights' attempt to do this though. I see no reason to be concerned if we are intruding on their territory either!

RyanCarey wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole,
and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

Faithlessgod, I protest! Rob makes a good point. We don't - or at least I don't - now what causes happiness in a human brain, let alone know whether similar happiness might be possible in an animal, a robot, a plant, or even a magnet. You can only experience directly the emotion that is your own. With respect to other people and animals, we observe that they must be happy because they behave appropriately to their emotion. How would a magnet behave if it were happy? Who knows! Might each atom in the universe increase entropy, leading us towards a big freeze because this is what makes it happy?

(thanks for the support, Ryan )

You are talking about qualia, and I don't think it is necessary for discussing the core concept of happiness, which is the achievement of goals. Just as there is an internal sensation of detecting light in the 625–740nm wavelengths ("redness"), there is an internal sensation of experiencing goal achievement ("happiness"). A camera can detect light of those wavelengths, and a learning robot (and, in a sense, a thermostat) can detect goal achievement....whether and how we or they "experience" it per se is fairly irrelevant to defining the concept, in my opinion.

I believe understanding the stuff requires separating out the hard to understand (qualia) from the easy to understand (ability of the brain to detect goal achievement and to reinforce behaviour leading to it). Mixing them together contributes to confusion. (just as you aren't going to get far trying to understand color perception if you get too hung up on "yeah, but why doesn't red look green and green look red?")

RyanCarey wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:However, the particular sort of happiness that is closest to human happiness occurs when the entity has the capacity to learn, since
"true" happiness might be considered to be the process of reinforcing successful decision paths (and our internal perception thereof).

How is success determined and happiness reinforced. These are key questions that imply happiness is only part of the process surely?

Well happiness is clearly pretty integral to incentive and motivation, clearly. It is no coincidence that those evolutionary imperatives, food and sex, are pleasurable.

Well said.

Hi Ryan

This thread is IMHO not related to the Brights thread. But you end up making the point of my main issue with the Brights. "document[ing] the origins of a sense of right conduct" is not the same as morality. "They are looking to explore how motives, intentions, and/or actions [work]" yes and that also is not morality. This point is made also by there being a clash between their two definitions - it is bad philosophy and no scientifically justifiable. Now I disagree that "it is like they are studying why people become hungry and we are contending that salt and vinegar chips are tastiest. ". In particular in this thread we are discussing the former!!
[edit] I am putting this above part of my reply into the Brights thread for it to be pursued there if anyone is interested[/edit]

This thread could only be about our differing utility models. We are exploring and understand how each others conceptions and how they could work and so,

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole,
and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

Faithlessgod, I protest! Rob makes a good point. We don't - or at least I don't - now what causes happiness in a human brain, let alone know whether similar happiness might be possible in an animal, a robot, a plant, or even a magnet. You can only experience directly the emotion that is your own. With respect to other people and animals, we observe that they must be happy because they behave appropriately to their emotion. How would a magnet behave if it were happy? Who knows! Might each atom in the universe increase entropy, leading us towards a big freeze because this is what makes it happy?

All I see is that use of the term "happiness" here is simply to define all meaning out of the term - so why use it at all? Specifically happiness does have a psychological, affective aspect - however it works and regardless of how we currently understand it - by removing that you have created an empty unfalsfiable tool -anything can be trivially mapped this way with such a broad conception, however you cannot then switch to a narrower more substantive version on the pain of equivocation. You have made it so general as to be explantorily useless as you cannot draw any conclusions!

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:However, the particular sort of happiness that is closest to human happiness occurs when the entity has the capacity to learn, since
"true" happiness might be considered to be the process of reinforcing successful decision paths (and our internal perception thereof).

How is success determined and happiness reinforced. These are key questions that imply happiness is only part of the process surely?

Well happiness is pretty integral to incentive and motivation, clearly. It is no coincidence that those evolutionary imperatives, food and sex, are pleasurable.

Aha! The equivocation!!!

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:
I have also used analogies of happiness on non-biological objects, for instance, two magnets are "happy" when placed north pole to south pole, and a thermostat is "happy" when the temperature of the room is close to the temperature the thermostat is set to try to achieve.

This is an over-extension and anthropomorphisation of this term. Happiness is a psychological and brain state. I see no analogy here.

Well, it is an important enough analogy that probably everything I have to say from here on won't be understood if we can't agree on that one.

This is a crucial disagreement. Now apart from point made in my previous reply - basically this is a hasty generalisation, there is another error equally as important in approaching it this way.

A thermostat is a means to an end. It can have, if you will, instrumental value - the final value being determined by whoever wants the room at a certain temperature. I think you are trying to make an argument that happiness is the only final value, yet here your example is of "happiness" as an instrumental value. It is another form of equivocation and a non sequitur to argue for happiness-as-means therefore happiness-as-ends.

rob wrote:Let me ask this: do you consider the word "attract" is an anthropomorphism when applied to magnets? When I am attracted to someone or something, being in proximity to that thing makes me happy. Why do we use the same word to describe magnets?

I am a programmer, and such anthropomorphisms are used all the time, and are immensely useful. No one ever has asked "do you really mean the program is 'happy' when the hash tables are balanced?" They understand what is meant, for good reason.

I too am a programmer. We anthropmorphise all the time and there is nothing wrong with that, provided we do not over extend these useful cross-domain metaphorical mappings which is exactly what you are doing here.

rob wrote:It sounds like you have defined the word happiness so it can only apply to biological entities, which to me, is simply going to be a barrier to understanding the underlying concept. (it reminds me of the question of why an airplane can fly but a submarine can't swim)

Well if you want such a broad concept of happiness I cannot see how you can use it in any of the narrower forms required to create a naturalistic theory.If you keep it this broad then it says nothing of any use at all.

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:(if you want to talk about the "qualia" of happiness -- i.e. the internal, subjective experience -- I can go into detail about that as well....but I'll save that for a future post)

I think this irrelevant to the task at hand. That is the thermostat not having qualia is irrelevant to my points above

Then why is it an "anthropomorphism"? What is it that humans have that mechanical objects such as thermostats don't?

Who said qualia is an anthropomorphism? What has any of this to do with what we are talking about?

rob wrote:I think if you consider the analogies, your question about motivations would be obvious. A thermostat is motivated to make the temperature match that which is set. An ameoba is motivated to gobble up nutrients. We are motivated to do things which, in general, are in our Darwinian interest to do (i.e. get genes into future generations).

The motive is external to the thermostat. Motives invented, built, installed and use the thermostat - none are internal to it. I take stereotypical motives as being about ends, these are all external to the thermostat, for which it is only a means. Whatever you are saying is not obvious

rob wrote:It is a continuum, and I use the word "tangible" to avoid the trap where (overly pedantic) people might say something like "donating to charity is a selfish act if it makes you happy to do so". Maybe true, but now you've redefined "selfish" so it isn't useful anymore.

Ahem, that is my point. So you agree that self interest means "interests of the self" and not "interests in the self" then?

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:And by the way, I consider "right" to be essentially synonymous with "moral" and "ethical". There are subtleties in the differences in meaning, of course, just as there are differences in meaning between "happiness" and "pleasure", but concentrating on these differences is (in my opinion) splitting hairs and is likely to result in missing the point.

So where does good and bad fit in? And surely there are many things that are right and wrong that are clearly not moral? e.g. answering a question right in math class etc.

You are mixing meanings of "right". There is self-interested "right" ("it was the right decision to buy google stock when it was low" or "it was the right decision to kill the witness before he identified us") vs. ethically right ("stopping to help the injured pedestrian was the right thing to do")

Ahem, you are also making point again! So you agree that right is not synonymous with moral. One needs a qualifier to determine which it is, otherwise the default is either generic right or clear from the context (what the implicit qualifier is). Self-interest right is another species of generic right

rob wrote:Sorry I didn't address everything that you said, I have to get to work.

Ditto - good conversation IMHO compared to many other forums though

faithlessgod wrote:Ahem, you are also making point again! So you agree that right is not synonymous with moral. One needs a qualifier to determine which it is, otherwise the default is either generic right or clear from the context (what the implicit qualifier is). Self-interest right is another species of generic right

faithlessgod, qualifiers aren't the answer to everything! On such a utilitarian forum as this, 'right' means morally right, not factually correct. That's obvious... right?

faithlessgod wrote:The motive is external to the thermostat. Motives invented, built, installed and use the thermostat - none are internal to it. I take stereotypical motives as being about ends, these are all external to the thermostat, for which it is only a means.

Such an assertion could be made about a child or a cat. We surely must consider the evidence. We have reasons to believe that cats and children have feelings because their brains are similar to ours and because they behave in a way that would be consistent with them being emotional creatures. When we move along to fish, or anencephalic (those short-lived people born with a brain-stem but no brain), it becomes less clear.

But regarding the similarity of brains, if you go down far enough, we're all made of the same stuff. The one thing we know for sure, surely, is that we don't really know anything for sure.

