A friend of mine was suggesting that a good use of our resources may be to promote philosophy in schools (he mentioned someone in the UK, I think maybe Peter Worley? http://www.peterworley.com/Home.html )

His argument was that stuff like painless pesticides and wild animal suffering are too "out there" for many people at all to accept. But if we can promote empathy and stuff in general this will eventually lead to people holding similar values to us.

I'm pretty skeptical of this, the things Utilitarians are interested in promoting are often quite "out there" and I think any programme for schools would have to be made in a reasonably specific way, that nature wasn't promoted as being intrinsically good for example, but then again maybe theres no reason why we cant do that? The Peter Worley guy seems to be going at things on his own?

Interesting -- thanks for sharing.

My first thought was that promoting general philosophy in schools seems too broad and non-targeted. It might have a net beneficial impact, but it seems better to get more specific with the kinds of issues we want to raise.

My second thought was that even if students are more open to "out there" ideas as a result, this isn't necessarily a good thing. Deep ecology can seem "out there" to your ordinary man on the street, but we don't want students to become more open to deep ecology. Even more so for panbiotic ethics.

I do think it can be worthwhile to engage in targeted discussion of things like wild-animal suffering and the fact that nature isn't intrinsically valuable. That, for example, was the purpose of Oscar's presentation at Oxford recently.

Whether it would be possible to introduce this into grade schools might depend on the teacher and the school. When I was in third grade, my dad invited himself into my classroom to read a few chapters from a book that my sister and I really enjoyed. Afterward, several students told me they were planning to read that book series on their own. However, I suspect it would get very hairy to talk about a controversial subject like wild-animal suffering in third grade. That might be better saved for high schools and colleges where speakers are allowed to make one-sided presentations without being viewed with suspicion.

If we want to reach younger audiences (and I'm not sure whether we need to, since college students are still very open-minded and might be more ready for these sorts of messages), there are always other avenues, like videos, music, etc. One of my friends suggested I should write a children's book about wild-animal suffering. I don't think I would be good at it, but it's not a terrible idea, considering how many children's books there are about ecological preservation.

Alan Dawrst wrote:My first thought was that promoting general philosophy in schools seems too broad and non-targeted.

Yes, and if there were such a policy about teaching philosophy in schools (at least in the U.S.) it could even be counterproductive if the politicians cherry-pick what to teach and mandate education on deontological principles or something that will add confusion.

Alan Dawrst wrote: I do think it can be worthwhile to engage in targeted discussion of things like wild-animal suffering and the fact that nature isn't intrinsically valuable.

I agree, but I think it would be difficult to enact that as public policy because people (where I live) currently would oppose the idea of dedicating resources to any kind of animal suffering.

I imagine a "philosophical intervention" that begins with a study of psychology and the abundant evidence that suggests that humans, as a species, overestimate the powers of their own intuition and fail to understand that the "feeling of knowing" is not the same as actually knowing something to be true. It will be exceedingly difficult to guide people to legitimate philosophical insight when they approach every new idea with the belief that their existing beliefs are the legitimate standard against which new ideas should be evaluated. After the defenses are debilitated, it might be possible to lead some people to develop more rational beliefs about ethics and rationality itself.

If utilitarianism is the rational consequence of certain first principles (which I believe), and people can learn to overcome their objections to utilitarianism through rational analysis (which I also believe), it should work to teach some combination of ethics and rationality.

It makes sense to spend a lot more time teaching ethics, I think. But we cannot teach ethics alone. People's decisions are nearly always affected by irrational influences; so we should teach how to think rationally and question one's own assumptions and prejudices. Unfortunately, this is not the sort of thing that can be taught in a guest lecture; it will require institutional-scale changes.

MTGandP wrote:If utilitarianism is the rational consequence of certain first principles (which I believe), and people can learn to overcome their objections to utilitarianism through rational analysis (which I also believe), it should work to teach some combination of ethics and rationality.

That is essentially what I think with a minor footnote saying "a certain interpretation of utilitarianism." My research goal in the long run is to identify the existing beliefs that most profoundly disrupt a person's ability to reach rational conclusions with respect to ethical issues, then develop "interventions" (that's psychobable for a "treatment" or "cure", or what a teacher might call a "curriculum") that help people to overcome theses barriers one at a time (or bundled together where appropriate). I am currently working on the topic of ethical beliefs about nature, but the results should apply elsewhere.

