So in this thread -- viewtopic.php?f=10&t=237 -- utilitymonster quoted research showing that almost 25% of philosophers are consequentialists (and presumably many of these are sympathetic with utilitarianism). http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

Not a majority, to be sure, but still a sizeable number. Yet if philosophers do genuinely accept the conclusions of utilitarianism, why are they so reluctant to join the utilitarian "movement" -- actively try to translate utilitarianism into practical ethics and political policy, through popular books, articles, public speaking, etc. Compare the vigorous way that scientists have engaged in the climate change debate. Why are so few philosophers doing the same?

I also note that utilitarianism seems to be relatively unpopular among college students open to new ideas. I had multiple friends at college who took up orthodox trotskyism and Leninism, radical environmentalism, radical gender politics, anarchism, animal rights -- and the grand sum of zero friends who were passionate about utilitarianism.

What is it about utilitarianism that is failing to inspire those most amenable to radical ideas?

Not just philosophers - the economics profession has a lot of utilitarianism too. Can't find any statistics with a quick search, but is an articlecomplaining about that the prevalence of utilitarian thinking in economics.

almost 25% of philosophers are consequentialists (and presumably many of these are sympathetic with utilitarianism)... Yet if philosophers do genuinely accept the conclusions of utilitarianism...

Consequentialism doesn't always imply utilitarianism, obviously you recognize this but I felt like driving home the point (sidenote: this article has a decent description of the exotic varieties of consequentialism).

Also, it's a big step to go from endorsing this big abstract idea about morality and to actually implementing that big idea. Maybe philosophers are more biased toward inaction?

What is it about utilitarianism that is failing to inspire those most amenable to radical ideas?

Just ain't cool. People are latching on to the movement that all their friends are supporting and ignoring the movements that their friends don't support. As to why it isn't cool, I'm not sure. Perhaps it demands too high a sacrifice, so that people can better signal their morality through easier moral systems.

I can list a few causes, based on my experience of meeting other professional philosophers.

*Like other researchers many philosophers seem primarily interested in finding out the truth (eg the truth about what's right to do) and aren't primarily in doing practical things. This isn't unexpected, since that's what they're good at and get rewarded for (ideally).

*Even among those who are interested in doing the right thing most think this should be done in standard ways. Eg they believe (perhaps because of motivated reasoning) that the best way to get utility would be to act for the political or social movement they favor (eg socialism, liberalism, libertarianism, environmentalism, etc).

Though, without having done any rigorous studies, it anecdotally seems like academic utilitarian philosophers are more likely to give money to Oxfam or similar charities.

Also, there are those who are actively promoting utilitarian movements, eg Peter Singer and Toby Ord.

spindoctor wrote: What is it about utilitarianism that is failing to inspire those most amenable to radical ideas?

I think I read brief comments about utilitarianism in two classes at school, but it was presented as something from the historical past. As for alternative view: religions have social institutions, assets, and tradition that keep them going, and virtue ethics and the like seem closest to the norms in the Western world that were forged from religions. We also can't forget that kids today are more interested in Internet entertainment and TV than philosophy. I also think one of the other big enemies is intuitionism--either in the form of gut feelings about what is right, religious revelation, or new age spiritualism that leads people to believe that what they are already doing is correct and good and that there is therefore no need to study any kind of ethics.

I personally do not understand the appeal of virtue ethics. It requires a bizarre type of intuitionism combined with a refusal to associate the philosophy with things like table manners or peer pressure (all of which pertain to actions driven by the expectations of others).

rehoot wrote:I also think one of the other big enemies is intuitionism--either in the form of gut feelings about what is right, religious revelation, or new age spiritualism that leads people to believe that what they are already doing is correct and good and that there is therefore no need to study any kind of ethics.

Agreed. But the most insidious forms of it run rife throughout academic philosophy - people who'll describe one system as more 'plausible' than another (or anyone who uses the word '(im)plausible' just about anywhere in a philosophical essay). Others will describe utilitarianism as 'a useful tool', seeming to completely misunderstand the question which it attempts to answer (and which they might have spent their whole career studying!) - I pressed a non-academic friend of mine who used this phrase, and we eventually realised that what he meant by utilitarianism was actually the felicific calculus; I suspect that's a common sort of error.

When I've pressed academics on the weakness of intuition in the past, they usually retort by saying that everyone uses it including me - it took me a while to realise that the suppressed premise is that all thought processes that might fall under the umbrella category of 'intuition' are basically equal. Though that said, some of the real charmers claim that only moral philosophers have a highly developed enough intuition to divine the true nature of morality.