Because, as far as explanations I've recieved are concerned, we don't know exactly how consciousness emerges in the brain. We don't even know if emergent properties are a reasonable thing to accept in the first place. If we assume reductionism, it isn't only plausible that magnets can feel. It's necessary. Because if the particles of a brain can feel, those particles that we share with magnets might reasonably assumed to be able to feel when they're constituting magnets too. And if magnets could feel, there would be know way to know because magnets haven't evolved to communicate. These particles can't marshall coordinated action.

NB. I am not actually convinced that magnets can feel, but I feel that the case might as well be put strongly.

RyanCarey wrote:Because, as far as explanations I've recieved are concerned, we don't know exactly how consciousness emerges in the brain. We don't even know if emergent properties are a reasonable thing to accept in the first place. If we assume reductionism, it isn't only plausible that magnets can feel. It's necessary.

I know you're putting it strongly, but this seems like overkill. If we assume reductionism, it's still quite possible (I want to say probable, though I can't justify it) that in practice feeling requires a minimal amount of complexity c, such that c is roughly equivalent to the brain of a small animal. Ie. feelings might - in practice - only occur in entities that are physically capable of communicating them.

The trouble with postulating feelings in something that can't communicate them is a) it's completely unfalsifiable and b) where do we stop? If you believe that tendency towards a state = happiness when in that state, then we should all be seeking to raise entropy in any way we can - so as utilitarians, we'd have to keep our houses as untidy as possible (to give a very mild example of the massive implications it would have), for example.

But while we're making unfalsifiable suggestions about these things, why not reverse the question? Why should a magnet feel 'happy' because it's in close proximity to another magnet? Since they have so little control over their behaviour, maybe magnets actually crave isolation and are cursed to forever act against their own desires.

We can only act on what we have good reason to believe is true, not on countless things that might be.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:Then why is it an "anthropomorphism"? What is it that humans have that mechanical objects such as thermostats don't?

Who said qualia is an anthropomorphism? What has any of this to do with what we are talking about?

I am simply trying to find out what you consider different about humans than mechanical objects. Qualia, that is, subjective feeling, being an obvious candidate. If it isn't qualia, what is it about "human happiness" that differentiates it from these other things?

You say "happiness is a brain state". So a thermostat or computer can't be "happy" because it doesn't have a brain, by your definition. Just like a submarine can't swim because we've defined "swim" in such a way that it excludes submarines, while we define "fly" so it includes planes. It is a meaningless distinction, though....simple semantics.

I am trying to bridge the gap between simple physical objects (magnets), to less simple objects (thermostats), to complex objects (a learning robot), to simple biology (an ameoba), to complex biology (a dog), to human. To understand happiness as a naturalistic thing, you have to build up its logical basis starting from the simplest going to the more complex. You seem unwilling to acknowledge the commonalities.

You didn't answer my question as to whether the term "attract" is an inappropriate anthropomorphism when applied to magnets. (btw, I assume you would agree a dog can be happy, right? so "anthro" might be out of place). I'd also like to ask, why do you think people intuitively understand what someone means when they say "the thermostat is happy when the temperature is 70 degrees"?

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:I think if you consider the analogies, your question about motivations would be obvious. A thermostat is motivated to make the temperature match that which is set. An ameoba is motivated to gobble up nutrients. We are motivated to do things which, in general, are in our Darwinian interest to do (i.e. get genes into future generations).

The motive is external to the thermostat. Motives invented, built, installed and use the thermostat - none are internal to it. I take stereotypical motives as being about ends, these are all external to the thermostat, for which it is only a means. Whatever you are saying is not obvious

The motive is not external, any more than is the motive for human actions is (i.e. natural selection is external, that's what put the motivations there, but it is irrelevant). The maker of the thermostat could be long dead, or who knows, the thermostat could have arisen by some sort of natural selection itself. How the thermostat got there is irrelevant.

I must admit I am confused, in that you say that there is a naturalistic definition of right and wrong, but you seem quite hung up on these artificial distinctions between humans and non-human (or non-biological) things.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:You are mixing meanings of "right". There is self-interested "right" ("it was the right decision to buy google stock when it was low" or "it was the right decision to kill the witness before he identified us") vs. ethically right ("stopping to help the injured pedestrian was the right thing to do")

Ahem, you are also making point again! So you agree that right is not synonymous with moral. One needs a qualifier to determine which it is, otherwise the default is either generic right or clear from the context (what the implicit qualifier is). Self-interest right is another species of generic right

No, as I said I think that "right" and "moral" are synonomous. Unless you pick a different meaning of "right". For instance, "right" also means the opposite of left, but that meaning would be, um....not right.

In both meanings here, though, "right" basically means beneficial behavior. Moral right is (essentially) that which benefits all. Selfish right is that which benefits oneself. I am talking about the former. In general I think it has been clear from context which one I mean, but I can try to say "moral right" whenever I think it may be misconstrued.

Arepo wrote:

RyanCarey wrote:Because, as far as explanations I've recieved are concerned, we don't know exactly how consciousness emerges in the brain. We don't even know if emergent properties are a reasonable thing to accept in the first place. If we assume reductionism, it isn't only plausible that magnets can feel. It's necessary.

I know you're putting it strongly, but this seems like overkill.
...
Why should a magnet feel 'happy' because it's in close proximity to another magnet? Since they have so little control over their behaviour, maybe magnets actually crave isolation and are cursed to forever act against their own desires.

We can only act on what we have good reason to believe is true, not on countless things that might be.

Your post is full of good points. You're right that I need to present reasons to believe a magnet can feel. I suppose I ask silly questions like 'can magnets feel' because I feel that our current understanding of human consciousness.

So... Decartes' outdated idea is that feelings and decisions are completely separate from neural circuitry: neural circuitry only carries the messages. We now instead believe that the feelings and the decisions exist in the neural circuitry. When we make a decision by weighing up various ideas, this is achieved by neurons amplifying various signals. When you decide to eat McDonalds, signals about hunger, taste and convenience are being amplified (to put it simply). It all operates according to physical laws.

There is no particular neuronal pathway in particular that would need to feel to do its job. There isn't any reason why the operation of a collection of neurons should feel like anything, really. Yet we can feel. So we have to accept that the operation of a collection of neurons can feel like something. We are then forced to consider: are there forks in neuronal pathways where a stimulus sends one path that causes an action and another that causes the feeling? If so, why on Earth have we evolved that pathway for feeling? Such a path would, evolutionary, be a waste of energy, surely! So there can only be one path. Or, more precisely, the pathways that can feel must act too. Feeling is somehow inherent in the neuronal pathways that cause behaviour. It is in those pathways that make us learn to do things, those that give us incentive to have sex, those that make us avoid hot things, cold things, pointy things. It is in those pathways that tell us when to sleep, it is in those that make us cry for social help.

So is it about the pathways or the behaviour? We need evidence. If all behaviour implied feeling, then why do we feel like distinct, seperate people? I suppose that's score one for Arepo. Also, if all behaviour implies feeling, why are we only conscious of part of what goes on in us? That might be a score two for Arepo... But it won't stop the issue from confusing me.

Arepo, what can I say mate we are in violent agreement!! You have already said what I would have wanted to respond, so I wont repeat this unnecessarily

Ryan

RyanCarey wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:Ahem, you are also making point again! So you agree that right is not synonymous with moral. One needs a qualifier to determine which it is, otherwise the default is either generic right or clear from the context (what the implicit qualifier is). Self-interest right is another species of generic right

faithlessgod, qualifiers aren't the answer to everything! On such a utilitarian forum as this, 'right' means morally right, not factually correct. That's obvious... right?

Humour aside, "correct" and "morally right" are both species of right. You seem to be defining away any meaningful problem of morality - or creating a redefinition of morality and so answering the wrong question - I note that this is a standard ploy of Randians and some egoists - dunno what you are A relevant exemplar being of problematic social interactions - where each party believes they are morally right. How is that even possible if I take your approach seriously?

Rob, I find it puzzling how close we are on the Brights thread yet differ so much here. As I have said qualia is irrelevant and is not required to apply moral reasoning and judgement. Moral agents can be human or machine so no issue there. However there is a minimum requirement to be a moral agent and you captured this very well in that other thread. Here you seem to be going awry...

Whilst I think Arepo already answered some of your points in addressing Ryan, I would say there is certain capacity required to be a moral agent which are malleable desires - desires that can be influenced by social forces. This could be a normal adult human or an intelligent agent as in BDI agents (belief-desire-intention theory). That is I don't agree that (human) happiness is the correct differentiator anyway and the differentiator is the capacity to have malleable desires including but not only the desire to be happy (which machines might lack but at no loss to being moral agents). Human happiness is an intrinsic feature of certain brains - those of humans!

You can redefine happiness - in the broad sense. Anyway I see no issue under suitable contexts of saying the submarines can indeed swim. Meanings are subjective - is Pluto a planet or not? - The physical object referred by "Pluto" remains unchanged either way. However you (and/or Ryan) are playing semantics by expanding the definition of happiness so much as define the meaning out of the term.

Bridging the gap we agree on, the difficulty you have in doing so with happiness highlights one of the issues with using happiness as a utility. Anyway it is simply not required to develop happiness as utility whilst going as far you, for some, reason feel the need to.

