My natural understanding for years has been that non-human high order mammals are moral agents like humans are, because I've met some of them and they seem to be complex individuals with opinions of their own. Granted their opinions are not expressed in verbally eloquent manner or do not take into account the high amount of variables a human being is capable of considering, but then most moral choices people make in their every day lives don't follow an impressively intricate ethical procedure either. I believe there is evidence non-human animals, especially mammals or vertebrates, are much alike humans, the differences being minor and in regards to mental capacity rather mainly quantitatively than qualitatively so, like Darwin would argue.

It also seems highly ironic that the generally claimed requirement for moral agency be rationality, when we homo sapiens sapiens make and have (and in my opinion I am reminded often so by people I come in contact with daily) clear signs of stupidity, irrationality, and emotional overtaking, detrimental to us or to others. Why do people continue to smoke tobacco in this day and age? Why does diffusion of responsibility exist in crouded groups? Why would a person be initially more inclined to believe their next door neighbour rather than a doctor in medicine in regards to health issues, when the doctor has a career in medicine and their next door neighbour has no fucking clue how viral infections work? Like Einstein said, "Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the universe". Moreover, sightings and studies show babies and non-human animals are capable of compassion and altruism, beyond the artificial barrier of species differentiation. It seems off then, that moral agency be attributed according to a piecewise-defined function, where

f(x) = moral agency (true-false value)
y = individual, individual ∈ {living creatures}
xsuby = 'IQ' of the y individual
z = arbitrary 'IQ' level

if xsuby >= z, then f(x) = true for y
if xsuby < z, then f(x) = false for y

I think a more fitting function would be one that attributes moral agency according to both emotional and rational skills, the more true the higher the complexity of these, where a rock has a moral agency of zero, absolutely, a unicelular organism has a moral agency of pretty much zero, and increasingly so up to the general homo sapiens sapiens individual, which has the most recognized moral agency aside from people in persistent vegetative state and the like.

The question I want to pose is, I do know that utilitarians such as Peter Singer recognize moral relevance to the fact that non-human animals have preferences or states of being that make them satisfied / happy or make them unsatisfied / unhappy. However, if this is the only metaethical way in which non-human animals are morally relevant, that opinion differs from mine in that I do not simply think preferences / satisfaction of non-human animals are morally relevant, but I think they are morally relevant in the same way I think the one of humans are relevant, in the way that they have preferences / satisfactions as moral agents. They are moral agents, like we are. They aren't simply 'holders' of preferences or satisfaction. They have a moral opinion of their own, and I listen to it like I listen to the ones of humans, if only using different methods of communicating and reading their cues because obviously non-human animals can't form verbal linguistic expressions: through study of their behaviour or if domestic, interaction.

I wanted to know if this is also the view of Peter Singer or of you sincerely here, without compromise. I think moral agency and free will are important matters in establishing the nature of ethics or what ethical theory we should follow.

First off, you can do a subscript just by setting the size really small, like this: xy. Also, x_y is a pretty common way to write it.

I don't really think "moral agency" means much. It reminds me of Diseased thinking: dissolving questions about disease. Something is bad if it causes pain. The intelligence of what did it is irrelevant.

what you're saying is fascinating and id love if you could tell us more and give us some examples!

but what way do you see this having an implication on practiaclly being a utilitarian?

Moral agent is the being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, thus capable of acting according to this moral distinction. The extent to which we consider beings moral agents has a big impact in general ethics. Any ethical theory which relies on the joined discernment of moral beings (rather than in the sole moral criteria of oneself), or that relies in intersubjectivity, is fundamentally changed depending on which beings we consider moral agents and which not. Take for example contractualism, where what is right is defined in terms of social agreement between those who (in contractualism) are deemed worthy enough to contribute to moral conclusions: the rational being, that is, those with the capacity to assess reasons and justifications, i.e. humans. It is my belief that if human beings were not traditionally considered the only moral agents, or that an elitist take on rationality wasn't the measure by which some beings are considered moral and others aren't, utilitarianism would be only one of the many non-speciesist moral theories available.

The difference between the moral contribution of non-human animals in utilitarianism and the one in the perspective I am talking about, is that in utilitarianism it is considered that non-human animals contribute to morality as a logical inference to its tenets:

Right is measured according to happiness / preferences.
Non-human animals can be happy / have preferences.
Therefore, right is also measured according to non-human animals.

In other ethical theories, which normally have a bigger load of axioms, non-human animals do not contribute to morality by explicit exclusion: only rational beings with moral discernment, or human beings, contribute to morality. So if people think, metaethically speaking, that non-human animals contribute to morals, that makes people

a) more likely to choose utilitarianism as an ethical theory
b) if not, then more likely to be non-speciesist in their morality, whether deontological, intuitive, etc.

If it is true that, metaethically speaking, non-human animals contribute to morals, then it's important to raise empathy or sympathy in regards to non-human animals, both in explicitly utilitarian and not explicitly utilitarian ways.


Something I have noticed in developing a metaethical basis and justification for choosing utilitarianism, (which hopefully I should be able to publish some day,) is that I am initially inclined a priori to think non-human animals contribute to morality, rather than entirely as a result of utilitarian inference. This is because of my experience with dogs. I like them very much, and when I interact with them I consider them equals. If they behave in some manner or show an interest on something I acknowledge their point of view like someone else would that of a person, e.g. if they run on some field it's their way of saying "I feel energetic, and this place is good for running!". This kind of acknowledgment is easier with domesticated animals as they are adapted to human behaviour and interaction, but I don't think wild animals are essentially different. So in perceiving little differences between non-human animals and humans, especially with mammals, and believing the theory of evolution proves this, I ascribe to moral agency happening not just in "rational" humans.

Nevertheless, my ponderings lead me to utilitarianism either way, and I wanted to know what's your take on this. Also, I'm not sure I should make explicit my understanding that non-human animals are moral agents too in an essay of justification for utilitarianism, since that gives a clear advantage to utilitarianism previous to choosing the most adequate ethical theory, in comparison to other ethical theories available. That may or may not ultimately serve the purpose of convincing non-utilitarians.