An interesting implication of cosmic inflation from New Scientist which I found via Dave Pearce: "Time need not end in the multiverse." I think this passage most clearly explains the idea:
This raises the question of why we find our universe so old. Evolution took billions of years to produce us, but that process could have happened much faster. Moreover, other universes with different laws of physics will produce life-supporting conditions sooner after their big bangs. To the extent this holds, we have anthropic evidence against the theoretical apparatus within which cosmic inflation makes this prediction.
An alternate escape route is to suppose we're in a simulation of a universe that's older than it is. But the motives for simulators to put their creatures into statistically-unlikely-old universes seem dubious.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the scenario is that it relies on a hack of slicing time at any given instant to avoid infinity problems. Maybe there's a better way to conceptualize the measures here.
If the idea is correct, are there implications for action? I don't see any immediately, since, unlike the doomsday argument, this scenario doesn't talk about how long we'll continue to exist, just how long we should expect to have existed already.
In a multiverse that grows exponentially, where each new generation of universes is far larger than the last, younger universes always outnumber older ones. Waking up, you will either be in a universe in which 1 minute has passed (heads), or in a universe in which 1 hour has passed (tails). "The experiment sets up a 59-minute ambiguity in the age of the universe," Guth says. "You should always bet on the younger one."
This raises the question of why we find our universe so old. Evolution took billions of years to produce us, but that process could have happened much faster. Moreover, other universes with different laws of physics will produce life-supporting conditions sooner after their big bangs. To the extent this holds, we have anthropic evidence against the theoretical apparatus within which cosmic inflation makes this prediction.
An alternate escape route is to suppose we're in a simulation of a universe that's older than it is. But the motives for simulators to put their creatures into statistically-unlikely-old universes seem dubious.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the scenario is that it relies on a hack of slicing time at any given instant to avoid infinity problems. Maybe there's a better way to conceptualize the measures here.
If the idea is correct, are there implications for action? I don't see any immediately, since, unlike the doomsday argument, this scenario doesn't talk about how long we'll continue to exist, just how long we should expect to have existed already.