The commonalities in relation to desires are such posits as "proto-desires" - e.g. tropisms in amoebas but this are not malleable in a relevant way and "derived desires", if you will, what a thermostat does. Just because the inventor or owner is long gone is irrelevant , that is an argument from the genetic fallacy.

Attract is not an anthropomorphism now applied to agents. It is a useful metaphorical cross-domain mapping so it helps us understand this phenomenon but no-one reads magnetic attraction as equivalent or differing only in degrees to human attraction, they are instantiated by radically different physical systems and processes. Ditto for thermostats.

You also hastily generalize "motive" to the same confusing conclusion. Bear in mind I am an externalist - which only makes sense if there are not only internal motives some of which are lacking in moral agents - but you define away the possibility of having any meaningful discussion on this. Similarly one could say that a BDI agent lacks a desire and external influences or new programming - coming externally - could be used to internalize that desire. But that is what you do say in the Brights thread and I agree!

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:The motive is external to the thermostat. Motives invented, built, installed and use the thermostat - none are internal to it. I take stereotypical motives as being about ends, these are all external to the thermostat, for which it is only a means. Whatever you are saying is not obvious

The motive is not external, any more than is the motive for human actions is (i.e. natural selection is external, that's what put the motivations there, but it is irrelevant). The maker of the thermostat could be long dead, or who knows, the thermostat could have arisen by some sort of natural selection itself. How the thermostat got there is irrelevant.

You have completely failed to address the means-end or instrumental/final distinction. I am a subscriber to means-end rationality, which akes perfect sense (to me at least) as a programmer, what model of rationality are you using, if not this, the most popular and default one?

Hopefully you are no longer confused on where I am coming from, but one step at a time

rob wrote:In both meanings here, though, "right" basically means beneficial behavior. Moral right is (essentially) that which benefits all. Selfish right is that which benefits oneself. I am talking about the former. In general I think it has been clear from context which one I mean, but I can try to say "moral right" whenever I think it may be misconstrued.

I am always wary of equivocation over right. I think it wrong And please note I do not agree with your definition of right. Now I am not quibbling but FYI please note I define right and wrong actions in reference to good and bad desires. To use your terminology: generic right are actions that are the result of generic good desires - which basically means beneficial to the desire(s) in question. Moral right are actions that are the result of generic good desire - that which tends to benefit all desires.. Selfish right are actions that are the result of selfish desires - that which tends to benefit oneself. Of course I would state this slightly differently however this highlights that you have smuggled in a value-laden term that you need to adumbrate - "benefit".

All in all, even as we disagree I am finding the level and type of debate refreshing, after talking to so many tedious moral subjectivists and moral relativists of many ilks. We might not ever reach agreement but at least we can better understand the stronger and weaker arguments for our differing positions.

Honestly, faithlessgod, your overuse of jargon just makes me tired, so I'm not going to address all your points. That is why I typically don't stick around on boards like this for very long, it just sounds like people showing off how much they have read, while demonstrating their capacity for missing some obvious points that they might get if they step back a bit from it and use everyday terms.

Why don't you, in everyday terms, describe what morality is in a naturalistic way?

I have noticed you don't like it when I apply the concept of "happy" to machines. How about the words "satisfy" and "satisfaction"? Can a machine be satisfied if its goal is met? To me, happiness and satisfaction are synonymous, however the latter is more likely to be applied to non-biological things, without it seeming to even be an anthropomorphism.

You claim that qualia is not the issue here, but I see that as the biggest difference in connotation of the words happiness and satisfaction: satisfaction might be considered a "state of goal acheivement" while happiness might be a "state of goal acheivement, and its associated qualia". ("pleasure" might be even further in the direction of qualia) So if someone injects morphine into you without your consent, it can cause "happiness" (the qualia, i.e. pleasure) even though you have not really satisfied any of your goals....simply because the morphine short-circuited our brain's circuitry for detecting goal achievement. (of course, if they do it enough, it will probably create a brand new goal in your brain: "get more morphine") But in most cases, happiness and satisfaction are, to me, logically equivalent.

You do say you are ok with the term "attract". Well, I think you did. You said:

Attract is not an anthropomorphism now applied to agents. It is a useful metaphorical cross-domain mapping so it helps us understand this phenomenon but no-one reads magnetic attraction as equivalent or differing only in degrees to human attraction, they are instantiated by radically different physical systems and processes.

...and I made it about halfway through that paragraph before nodding off to sleep.

Seriously though....you say "no one" see those as differing in only degrees from human attraction, and on that you are wrong. I most certainly do, and I am someone, last I checked.

As I said, I wanted to start at the simple and go to the complex. What about an ameoba with a "tropism" toward food? It is more complex than a magnet, but less complex than a human. Same with the thermostat being "attracted" to a particular temperature. Same with a dog being attracted to its food bowl. Where do you draw the line?

I detect a lot of black and white thinking on your part. For instance, you say that happiness is a "psychological state". (while denying that this has anything to do with qualia) But you have never stated what makes a person able to have a psychological state while a machine can't. (can an amoeba? a fly? a dog?) Is there not a continuum?

rob wrote:Honestly, faithlessgod, your overuse of jargon just makes me tired, so I'm not going to address all your points. That is why I typically don't stick around on boards like this for very long, it just sounds like people showing off how much they have read, while demonstrating their capacity for missing some obvious points that they might get if they step back a bit from it and use everyday terms.

It would be a shame if you left over this. Since FG seems to agree with me, and I agree with Ryan, and Ryan seems to agree with you, I suspect the difference between you is more one of language than sentiment.

Quickfire forum posts don't seem to be conducive to discovering such things, though. If you feel up to it, maybe a semi-formal discussion over something you both agree is a sticking point would be helpful, along the lines of TR's. It could be a little less extreme than theirs. 500 words every 4 days or something, and you could agree in advance to ban any jargon besides pre-agreed terms

rob wrote:Honestly, faithlessgod, your overuse of jargon just makes me tired, so I'm not going to address all your points. That is why I typically don't stick around on boards like this for very long, it just sounds like people showing off how much they have read, while demonstrating their capacity for missing some obvious points that they might get if they step back a bit from it and use everyday terms.

Sorry to hear this, please don't go, your ideas have stimulated me even as we disagree. You can always ignore me and just debate with others, I won't mind, better that than for you to go. The only jargon I use I think was metaphorical cross-domain mapping, but I do not know a more succinct way to a say, maybe just metaphor?

rob wrote:Why don't you, in everyday terms, describe what morality is in a naturalistic way?

Fair enough. Note I do think we get to the crux of the matter at the bottom of this post, so please do not be put off by this, but you asked

[edit]
A simpler answer

Desires that tend to fulfil other desires are morally good. Desires that tend to thwart others desires are morally bad. MOrailty is about promoting good desires and demoting bad desires.

You can ignore this if you like:-
In one (a bit long) paragraph:
Value is the relation between desire and states of the world. Desire, states of the world and these relations all exist, all other claimed types of value appear to be fictions - they do not exist. When a desired state of world occurs, the desire is fulfilled - that is good. When a desired state of world is prevented, the desire is thwarted - that is bad. Moral value is about the desirability of malleable desires - desires that can be affected by social forces . If a desire tends to fulfil other desires (any and all such desires without exception that are effected and without bias) it is morally good, if a desire tends to thwart other desires (ditto) it is morally bad. Morality is about the promotion of good desires and the demotion of bad desires through social forces - praise, condemnation, reward and punishment. This is all based on what everyone does anyway, except currently it is often done incoherently and inconsistently - as many are confused over what to promote and demote by various ideologies etc. that use rhetoric, sophistry and so on to promote some bad desires and demote some good desires. Moral, good and bad are optional and useful shorthand terms nothing more, regardless it is still the case that desires that tend to fulfil or thwart other desires are acted upon (derivatively right and wrong actions) and this is the issue of morality we are talking about and need to deal with. In other words, apart from desires, the states of the world and their relations there are no additional moral facts.
[/edit]

Lets stop there

rob wrote:I have noticed you don't like it when I apply the concept of "happy" to machines. How about the words "satisfy" and "satisfaction"? Can a machine be satisfied if its goal is met? To me, happiness and satisfaction are synonymous, however the latter is more likely to be applied to non-biological things, without it seeming to even be an anthropomorphism.

I can grant that happiness and satisfy are synonymous. Satisfaction and fulfilment are critically, as used here, not. A desire can be fulfilled and one is not satisfied etc. They can diverge. Satisfaction (and frustration) refer to states of mind (or brain if you will) whereas fulfilment (and thwarting) refer to states of the world - as to whether they are true or not.

rob wrote:You claim that qualia is not the issue here, but I see that as the biggest difference in connotation of the words happiness and satisfaction: satisfaction might be considered a "state of goal acheivement" while happiness might be a "state of goal acheivement, and its associated qualia". ("pleasure" might be even further in the direction of qualia) So if someone injects morphine into you without your consent, it can cause "happiness" (the qualia, i.e. pleasure) even though you have not really satisfied any of your goals....simply because the morphine short-circuited our brain's circuitry for detecting goal achievement. (of course, if they do it enough, it will probably create a brand new goal in your brain: "get more morphine") But in most cases, happiness and satisfaction are, to me, logically equivalent.