Based on the typical path of any psychological counseling, the first year of treatment is characterized by the patient's denial that the problem exists. When applied to ethical beliefs, people who believe that it is immoral to work on Sunday and perfectly moral to chop animals into pieces and eat them believe that they understand the ethical issue and will completely deny that a problem exists. People who are in denial can look right at a rational argument and ignore it either by denying the premises (ad infinitum) or via a Moorean fact (acknowledge that there is a contradiction but never the less deny the opposing argument with the belief that there must be something wrong with it even though the person cannot identify what is wrong at the moment). The latter situation is preferable--I found myself in that situation on some ethical issues before accepting the rational conclusion of the dilemma.

MTGandP wrote:If utilitarianism is the rational consequence of certain first principles (which I believe), and people can learn to overcome their objections to utilitarianism through rational analysis (which I also believe), it should work to teach some combination of ethics and rationality.

Hmm, I'm wary of the first claim. Yes, utilitarianism can be deduced from certain first principles, but so can deontology and so can paperclip maximization.

I do think that teaching rationality strengthens consequentialist thinking on average, but I don't think this is because utilitarianism has a special relationship with rationality. Teaching rationality on the planet of paperclip maximizers would also strengthen paperclip maximization.

But insofar as it seems to be empirically the case that rationality training helps utilitarian thinking among modern humans, I think it's generally a good thing.

It seems likely to me that rationality leads people from virtue ethics and deontology to consequentialism and nihilism. Last year's survey at the rationalist website lesswrong found that
"680 people (62.4%) were consequentialist, 152 (13.9%) virtue ethicist, 49 (4.5%) deontologist, and 145 (13.3%) did not believe in morality."

It would seem that a few active consequentialists can help more (even if they only give a small percentage of their income in aid) than a large number of nihilists can harm. So this is a very favourable balance. However, imo, personality factors could account for most of this result, rather than rationality per se.

RyanCarey wrote:It would seem that a few active consequentialists can help more (even if they only give a small percentage of their income in aid) than a large number of nihilists can harm.

Virtue ethicists might give a lot too; I'm not sure. For example, many Christians subscribe to virtue ethics, and Jesus commanded giving lots to the poor, though obviously the impact is blunted in practice. Plus, this giving is probably not optimized for efficiency. (Many religious people donate a lot, but it goes to their churches, or maybe to soup kitches.)

More importantly, there aren't nearly as many Christians who donate to veg outreach. (Still, there are a few.)

RyanCarey wrote:So this is a very favourable balance. However, imo, personality factors could account for most of this result, rather than rationality per se.

Yes. Also, causation going the other way: I'm interested in LessWrong and care about rationality because I'm a consequentialist. In other words, I first cared about reducing suffering, and because doing that required knowing how the multiverse works, I then became interested in better understanding how the multiverse works.

I don't think most people will ever consistently take whatever philosophical or ethical beliefs and principles they hold to their logical conclusions which is partly why I think promoting utilitarianism is pointless.

we can promote empathy and stuff in general this will eventually lead to people holding similar values to us.

I once believed this but people have different ideas about what empathy is or involves, I think two equally compassionate people can come to radically different conclusions depending on their worldviews. Without a rationally thought out, organized system to guide empathic feelings, empathy won't necessarily make much of a difference (especially if people are empathetic on the basis of enlightened self-interest and not because they believe everyone's interests have the same inherent value from an 'objective' point of view).

Ruari wrote:we can promote empathy and stuff in general this will eventually lead to people holding similar values to us.

Ubuntu wrote: I think two equally compassionate people can come to radically different conclusions depending on their worldviews. Without a rationally thought out, organized system to guide empathic feelings, empathy won't necessarily make much of a difference

What people can do is develop a habit or a culture in which people take the time to consider the perspective of others--perhaps this is hair-splitting, but people can control the flow of their actions and thoughts (to some degree) and empathy follows as a consequence. Buddhists might call this "cultivating compassion," and I experienced this first-hand and observed how my behavior changed (initially toward homeless panhandlers near where I lived).

Two people with the same "empathy" could come to radically different conclusions, but research on empathy shows that people who rate themselves as having more empathic feeling about something are more prone to help--it's not a sure thing, but the odds are in favor of the empathic person helping more than the nonempathic person. You can get an idea of what the research say by looking at abstracts or full articles on "empathy and altruistic behavior" http://tinyurl.com/d5d2tnl. If you search from a university campus, you'll have better access to the full articles.

Alan Dawrst wrote:

MTGandP wrote:If utilitarianism is the rational consequence of certain first principles (which I believe), and people can learn to overcome their objections to utilitarianism through rational analysis (which I also believe), it should work to teach some combination of ethics and rationality.

Hmm, I'm wary of the first claim. Yes, utilitarianism can be deduced from certain first principles, but so can deontology and so can paperclip maximization.

One of those first principles is that well-being matters (or something along those lines).