Douglas Adams had it spot on:

"You just let the machines get on with the adding up," warned Majikthise, "and we'll take care of the eternal verities thank you very much. You want to check your legal position you do mate. Under law the Quest for Ultimate Truth is quite clearly the inalienable prerogative of your working thinkers. Any bloody machine goes and actually finds it and we're straight out of a job aren't we? I mean what's the use of our sitting up half the night arguing that there may or may not be a God if this machine only goes and gives us his bleeding phone number the next morning?"

"That's right!" shouted Vroomfondel, "we demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!"

Suddenly a stentorian voice boomed across the room.

"Might I make an observation at this point?" inquired Deep Thought.

"We'll go on strike!" yelled Vroomfondel.

"That's right!" agreed Majikthise. "You'll have a national Philosopher's strike on your hands!"

"And whom will that inconvenience?"

"Never you mind whom it'll inconvenience. It'll hurt, buster, it'll hurt."

The hum level in the room suddenly increased as several ancillary bass driver units, mounted in sedately carved and varnished cabinet speakers around the room, cut in to give Deep Thought's voice a little more power.

"All I wanted to say," bellowed the computer, "is that my circuits are now irrevocably committed to calculating the answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything -" he paused and satisfied himself that he now had everyone's attention, before continuing more quietly, "but the programme will take me a little while to run."

Fook glanced impatiently at his watch.

"How long?" he said.

"Seven and a half million years," said Deep Thought.

Lunkwill and Fook blinked at each other.

"Seven and a half million years ...!" they cried in chorus.

"Yes," declaimed Deep Thought, "I said I'd have to think about it, didn't I? And it occurs to me that running a programme like this is bound to create an enormous amount of popular publicity for the whole area of philosophy in general. Everyone's going to have their own theories about what answer I'm eventually to come up with, and who better to capitalize on that media market than you yourself? So long as you can keep disagreeing with each other violently enough and slagging each other off in the popular press, you can keep yourself on the gravy train for life. How does that sound?"

The two philosophers gaped at him.

"Bloody hell," said Majikthise, "now that is what I call thinking. Here Vroomfondel, why do we never think of things like that?"

"Dunno," said Vroomfondel in an awed whisper, "think our brains must be too highly trained, Majikthise."

Note also that it isn't specific to utilitarianism. There are many virtue ethicists and even more deontologists than consequentialists (see the philpaper survey above). But there aren't any virtue ethical or deontological movements.

I think that's asymmetric. Virtue and deontological ethics are fundamentally private - neither implies that I should make other people to agree with me, or that, if it turns out they do, I have any particular reason to team up with them towards any particular goal. As long as I cultivate a just character/don't lie, cheat, steal, kill etc/follow Yahweh's commands, the demands of those respective moralities are satisfied.

Note that all these positions are very general and formal. In principle a virtue ethical or deontological theory can have just about any content. So it is too much to say that those positions are fundamentally private.

Still, I agree that there are reasons to believe there might be some asymmetry if we look at fully specific versions of the theories, which are common today. One such reason is that most contemporary fully specific versions of consequentialism might seem to imply that one ought to take part in some movement.

On the other hand, it isn't obvious that such a movement need to be specifically utilitarian movement. I guess many consequentialists believe that they rather should take part in the political/religious/etc movement they believe in.

Also, note that specific versions of deontological or virtue ethic positions might have the same results. For example, some versions of religious ethics, like christian ethics, might imply that you should convert people and people might join political movements for virtue ethical or deontological reasons.

Jesper Östman wrote:Note that all these positions are very general and formal. In principle a virtue ethical or deontological theory can have just about any content. So it is too much to say that those positions are fundamentally private.

In principle as well you can describe any event or set of events conceivable, apply the word ‘good’, or ‘should or something related of either, and call it a moral system. There will clearly be grey areas between what we call one type rather than another, and some so far outlying that it would be absurd to call them anything. (If, as I do, you believe that good and should cannot refer to anything in the observable universe unless you treat them as synonyms for things like ‘pleasurable’ and ‘would create more pleasure’, then there’s another infinitish spectrum of arbitrary concepts that evoke passion in us and point to certain ways we should react to such sets of events without necessarily having any clear meaning).

But inasmuch we define virtue and deontological ethics as non-consequentialist systems – which we usually do, and which it seems helpful to do - I think what I say is true by definition. Consequentialism takes the focus of ethics off the self-at-specific-moment and places it somewhere broader - in util's case, everywhere. Sure, you could have virtue consequentialism, which seeks to foster good character in as many people as possible, deontological consequentialism which does the same with a sense of duty etc, but wherever I've seen anyone describe such systems it's to say they're not what the modifying ethic is about.