I think here you are using satisfaction as I have been using fulfilment and happiness where I used satisfaction. Importantly it is not 'in most cases where they are "logically equivalent"' e.g. converge but where they diverge that needs to be understood. That is what I am emphasizing.

Attract is not an anthropomorphism now applied to agents. It is a useful metaphorical cross-domain mapping so it helps us understand this phenomenon but no-one reads magnetic attraction as equivalent or differing only in degrees to human attraction, they are instantiated by radically different physical systems and processes.

...and I made it about halfway through that paragraph before nodding off to sleep.

One term, similar idea, radically different underlying process?

rob wrote:Seriously though....you say "no one" see those as differing in only degrees from human attraction, and on that you are wrong. I most certainly do, and I am someone, last I checked.

Point noted, however I do not see how one can do this unless one ignores the empirical/material/physical differences. Now why would one do that?

rob wrote:As I said, I wanted to start at the simple and go to the complex. What about an ameoba with a "tropism" toward food? It is more complex than a magnet, but less complex than a human. Same with the thermostat being "attracted" to a particular temperature. Same with a dog being attracted to its food bowl. Where do you draw the line?

I see your argument yet am unconvinced. I think you are enamoured by the use of the term "attraction" above and beyond the call of duty You are relying on an abstraction of attraction to do this. The similarity is artificial although appealing and comprehensible as you have presented. I have already called a tropism a proto-desire. To extend this magnetic attraction becomes a pseudo-desire. IMHO It is a false analogy. Whereas the thermostat is a derived desire. These distinctions are interesting and you are taking me along path I had not considered before. These ideas are tentative answers. Thanks.

rob wrote:I detect a lot of black and white thinking on your part. For instance, you say that happiness is a "psychological state". (while denying that this has anything to do with qualia) But you have never stated what makes a person able to have a psychological state while a machine can't. (can an amoeba? a fly? a dog?) Is there not a continuum?

One of my themes is against black and white thinking - I see too many false dichotomies in ethics and think there are usually three options and the third, the most likely correct, is obfuscated by these dichotomies. I welcome the same point back to me. I do not deny that happiness is anything to do with qualia, rather that this is is irrelevant. What I am saying is that happiness is a type of pyschological state, by definition. Over extending this tends to hide useful and important distinctions that need to be made.

There really is not much between us. Hopefully we are now clear on each other's use of terms - each other's jargon The main issue then becomes that you want to collapse distinct categories into one - synonyms - whereas I go the other way. Why?

Well I think that one can achieve satisfaction without fulfilment (e.g via wireheading, drugs) but it is only fulfilment that is about states of the world and the motives (desires) to bring them about via actions - whereas satisfaction - feeling good - is not.

To translate to your terms

"Well I think that one can achieve happiness without satisfaction (e.g via wireheading, drugs) but it is satisfaction t that affects states of the world and and the motives (X) to bring them about via actions - whereas happiness - feeling good - is not".

My difficulty in this translation is I cannot see what X is. In my version I have use of three terms: "satisfaction", "fulfilment" and "desire" whereas in yours there are only two "happiness" and "satisfaction", what is the third (X)?

faithlessgod wrote:Sorry to hear this, please don't go, your ideas have stimulated me even as we disagree. You can always ignore me and just debate with others, I won't mind, better that than for you to go. The only jargon I use I think was metaphorical cross-domain mapping, but I do not know a more succinct way to a say, maybe just metaphor?

Well sorry if that sounded bitchy. Maybe jargon isn't the word....it's just that you seem to want to word things in particularly....I don't know, convoluted, complex ways? I like to stick with simple descriptions, and make sure that every word is well defined.

faithlessgod wrote:

Desires that tend to fulfil other desires are morally good. Desires that tend to thwart others desires are morally bad. MOrailty is about promoting good desires and demoting bad desires.

Hmmm. Not sure I get it. I also am surprised that you find the word "desire" any more naturalistic than "happy". (if it can't be applied to things without "minds", it isn't naturalistic....that is until you define mind in a naturalistic way). Any reason you don't say "actions that fulfill desires" rather than "desires that fulfill other desires"?

In any case I think until you need to say "the desires of others" rather than "other desires". Otherwise....it doesn't make sense. Also unless it includes the wishes/goals/desires/preferences of others....any selfish (and even evil) behavior could be labeled moral, and that goes against any notion of morality I have, certainly.

faithlessgod wrote:I can grant that happiness and satisfy are synonymous. Satisfaction and fulfilment are critically, as used here, not. A desire can be fulfilled and one is not satisfied etc. They can diverge. Satisfaction (and frustration) refer to states of mind (or brain if you will) whereas fulfilment (and thwarting) refer to states of the world - as to whether they are true or not.

Ok, well I don't normally see a difference between satisfaction and fulfillment, but ok. And I have no idea what you mean by a "desire can be fulfilled and one is not satisfied"....are you confusing long term and short term satisfaction? That applies to words like "happy" too: "Waitress, I ordered a coke not a sprite" "We don't have coke, would you be happy if I brought you a pepsi?" "No, of course not. I wouldn't be happy unless my wife takes me back" I don't think just by changing from pleasure to happiness to satisfaction to fulfillment or really anything is going to solve that...you just have to know by context which you mean.

So you have restricted satisifaction to refer to the brain/mind. Presumably you don't consider a computer, no matter how sophisticated, to be a brain or mind? Does a dog have a mind? A mosquito? An earthworm?

I think you are unnecessarily restricting the definition. Fine, I guess, if you want to use it that way, as long as there is a logical equivalent, "fulfillment", that does not have such a restriction. Still, I think all that does is make it harder to understand things in a naturalistic way if you use different words for biological things than artificial things...it makes it harder to simplify the concepts down to their essence, since even the simplest biological thing on the planet today is far too complex for humans to fully understand as yet.

faithlessgod wrote:I think here you are using satisfaction as I have been using fulfilment and happiness where I used satisfaction. Importantly it is not 'in most cases where they are "logically equivalent"' e.g. converge but where they diverge that needs to be understood. That is what I am emphasizing.

I would suggest that concentrating on where they diverge rather than on their commonality is probably a good approach, assuming your goal is to miss the point that I was trying to make.

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:Seriously though....you say "no one" see those as differing in only degrees from human attraction, and on that you are wrong. I most certainly do, and I am someone, last I checked.

Point noted, however I do not see how one can do this unless one ignores the empirical/material/physical differences. Now why would one do that?

Because I am trying to define happiness in a naturalistic way, and trying to find the simplest scenario to describe it, as a starting point. Happiness, at its most basic, is a state where an attraction has been satisfied. Your insistence that it only apply in a psychological (a.k.a. human or at least biological) is a way -- and a fallacious way, I should point out -- of defining terms so that morality and other such concepts cannot be explained in a naturalistic way.

I used magnets as one example because, inevitably, if I even use a thermostat, someone is going to say "yeah but the goal isn't the thermostat's, it is that of the humans who designed and set the thermostat". Seems less likely with magnets.

Anyway, can you answer these questions:

1) if someone said to you "magnets are happy if the north pole of one is to the south pole of another, and unhappy if north pole to north pole", would you understand what they meant?

2) why?

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:As I said, I wanted to start at the simple and go to the complex. What about an ameoba with a "tropism" toward food? It is more complex than a magnet, but less complex than a human. Same with the thermostat being "attracted" to a particular temperature. Same with a dog being attracted to its food bowl. Where do you draw the line?

I see your argument yet am unconvinced. I think you are enamoured by the use of the term "attraction" above and beyond the call of duty You are relying on an abstraction of attraction to do this. The similarity is artificial although appealing and comprehensible as you have presented. I have already called a tropism a proto-desire. To extend this magnetic attraction becomes a pseudo-desire. IMHO It is a false analogy. Whereas the thermostat is a derived desire. These distinctions are interesting and you are taking me along path I had not considered before. These ideas are tentative answers. Thanks.

You're welcome. I hope you give it more consideration. I am about simplifying things to their very essense, I think it is the key to clarity. Unfortunately, clarity seems the anathema of most philosophical writing, which is why I generally avoid it, and I guess why I picked on you for making things seem more complex than they need to be. (I do, however, like it when scientists write about philosophy, they tend to do it much better. Dawkins being one of the best. Note my other post about Dawkin's use of the word "selfish" to apply to genes. )

Iam trying not to repeat what I said in the other thread on jargon, if you will, we both have it. The difference is that I consider these words just as vehicles to help clarify and simplify what is being referred to, where as you are making them fuzzy and complex so making it unclear as to what is being referred to. The point here is mystery is to why you think the opposite. Surely it is the case that the one who is achieving clarity should more easily translate from one vocabulary to the other and identify what is lacking or unclear in either vocabulary, whereas the one who is failing cannot, does not or is unable to do that. Well, sorry, I seem to be the former and you the latter and I think, unfortunately, that your claim for clarity is an assertion contradicted by the evidence of these two threads. I am not looking for further argument on this but it is frustrating as, I might be mistaken, but I think we both agree on the underlying (beneath the words) physical process. Lets see if what follows can help.

