Hi all, I wonder whether you think I'm making sense in the following passages, which are somewhat more abstract than my usual.

The appropriate ethical theory for the number of people in the world
Most ethicists agree that in a world without happiness and suffering, there would be nothing to call ethics. Furthermore, deontologists usually agree with utilitarians that if there was only one person in the world, they would have nothing more to do than to maximise their own happiness. In a world that contains many people, utilitarians want to simply maximise everyone' happiness. Deontologists recognise that happiness is still important. However, they allow intervening circumstances to override the consideration of happiness and suffering. This is their disagreement.

So imagine a utilitarian. By evolution, he has been made to value all happiness over suffering. Suppose that otherwise, his thinking is untouched by biological and cultural evolution. Then, in an instant, he takes on a network of evolved attitudes, opinions and social constructions. Now, although happiness and suffering still matter to him, they can be sometimes overriden. Ethics takes on a new complexity, and is a process of balancing considerations, which are somewhat intuitive, against one and other. This utilitarian has become something indistinguishable from the deontologist. Thus, you have imagined morally irrelevant factors transforming a utilitarian into a deontologist.

The utilitarian's relationship to reality and fiction
The utilitarian decision process bears some similarity to the ordinary decision to watch a TV show. Suppose that in a comedy you’re watching, the star Larry David gives a child an embarrassingly stingy present. Watching this will give you certain thoughts and feelings. You may decide that Larry is uncaring and inappropriate. You may feel upset on behalf of the child and altogether embarrassed about the situation. On reflection, these thoughts and feelings are irrational because they refer to fiction. However, they are no less real for this. We really thought and felt these things. In deciding whether or not to watch Larry’s show, we say that we do not enjoy the show. We might go so far as to say that Larry is an idiot who does not deserve out attention. However, for this to make sense, it must be taken as a creative expression of the frustration that the show brings. That is, the events of the show are not in themselves relevant to our viewing choices. Nor are our thoughts about the fictional events in themselves relevant considerations. All that can reasonable be considered in this decision is the feelings that the show elicits in the viewer. Although this sadness or embarrassment refers to something fictional, this irrationality does not diminish them.

There is a speculation, popular outside of utilitarian thought, that the world could be entirely simulated for the viewing pleasure of our artificially preserved brains. If this was so, such a world would be an “enjoyable ride”, in which moral prescriptions would not extend beyond utilitarianism. A weaker version of this idea is surely true, that such a world is at least conceivable. If a realistic pattern of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and reflective thoughts were fed directly into our brains, would we really know the difference? Our perceptions may arrange themselves in a way that makes us most confident about the external state of affairs. But then, can we ever be entirely sure? If there is such a thing, our perceptions are the realest part of our existence. The utilitarian thinking is that life is “too important to be taken seriously”. Utilitarian thinkers can of course correctly tell apart fiction and reality. However, they can come to regard reality with some of the absurdity usually reserved for fiction. Then, in our absurd world (as in a fictional one), we ought to do (or watch) what pleases us.

very interesting:D i used to think about a similar thing a lot when i was younger, if we could imagine something to be real so well that we believed it mand percieved it then you could live your dreams. but you would be alone, and for me that couldn't make up for anything

Hmm, I don't quite understand what the author is trying to prove. Yes, some people are persuaded by evolution, culture, etc. to be deontologists, but I'm not one of them. I'm going to do what I care about. There may be other beings persuaded by evolution, culture, etc. to maximize paperclips, or maximize torture, but I don't approve of that. (Well, if they exterminate wild animals, the paperclips aren't so bad!)

So imagine a utilitarian. By evolution, he has been made to value all happiness over suffering. Suppose that otherwise, his thinking is untouched by biological and cultural evolution. Then, in an instant, he takes on a network of evolved attitudes, opinions and social constructions. Now, although happiness and suffering still matter to him, they can be sometimes overriden. Ethics takes on a new complexity, and is a process of balancing considerations, which are somewhat intuitive, against one and other. This utilitarian has become something indistinguishable from the deontologist. Thus, you have imagined morally irrelevant factors transforming a utilitarian into a deontologist.

Is this meant to be an argument against deontology? Can you put it into premise-conclusion form?

1. Our moral intuitions are evolved
2. Evolution operates to make us fit, not to inform us
3. Our moral intuitions operate do not operate to inform us
4. The value of our intuitions depends on their truth
5. Our moral intuitions are not morally useful.
6. Moral intuitions can only distract us from proper moral inquiry

Notes:
> You can figure out which of those are premises for which conclusions, and what the implicit premises are.
> I welcome criticism of point two.

You could run a similar line of reasoning for pleasure and pain (perceptions), but I don't think it applies:
1. Our perceptions are evolved
2. Evolution operates to make us fit, not to inform us
3. Our perceptions operate to make us fit, not to inform us.
4. The value of our perceptions does not depend on their external validity
5. The value of our perceptions is intrinsic. Just as the television can be valuable even if is depicts false events, so too can perceptions.
6. Perceptions can be morally useful, unlike moral intuitions.

Notes:
> I realise this looks dices, especially 5. And I realise 5 needs elaboration. But I think there is something about this reasoning that appeals to a lot of classical utilitarians.
> As far as I can recall, this is Peter Railton's metaethic for utilitarianism. I just thought you might be interested in a plain (-ish) English version.
> Once again, there are some implicit premises, let me know if they're not obvious.

I question 4 in the first argument. The argument only works if you believe there is an objective moral reality, such that something can be morally good independent of whether anyone thinks it is morally good. If one's morality is not composed of beliefs about moral facts, but instead a goal to (for example) maximize welfare, then there is no fact of the matter one can be informed or uniformed about.

+1 for Brent's statement. I was about to write the same thing until I saw that he had said it already.

RyanCarey wrote:1. Our moral intuitions are evolved
2. Evolution operates to make us fit, not to inform us
3. Our moral intuitions operate do not operate to inform us
4. The value of our intuitions depends on their truth
5. Our moral intuitions are not morally useful.
6. Moral intuitions can only distract us from proper moral inquiry

Notes:
> You can figure out which of those are premises for which conclusions, and what the implicit premises are.
> I welcome criticism of point two.

You could run a similar line of reasoning for pleasure and pain (perceptions), but I don't think it applies:
1. Our perceptions are evolved
2. Evolution operates to make us fit, not to inform us
3. Our perceptions operate to make us fit, not to inform us.
4. The value of our perceptions does not depend on their external validity
5. The value of our perceptions is intrinsic. Just as the television can be valuable even if is depicts false events, so too can perceptions.
6. Perceptions can be morally useful, unlike moral intuitions.

Sorry, I still don't see how this is an argument against deontology... don't the fourth premises in both arguments (and the fifth premise in the second) amount to already assuming deontology is false and utilitarianism correct?

I'm with tog on this one. The main reason I'm posting though is to ask: Does anyone else think of Peter Singer when they watch Larry David?