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

Desires that tend to fulfil other desires are morally good. Desires that tend to thwart others desires are morally bad. Morality is about promoting good desires and demoting bad desires.

Hmmm. Not sure I get it. I also am surprised that you find the word "desire" any more naturalistic than "happy". (if it can't be applied to things without "minds", it isn't naturalistic....that is until you define mind in a naturalistic way)

Desire is already is more naturalistic than happy and this has long been well understood in cognitive science and philosophical psychology. Whereas you are tryning to naturalize "happy" - to make it more objective I think, "desire" already is natural, no additional move is needed to naturalize it. Desire is not predicated on a prior concept of mind and it is a mistake to think it is. Otherwise how could there be BDI agents?

rob wrote: Any reason you don't say "actions that fulfill desires" rather than "desires that fulfill other desires"?

Desires are the proximate source of actions. The consequences of these actions is the effect in other desires. More specifically, the desires via actions materially and physically effect the capacity for other desires to be fulfilled or thwarted. Actions not caused or prevented by (malleable) desires are not the kind of thing that is directly under the topic of morality, as they cannot be effected by social forces.

rob wrote:In any case I think until you need to say "the desires of others" rather than "other desires". Otherwise....it doesn't make sense.

You wanted the most compact version and that is what it was. Of course it is the desires of others but it is also one's own (other desires).

rob wrote: Also unless it includes the wishes/goals/desires/preferences of others....any selfish (and even evil) behavior could be labeled moral, and that goes against any notion of morality I have, certainly.

Huh? The above approach includes all this as I clearly stated already. Maybe you should read what I said more carefully, you are just repeating my argument, how is that meant to defeat my argument???? It certainly makes no sense for you to repeat my argument as if that refutes my argument! Bizarre.

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:I can grant that happiness and satisfy are synonymous. Satisfaction and fulfilment are critically, as used here, not. A desire can be fulfilled and one is not satisfied etc. They can diverge. Satisfaction (and frustration) refer to states of mind (or brain if you will) whereas fulfilment (and thwarting) refer to states of the world - as to whether they are true or not.

Ok, well I don't normally see a difference between satisfaction and fulfillment, but ok. And I have no idea what you mean by a "desire can be fulfilled and one is not satisfied"....are you confusing long term and short term satisfaction?

You say you can see there is a difference and then you cant! Here goes, first in my terminology and then in yours - as well as I can
My terminology: "It does not matter to me whether your desire satisfies you or not, but only as to how its fulfilment affects me"
Your terminology:"It does not matter to me whether your motive(?) makes you happy or not, but only as to how its satisfaction affects me"
Now if you don't understand that then you are making an argument from ignorance or lack of imagination.

rob wrote:So you have restricted satisifaction to refer to the brain/mind.

No only a brain state, I make no reference to mind, this is a straw man.

rob wrote:Presumably you don't consider a computer, no matter how sophisticated, to be a brain or mind? Does a dog have a mind? A mosquito? An earthworm?

More straw men nothing I have said could lead you to presume this. I want discussion and debate that progresses so that we can mutually learn from each other. I am really not sure what you want from this.

rob wrote:I think you are unnecessarily restricting the definition. Fine, I guess, if you want to use it that way, as long as there is a logical equivalent, "fulfillment", that does not have such a restriction.

You are unacceptably expanding your definitions and so obfuscating important distinctions. If you don't think they are important then that is a topic for us to debate but then you still have to acknowledge not define away those distinctions and make an argument not just state an opinion as to why they are not important. Defining the issue away is not acceptable and not an argument.

rob wrote: Still, I think all that does is make it harder to understand things in a naturalistic way if you use different words for biological things than artificial things...it makes it harder to simplify the concepts down to their essence, since even the simplest biological thing on the planet today is far too complex for humans to fully understand as yet.

Again that is my point and specifically what you are failing to do here.

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:I think here you are using satisfaction as I have been using fulfilment and happiness where I used satisfaction. Importantly it is not 'in most cases where they are "logically equivalent"' e.g. converge but where they diverge that needs to be understood. That is what I am emphasizing.

I would suggest that concentrating on where they diverge rather than on their commonality is probably a good approach, assuming your goal is to miss the point that I was trying to make.

Well my point is that this distinction enables a realist basis to morality, what is your point then? You have again failed to address the distinctions I just made, why?

rob wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:Seriously though....you say "no one" see those as differing in only degrees from human attraction, and on that you are wrong. I most certainly do, and I am someone, last I checked.

Point noted, however I do not see how one can do this unless one ignores the empirical/material/physical differences. Now why would one do that?

Because I am trying to define happiness in a naturalistic way, and trying to find the simplest scenario to describe it, as a starting point.

So you want a naturalistic (i.e. material and physical) definition of happiness and that requires you to ignore differences in material and physcial reality. Is that not a contradiction?

rob wrote: Happiness, at its most basic, is a state where an attraction has been satisfied. Your insistence that it only apply in a psychological (a.k.a. human or at least biological) is a way -- and a fallacious way, I should point out -- of defining terms so that morality and other such concepts cannot be explained in a naturalistic way.

Huh? As you have defined happiness you have defined away the possibility of any type of morality - your model says one thing but beneathe the surface it is nihilism. That is by universalising happiness it becomes completely empty of use, since all situations however they occur to whoever (including inanimate objects) are already happy and nothing can or needs to be done to alter that.

rob wrote:I used magnets as one example because, inevitably, if I even use a thermostat, someone is going to say "yeah but the goal isn't the thermostat's, it is that of the humans who designed and set the thermostat". Seems less likely with magnets.

True but then magnets have nothing remotely like goals, they just are, they could not even appear to be agents. AFAIC they are completely irrelevant to the issue at had and you have failed to establish any relevancy, your semantic games included. You seem to have peculiar reductionist notions. No geneticist needs to get lower than genes and molecular biology to establish the naturalness of genes - they do not need oto go all the way down to the quantum world. You on the other hand reduce your notion of happiness so far that it has lost any use. Why go that far, I think you are forced to because you fail to see and define away important distinctions. Either way you end up with nothing just a lot of nice sounding words. And yet you still better understand how morality works than many others. Just let go of your obsession of "happiness" it wil be OK

rob wrote:Anyway, can you answer these questions:

1) if someone said to you "magnets are happy if the north pole of one is to the south pole of another, and unhappy if north pole to north pole", would you understand what they meant?

Yes and so what? Nothing follows from this. This a metaphor that you are over extending to the point of error.

rob wrote:2) why?

That is how metaphors work projecting from a more familiar domain to a less familiar domain or, as I have said before, metaphorical cross-domain mapping. You are confusing the map for the territory. Certainly in this case the map is not the territory and, as far as morality is concerned, your map is misleading.

faithlessgod wrote:

rob wrote:As I said, I wanted to start at the simple and go to the complex. What about an ameoba with a "tropism" toward food? It is more complex than a magnet, but less complex than a human. Same with the thermostat being "attracted" to a particular temperature. Same with a dog being attracted to its food bowl. Where do you draw the line?

I see your argument yet am unconvinced. I think you are enamoured by the use of the term "attraction" above and beyond the call of duty You are relying on an abstraction of attraction to do this. The similarity is artificial although appealing and comprehensible as you have presented. I have already called a tropism a proto-desire. To extend this magnetic attraction becomes a pseudo-desire. IMHO It is a false analogy. Whereas the thermostat is a derived desire. These distinctions are interesting and you are taking me along path I had not considered before. These ideas are tentative answers. Thanks.

rob wrote:You're welcome. I hope you give it more consideration.

Well excuse me. I have given your argument consideration and considered response and nothing you have just presented in this post helps your case. How about you do the same for mine rather than ignore and define them away?

rob wrote: I am about simplifying things to their very essense, I think it is the key to clarity.

I agree, my criticsm of you is that you are failing to do this and end up doing the opposite.

rob wrote: Unfortunately, clarity seems the anathema of most philosophical writing, which is why I generally avoid it, and I guess why I picked on you for making things seem more complex than they need to be.

Well that is your opinion. Much philosophical writing and the terminology used here is for clarity and you ignore it at your peril. I am making things as simple as possible and no simpler. You are over simplifying and end up saying nothing. That is the issue here. Simplicity is only one criteria, it can be overused that is your main error.

rob wrote: (I do, however, like it when scientists write about philosophy, they tend to do it much better.

Well I am trying to have a science debate here and it is you who are making philosophical mistakes that need to be pointed out. How about you stop doing this? Just complaining about approaches and what you like or not is not an argument (rational or empirical)

rob wrote: Dawkins being one of the best. Note my other post about Dawkin's use of the word "selfish" to apply to genes. )

I used the selfish gene in support of my argument, you are getting confused again. You are confusing clarity with vagueness and fuzziness. Get over it.

Well, in response that what I stated at the beginning of this post, from what I have read here I can only (tentatively) conclude that rob is not going to let go of philosophical semantic games and so continue to prevent real empirical discussion. Oh well.

Please surprise me Rob (and so prove me wrong in my conclusion) or there is not point carrying this on.

I think I might as well put myself in the firing line and present is a naturalistic basis for right and wrong.

I advocate a variant of Preference Satisfaction called Desire Utilitarianism which meta-ethically is a reductive naturalist, quasi-realist and empirical framework for examining ethical issues. I currently advocate this as this the best approach, that I have seen to date, that satisfies various conditions that are required for a decent empirical approach to anything - conditions such as parsimony, clarity, fecundity, minimal reliance on other speculative solutions, defeasibility and so on.

In one line DU is "morality is about using praise,condemnation, reward and punishment to encourage desires that tend to fulfil desires and discourage desires that tend to thwart desires".

To expand this for the question in this thread there are two preliminary points:

1. 'Moral Speak' is optional, once moral terms have been naturalized there is no need to use them at all, since as a reductive naturalist moral facts supervene on natural facts, there are no additional moral facts. Still it is a useful shorthand, if what is meant is clear and any prior definitions are stipulative here (or substitute the definition to avoid any intermediate misconceptions).

2. Once the naturalization is done there is no need to expand what natural facts, process, concepts and models underlay this, expansion only required to the degree that they are not generally accepted.

In DU generic value is the relation between desires and the states of affairs which are their target. Good means 'such as to fulfil the desire of the kind in question'. Bad means 'such as to thwart the desire of the kind in question'. Moral value is about identifying the desirability of a desire, evaluated as a means with respect to the fulfilment and thwarting of all affected desires, treated equally by default. Hence moral good desires are 'such as to fulfil or tend to fulfil all desires' and morally bad desires 'are such as to thwart or tend to thwart all desires' - in both cases all desires whoever has them are the desire of the kind in question.

Actions are means to fulfil a desires, any desire. An action is right to the degree it tends to fulfil a desire, wrong to the degree it does not or tends to thwart a desire. Hence an action is morally right to the degree that it tends to fulfil morally good desires, morally wrong to the degree that it tends to thwart morally bad desires.

That's it but a final expansion without using any moral terms would be something like 'Morality is about encouraging actions that tend to fulfil desires and discouraging actions that tend to thwart desires'. The one sentence formation above DU highlights that the actual encouragement/discouragement is primarily on desires not actions.

This is the only long-ish thread that I’ve read in total on this forum so far. And I have to say that I’m completely under-whelmed.

There is too much philosophical jargon, too many abbreviations and very little light cast on the subject matter. If you want to attract human beings to this forum as opposed to moral philosophy buffs you’d better shape up.

Having started a topic of a well defined nature the OP goes immediately off topic and starts talking about happiness. He is ably assisted in this diversion by many of the posters. Here’s my assistance in this dubious enterprise. I make two points:

Despite more verbiage than you can shake a stick at no poster appears to differentiate between personal gratification and happiness.

It may not matter very much that different people have different views of what happiness is. Given that consequentialists are using assessed degrees of happiness produced by different choices to make decisions, they are comparing like with like and only the differences between different outcomes are relevant. In most cases I contend this will remain a positive difference, (or a negative difference), whatever the detailed definition of happiness the assessor is using. Consequently, provided the individual is consistent, exactly which view he takes on happiness doesn’t matter.

On to the main purpose of the thread:

Too many posters spent too much time playing with words. On a forum like this good and bad, right and wrong are related to moral systems. Any other usage of these words, if not clear by context, should be explicitly spelled out. I have assumed that this thread is concerned with definitions for right and wrong only in the context of morality. If that’s not the case it certainly aught to be.

My view is:

Right or good means consistent with a moral system and its values. Wrong or bad means not consistent.

I’m afraid if all posters were like me this thread would have been very short indeed.

Trouble is, one's jargon is another's everyday language. Reading your introductory post, I had to look up both 'circumstantialist' and 'moral pragmatist'. (I couldn't find reliable-looking descriptions of either - I assume from the makeup of of the phrases that they have something to do with dealing with situations as we come to them, but I'm not really sure what views that would exclude).

Too many posters spent too much time playing with words. On a forum like this good and bad, right and wrong are related to moral systems. Any other usage of these words, if not clear by context, should be explicitly spelled out. I have assumed that this thread is concerned with definitions for right and wrong only in the context of morality. If that’s not the case it certainly aught to be.

This seems reasonable enough - I prefer to take it further, though. If 'right', means 'consistent with a moral system' (presumably you mean with a specified moral system? Anything is consistent with a potential moral system), why bother using this rag of a word to begin with? Why not just omit it altogether, along with other junk words like 'moral', and be clear about what we mean to begin with? As someone who believes that nothing matters besides happiness (of some form, and I agree that the precise form isn't important for most purposes), surely it's clearer to say 'this action will increase overall happiness' than 'this action is right'...

Hi Gordonhide. I agree with both you and Arepo about Jargon. Felicifia, philosophy and the world need more straight-talkers. But not everyone can be linguists or speech-writers. We're - unfortunately - all fallible humans.

Now you've said that you consider right to mean 'consistent with that person's moral system' and you've said that you consider happiness a diversion from right and wrong.
Well if you define 'right' as sincere, then people with 'god hates fags' mentalities are right in so far as their actions follow through their beliefs. Is that really what you believe? When a fundamentalist religious person kills a doctor in an abortion clinic as is consistent with their beliefs (an eye for an eye) is this a good thing?

NB. I admit discussion went off-topic, to consciousness. I find consciousness exciting and puzzling, but I guess I can't expect everyone to share that fascination.

Arepo wrote:Trouble is, one's jargon is another's everyday language. Reading your introductory post, I had to look up both 'circumstantialist' and 'moral pragmatist'. (I couldn't find reliable-looking descriptions of either - I assume from the makeup of of the phrases that they have something to do with dealing with situations as we come to them, but I'm not really sure what views that would exclude).

Touché! I must have been having one of my Alzheimer days. I meant "consequentialist". Sorry to have put you to any trouble. As for "moral pragmatism" I'm afraid I pulled that out of one of my more unsavoury orifices. What I meant by it was a belief that a moral system should be built from ideas that have been shown to work rather than ideas which are logical and aught to work. As an example, this is why I believe a moral system must be largely consistent with emotions and instincts. In practical term, too many inconsistent decisions will be made if this is not the case.

Arepo wrote:

GordonHide wrote:Too many posters spent too much time playing with words. On a forum like this good and bad, right and wrong are related to moral systems. Any other usage of these words, if not clear by context, should be explicitly spelled out. I have assumed that this thread is concerned with definitions for right and wrong only in the context of morality. If that’s not the case it certainly aught to be.

This seems reasonable enough - I prefer to take it further, though. If 'right', means 'consistent with a moral system' (presumably you mean with a specified moral system? Anything is consistent with a potential moral system), why bother using this rag of a word to begin with? Why not just omit it altogether, along with other junk words like 'moral', and be clear about what we mean to begin with? As someone who believes that nothing matters besides happiness (of some form, and I agree that the precise form isn't important for most purposes), surely it's clearer to say 'this action will increase overall happiness' than 'this action is right'...

It's a matter of convenient brevity I think. If you know anything about programming think of "right" and "wrong" as local variables in the "morality" subroutine.

RyanCarey wrote:Now you've said that you consider right to mean 'consistent with that person's moral system' and you've said that you consider happiness a diversion from right and wrong.

Not quite. I consider happiness to by a diversion from the "definitions of right and wrong" thread.

RyanCarey wrote:Well if you define 'right' as sincere, then people with 'god hates fags' mentalities are right in so far as their actions follow through their beliefs. Is that really what you believe? When a fundamentalist religious person kills a doctor in an abortion clinic as is consistent with their beliefs (an eye for an eye) is this a good thing?

well I'm not sure where "sincere" crept into things but, essentially, I think in the examples you quote those people do act according to their own moral system. That doesn't mean they're right according to my moral system.

There is an interesting point here. How far is a relativist justified in criticising the moral system and therefore the moral actions of others? Well, this is one of the cases where I believe that criticism is justified. This is because I believe that everybody's moral system should be sufficiently consistent with the prevailing values of the society in which they live so as not to impede the smooth running of that society.

If these actions were consistent with the common moral values I would have to withdraw my objection or find some other basis for objection which was largely independent of any moral system, (especially my own), or at least common to most moral systems.

GordonHide wrote:Right or good means consistent with a moral system and its values. Wrong or bad means not consistent.

Can one moral system better than another? Your point surely allows that an action that in one moral system is right, can be wrong in another, leading us to ask is there are natural basis to decide which is in error, or not?

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:Right or good means consistent with a moral system and its values. Wrong or bad means not consistent.

Can one moral system be? better than another? Your point surely allows that an action that in one moral system is right, can be wrong in another, leading us to ask is there are natural basis to decide which is in error, or not?

I believe their are grounds for determining that one moral system is better than another. These are that one moral system will serve a particular society better than another. basically it's horses for courses.

Clearly in my world it's all too likely that one man's right is another's wrong. In these circumstances neither may be in error. (How could they be? Error is defined in relation to the particular moral system.)

For me there is no absolute or objective standard, (unless utility to a particular society could be so defined), which allows me to consider actions in error if they are sanctioned outside my own moral system.

GordonHide wrote:I believe their are grounds for determining that one moral system is better than another. These are that one moral system will serve a particular society better than another. basically it's horses for courses.

This sounds like moral relativism not utilitarianism. Yet you grant that a society can morally evolve relative to itself. How do you, or anyone, determine that one system will server a society better than another, without circular reasoning, given, as you say below, that "Error is defined in relation to the particular moral system".

GordonHide wrote:Clearly in my world it's all too likely that one man's right is another's wrong. In these circumstances neither may be in error. (How could they be? Error is defined in relation to the particular moral system.)

This sounds like normative relativism not utilitarianism. Implicit in this is the point that your own moral system has no privilege over any other one.

GordonHide wrote:For me there is no absolute or objective standard, (unless utility to a particular society could be so defined), which allows me to consider actions in error if they are sanctioned outside my own moral system.

Given the implication of normative relativism above, there is no justification as to why you, or anyone, should or could judge any other actions of another moral system in terms of one's own. What do you mean by an absolute or objective standard? This is not the only alternative to what you propose, why do you imply that it is? For example DU proposes a provisional, relational and defeasible standard, in all respects better than an absolute one especialy as it far more emprically consistent and coherent with what we know about "standards" anywhere else.

GordonHide wrote:It's a matter of convenient brevity I think. If you know anything about programming think of "right" and "wrong" as local variables in the "morality" subroutine.

In DU too it could be thought that" "right" and "wrong" as local variables in the "morality" subroutine ". A right (wrong) action is that which tends to fulfil (thwart) good desires. The "morality" routine is a desire is good (bad) if it is such as to more likely fulfil (thwart) all the affected desires.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:I believe their are grounds for determining that one moral system is better than another. These are that one moral system will serve a particular society better than another. Basically it's horses for courses.

This sounds like moral relativism not utilitarianism. Yet you grant that a society can morally evolve relative to itself. How do you, or anyone, determine that one system will server a society better than another, without circular reasoning, given, as you say below, that "Error is defined in relation to the particular moral system".

Yes, I count myself a moral relativist although I'm not sure that the more rigid relativists would agree with this.

I guess this is where I part company with many relativists. I do compare moral systems and I can make no claims to objectivity. A pure relativist might disown me at this point. When assessing another moral system I do so in the context of the society where it operates. No matter where it operates I will regard it as inferior if it is not internally consistent.

I regard a moral system as inferior if it is so different from the prevailing moral system within a society that it causes otherwise unnecessary friction between society members. My assessment of this is subjective.

I regard a moral system as inferior if it decreases the overall wellbeing of society, judged according to the values of that society.

I regard a moral system as inferior if, according to my subjective judgement, it militates against the survival of society.

I regard a moral system as inferior if it leads to too many decisions which are at odds with the social emotions and instincts gifted to us by natural selection.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:Clearly in my world it's all too likely that one man's right is another's wrong. In these circumstances neither may be in error. (How could they be? Error is defined in relation to the particular moral system.)

This sounds like normative relativism not utilitarianism. Implicit in this is the point that your own moral system has no privilege over any other one.

That is mostly true for me even though I am not a purist.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:For me there is no absolute or objective standard, (unless utility to a particular society could be so defined), which allows me to consider actions in error if they are sanctioned outside my own moral system.

Given the implication of normative relativism above, there is no justification as to why you, or anyone, should or could judge any other actions of another moral system in terms of one's own. What do you mean by an absolute or objective standard? This is not the only alternative to what you propose, why do you imply that it is? For example DU proposes a provisional, relational and defeasible standard, in all respects better than an absolute one especialy as it far more emprically consistent and coherent with what we know about "standards" anywhere else.

See above for the ground upon which I presume to judge other systems. I agree they make me a poor relativist. I can't really say what I mean by an objective or absolute standard as I don't believe one exists. I guess I mean some standard whose validity could be proven logically or scientifically or else, perhaps, some standard enjoying universal acceptance.

As for alternatives, I'm all ears. I propose no standards because I have no firm ideas on which to base them.

GordonHide wrote:Touché! I must have been having one of my Alzheimer days. I meant "consequentialist". Sorry to have put you to any trouble.

No worries.

As for "moral pragmatism" I'm afraid I pulled that out of one of my more unsavoury orifices. What I meant by it was a belief that a moral system should be built from ideas that have been shown to work rather than ideas which are logical and aught to work. As an example, this is why I believe a moral system must be largely consistent with emotions and instincts. In practical term, too many inconsistent decisions will be made if this is not the case.

Gottit. (I'd probably disagree, but I won't derail the thread by discussing it here)

GordonHide wrote:It's a matter of convenient brevity I think. If you know anything about programming think of "right" and "wrong" as local variables in the "morality" subroutine.

I know very little about programming, though I think I understand what you mean.

On the 'convenient brevity' thing - that's the whole point of jargon, isn't it? It can be very useful to cut down the number of words or syllables used to describe a common concept, but the price is reducing the number of people who can understand you when you discuss it.

It works perfectly well if you're having a conversation with people who use exactly the same jargon in exactly the same way, but if they're less familiar with your use of it, it becomes much less efficient.

My issue with ideas like 'right' and 'morality' (and related concepts like 'ought' and 'duty') is that after 3000-odd years, they remain jargon. They can hardly save time in the long run, conversations about our motivations for treating each other certain ways inevitably turn into arguments about what such words mean. What's worse, almost everyone thinks there's something specific that they 'should' mean.

Imagine what discussions about programming would be like if no two programmers agreed on what 'subroutine' meant, but they were all convinced that their own definition was somehow the 'correct' one.

I want to say you'd never get anywhere, but that's probably not true. You'd gradually be able to figure out what the other people were saying, but it would be a much slower process than if you'd picked a single, simple definition for the word in the first place. But failing that, if you resorted to the 'longer' approach of describing them (without using the word 'subroutine' at all) every time a relevant discussion came up, you'd still progress much faster - despite abandoning your convenient brevity.

Hiya Gordon

Am I right in assuming from what you are saying that you deny that there can be a naturalistic basis for right and wrong (as in statements that can correspond to reality and be true or false)? Note that this does not prevent utilitarianism or its preference satisfaction variant - as in Hare's universal prescriptivism which also denies this. Now I do not not see such a naturalistic basis as an absolute or objective standard - not sure that how that is meant to work - but still if there were such a basis it would be applicable across and within societies to evaluate their moral codes. Indeed Hare's preference satisfaction can do this too. So denying a naturalistic ground does not necessarily lead to moral relativism even of the mild variety you espouse.

GordonHide wrote:Yes, I count myself a moral relativist although I'm not sure that the more rigid relativists would agree with this.

rigid or absolute??

GordonHide wrote: When assessing another moral system I do so in the context of the society where it operates. No matter where it operates I will regard it as inferior if it is not internally consistent.

What gives you the right to impose such an external standard - internal consistency - on any culture's moral code?

GordonHide wrote:I regard a moral system as inferior if it is so different from the prevailing moral system within a society that it causes otherwise unnecessary friction between society members. My assessment of this is subjective.

I commend your honesty here by fail to see why it is necessarily subjective. There are plenty of empirical approaches which can examine the performance of societies including specifications of "frictions" - so surely one could do better than just have a subjective opinion on the matter?

GordonHide wrote:I regard a moral system as inferior if it leads to too many decisions which are at odds with the social emotions and instincts gifted to us by natural selection.

Now surely this is clearly a non (morally iei culturally) relative "standard"?

GordonHide wrote: I can't really say what I mean by an objective or absolute standard as I don't believe one exists.

I agree that none such exists that we could ever absolutely know about. All our knowledge is provisional.

GordonHide wrote: I guess I mean some standard whose validity could be proven logically or scientifically or else, perhaps, some standard enjoying universal acceptance.

This "standard" might be objective in some sense but not when repeatedly conjoined with absolute. I do not think any scientific knowledge enjoys universal acceptance, so do not see why the criterion of universal acceptance would apply specially here.

GordonHide wrote:As for alternatives, I'm all ears. I propose no standards because I have no firm ideas on which to base them.

Fair enough. Utilitarianism proposes various standards (utilities) with various grounds (naturalistic reduction or not, objective or subjective etc.) that can lead to PS or DU. If it is a standard it is not absolute for multiple reasons (some mentioned above). Such standards exist all over the place and I see no reason here why they cannot too, do you?

Arepo wrote:

GordonHide wrote:It's a matter of convenient brevity I think.

On the 'convenient brevity' thing - that's the whole point of jargon, isn't it?

Actually it's usually used to refer to things, concepts etc. that don't occur outside the specialist sphere, but brevity is certainly often an added bonus.

Arepo wrote:My issue with ideas like 'right' and 'morality' (and related concepts like 'ought' and 'duty') is that after 3000-odd years, they remain jargon. They can hardly save time in the long run, conversations about our motivations for treating each other certain ways inevitably turn into arguments about what such words mean. What's worse, almost everyone thinks there's something specific that they 'should' mean.

I think right and wrong is a special case. You don't need to be a moral philosopher to have a fair idea what they mean in the context of morality. Right and wrong are used in disingenuous ways by people who aught to know better.

In the context of morality right means consistent with a moral system. In the context of the natural world it means consistent with real world observations or certain inferences. In the context of mathematics or logic it means consistent with the original premises and the rules of logic. It is common to confuse these meanings in order to try and give the use of the word "right" used in morality either the empirical association of real world data or the certainty of correct logical analysis.

When someone imports a word like "truth" into the moral discourse you know to be immediately on your guard but careful misuse of right and wrong can sometimes take a minute to discover.

faithlessgod wrote:Hiya Gordon

Am I right in assuming from what you are saying that you deny that there can be a naturalistic basis for right and wrong (as in statements that can correspond to reality and be true or false)? Note that this does not prevent utilitarianism or its preference satisfaction variant - as in Hare's universal prescriptivism which also denies this. Now I do not not see such a naturalistic basis as an absolute or objective standard - not sure that how that is meant to work - but still if there were such a basis it would be applicable across and within societies to evaluate their moral codes. Indeed Hare's preference satisfaction can do this too. So denying a naturalistic ground does not necessarily lead to moral relativism even of the mild variety you espouse.

I'm afraid this is "moral philosophy speak" which is double dutch to me. What is a naturalistic basis? How do statements correspond to reality? Are they statements about observations in the real world that are true? (Insofar as we can judge).

Note that I don't claim to be a utilitarian. For me a moral system should promote the general wellbeing. I use the consideration of the consequences of possible actions I might take to decide which is more in tune with the objective.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:Yes, I count myself a moral relativist although I'm not sure that the more rigid relativists would agree with this.

rigid or absolute??

Well, for instance, I do not believe that all other moral systems are as valid as my own.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote: When assessing another moral system I do so in the context of the society where it operates. No matter where it operates I will regard it as inferior if it is not internally consistent.

What gives you the right to impose such an external standard - internal consistency - on any culture's moral code?

I dont know about "a right to impose an external standard" but logic tells me that inconsistency will lead to confusion in making moral decisions which will lead to conflict in society.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:I regard a moral system as inferior if it is so different from the prevailing moral system within a society that it causes otherwise unnecessary friction between society members. My assessment of this is subjective.

I commend your honesty here by fail to see why it is necessarily subjective. There are plenty of empirical approaches which can examine the performance of societies including specifications of "frictions" - so surely one could do better than just have a subjective opinion on the matter?

That may be.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:I regard a moral system as inferior if it leads to too many decisions which are at odds with the social emotions and instincts gifted to us by natural selection.

Now surely this is clearly a non (morally iei culturally) relative "standard"?

I told you I was a poor relativist. My view is that many of the decisions we make in life have to be made by instinct because we don't have the time for sober consideration. I think things would be unworkable in practical terms if you had to keep saying "I'm sorry what I did was wrong but I had to make a decision on instict" This happens often enough even though my moral system does largely agree with my emotions and instincts.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:I can't really say what I mean by an objective or absolute standard as I don't believe one exists.

I agree that none such exists that we could ever absolutely know about. All our knowledge is provisional.

GordonHide wrote: I guess I mean some standard whose validity could be proven logically or scientifically or else, perhaps, some standard enjoying universal acceptance.

This "standard" might be objective in some sense but not when repeatedly conjoined with absolute. I do not think any scientific knowledge enjoys universal acceptance, so do not see why the criterion of universal acceptance would apply specially here.

Your preaching to the converted.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:As for alternatives, I'm all ears. I propose no standards because I have no firm ideas on which to base them.

Fair enough. Utilitarianism proposes various standards (utilities) with various grounds (naturalistic reduction or not, objective or subjective etc.) that can lead to PS or DU. If it is a standard it is not absolute for multiple reasons (some mentioned above). Such standards exist all over the place and I see no reason here why they cannot too, do you?

I've no idea.

GordonHide wrote:I think right and wrong is a special case.

Why?

GordonHide wrote:[1]In the context of morality right means consistent with a moral system. [2]In the context of the natural world it means consistent with real world observations or certain inferences. [3]In the context of mathematics or logic it means consistent with the original premises and the rules of logic. It is common to confuse these meanings in order to try and give the use of the word "right" used in morality either the empirical association of real world data or the certainty of correct logical analysis.

So you are arguing equivocation over "right", as the relevant meaning in [2] and [3] is some type of "truth" and you are saying that "right" has a different meaning - not 'truth' - in [1]. Still you have not said what "right" means which is what this thread is meant to be about.
[EDIT] Apologies for the emphasis. You clearly do think you have provided an answer and this the first time I am asking for clarification on this. Sorry about that[/edit]

GordonHide wrote:When someone imports a word like "truth" into the moral discourse you know to be immediately on your guard but careful misuse of right and wrong can sometimes take a minute to discover.

Well since no-one here has defended a position such as moral right means true and moral wrong means false, this looks like a straw man?

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:I think right and wrong is a special case.

Why?

GordonHide wrote:[1]In the context of morality right means consistent with a moral system. [2]In the context of the natural world it means consistent with real world observations or certain inferences. [3]In the context of mathematics or logic it means consistent with the original premises and the rules of logic. It is common to confuse these meanings in order to try and give the use of the word "right" used in morality either the empirical association of real world data or the certainty of correct logical analysis.

So you are arguing equivocation over "right", as the relevant meaning in [2] and [3] is some type of "truth" and you are saying that "right" has a different meaning - not 'truth' - in [1]. Still you have not said what "right" means which is what this thread is meant to be about.
[EDIT] Apologies for the emphasis. You clearly do think you have provided an answer and this the first time I am asking for clarification on this. Sorry about that[/edit]

I'm sorry I have to answer a question with a question. Why do you find "consistent with a moral system" an inadequate definition of right? Perhaps I can be more explicit. I believe the purpose of a moral system should be to guide the user in his actions so that each action is a good choice for general wellbeing within society. Something which is right conforms to that purpose.

Perhaps it is worth noting that whereas in logic right and wrong are essentially the two possible values of a Boolean variable in morality, there may be a best and worst possible decision, but there may be a range of right and wrong decisions between them.

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:When someone imports a word like "truth" into the moral discourse you know to be immediately on your guard but careful misuse of right and wrong can sometimes take a minute to discover.

Well since no-one here has defended a position such as moral right means true and moral wrong means false, this looks like a straw man?

I make no claim that anyone has misused the word "truth" I merely point out that such misuse is easy to spot whereas misuse of “right” is more prevalent and sometimes more subtle and that’s why “right and wrong” is a special case.

For example this comment by you appears only to serve to confuse the issue:

faithlessgod wrote:So where does good and bad fit in? And surely there are many things that are right and wrong that are clearly not moral? e.g. answering a question right in math class etc.

GordonHide wrote:Why do you find "consistent with a moral system" an inadequate definition of right?

Because this looks like a restatement of moral relativism rather than a definition of right. It is implied in what you have written that we can understand other moral codes and even where they apply and how to apply them - even as we might disagree with them or not. That is the ideas are commensurable -that is can be translated - not just from one language to another - from one moral code to another. It is this feature that I would expect your definition of right and wrong to refer to. Of course right and wrong might be basic or derived from something else such as good and bad, which leads to:

GordonHide wrote: Perhaps I can be more explicit. I believe the purpose of a moral system should be to guide the user in his actions so that each action is a good choice for general wellbeing within society. Something which is right conforms to that purpose.

This makes more sense but now what do you mean by "good" in the above? It appears that you like me, although very differently, seem to derive right from good?

GordonHide wrote:Perhaps it is worth noting that whereas in logic right and wrong are essentially the two possible values of a Boolean variable in morality, there may be a best and worst possible decision, but there may be a range of right and wrong decisions between them.

Yes we agree here - that is why I think they are scalar rather than boolean terms. Hence the use of "degree" in my generic (pre-moral) definitions: "An action is right to the degree it tends to fulfil a desire, wrong to the degree it does not or tends to thwart a desire".

GordonHide wrote:

faithlessgod wrote:

GordonHide wrote:When someone imports a word like "truth" into the moral discourse you know to be immediately on your guard but careful misuse of right and wrong can sometimes take a minute to discover.

Well since no-one here has defended a position such as moral right means true and moral wrong means false, this looks like a straw man?

I make no claim that anyone has misused the word "truth" I merely point out that such misuse is easy to spot whereas misuse of “right” is more prevalent and sometimes more subtle and that’s why “right and wrong” is a special case.

Understood but ironically I can see no way to understand your original definition but in this way, maybe that was what you were defending against or trying to avoid happening?

GordonHide wrote:For example this comment by you appears only to serve to confuse the issue:

faithlessgod wrote:So where does good and bad fit in? And surely there are many things that are right and wrong that are clearly not moral? e.g. answering a question right in math class etc.

Well this was my confusion over your "consistent with a moral system" definition. What you seemed to be saying, at least to me, is that "whatever a moral system says is right is right" - and your "definition" was referring to the second right not the first - which looks like the equivalent of saying "whatever a moral system says is right is true" (within that culture). Anyway I think this, now, a minor point (I hope), lets not get distracted by this?

In my last post I was asking for a definition or sense of the first "right" which you have started to provide above. This is only so we can compare apples with apples. Comparing different definitions, sense or basis for right and wrong across one's different metaethical frameworks - utilitarian, moral relativism and others.