Ubuntu wrote:I don't think most people will ever consistently take whatever philosophical or ethical beliefs and principles they hold to their logical conclusions which is partly why I think promoting utilitarianism is pointless.

Perhaps we're talking about slightly different things, but I think "promoting utilitarianism" doesn't have much to do with explaining the philosophical content in an academic way, unless the situation calls for it. It's mainly about giving examples of cost-effective causes to support, challenging received intuitions (e.g., that natural suffering is acceptable), focusing on efficiency in charity, making friends, sharing ideas, having fun.

Peter Singer is a great example of what it looks like to promote utilitarianism. While he can speak to fellow philosophers in journal articles if he needs to, he usually explains ideas without jargon or overarching philosophical edifices. He appeals to people's reason and their emotions, focusing on concrete examples and things they can do. Animal Liberation has sold over 400,000 copies. Whether those readers are people who "hold to their logical conclusions" or not, a significant minority of them have been influenced to eat less meat.

Ubuntu wrote:I think two equally compassionate people can come to radically different conclusions depending on their worldviews.

Agree. Many empathetic people are working to preserve wild-animal habitats, with the effect of increasing the amount of small-animal suffering in those regions.

However, I do think empathy better correlates with actions that reduce suffering than a coin toss. Even if that isn't true now, it's not so important. What matters mainly is that empathetic values persevere into the age of friendly AI. The AI can figure out the facts for us later, but we need to get its values correct now.

Ubuntu wrote:especially if people are empathetic on the basis of enlightened self-interest and not because they believe everyone's interests have the same inherent value from an 'objective' point of view

That's an interesting phrase. What does it mean to be empathetic out of self-interest? I thought the definition of empathy was caring about others for their own sake. Or are you thinking of people who feel better when they help others because they would feel bad if they didn't?

rehoot wrote:Two people with the same "empathy" could come to radically different conclusions, but research on empathy shows that people who rate themselves as having more empathic feeling about something are more prone to help

Also more likely to be vegetarian.

Empathy, to my knowledge, is the ability to understand others' emotion.

RyanCarey wrote:Empathy, to my knowledge, is the ability to understand others' emotion.

You are correct. I think I often misuse the word when what I actually mean is "sympathy." From Wikipedia's article:

Empathy is distinct from sympathy (which includes empathizing with in addition to having a positive regard or non-fleeting concern for the object thereof) [...]. Sympathy or empathic concern is the feeling of compassion or concern for another, the wish to see them better off or happier.

RyanCarey wrote:Empathy, to my knowledge, is the ability to understand others' emotion.

I understand it to mean you're vaguely reflective of their emotion, whereas one can sympathise with someone while feeling an emotion quite different to anything they're feeling.

Two people with the same "empathy" could come to radically different conclusions, but research on empathy shows that people who rate themselves as having more empathic feeling about something are more prone to help--it's not a sure thing, but the odds are in favor of the empathic person helping more than the nonempathic person. You can get an idea of what the research say by looking at abstracts or full articles on "empathy and altruistic behavior" http://tinyurl.com/d5d2tnl. If you search from a university campus, you'll have better access to the full articles.

Yes but people define 'help' in different ways because they have different ideas about what's in a person's interests as well as how to go about promoting those interests. A deontologist whose opposed to euthanizing terminally ill patients might genuinely base their position on a concern for what they view as being the welfare of other people but I would say their concern is seriously misguided and harmful. I say this partly because I always took on a literal definition of em/sympathy, 'to feel with' or be 'in feeling' with someone and, naturally, to want their happiness and freedom from suffering as a result, but you could argue that empathy is more complicated than that (Michael Slote argues that empathy is necessarily partial and concerned with the concrete here and now instead of the abstract genocide over there, an intelligent alien species may be adapted for the kind of impartial, quantitative empathy that HU requires but we aren't) and there are actions that most people would say express empathy or lack of empathy but have no actual consequences for other people (ie. rape fantasies, gossiping behind someone's back, leaving flowers on someone's grave, ). I agree that empathetic people are more likely to help others than non-empathetic people are and I can't think of a non-emotional reason to want to maximize aggregate happiness/minimize aggregate suffering, I just think a rationally thought out and logically consistent ethical system is needed to properly guide empathy.

That's an interesting phrase. What does it mean to be empathetic out of self-interest? I thought the definition of empathy was caring about others for their own sake. Or are you thinking of people who feel better when they help others because they would feel bad if they didn't?

Yes, basically. Basing the rightness or wrongness of actions on what they say about your character instead of real world consequences. If we could simulate the positive feeling that comes with altruistic behavior w/out behaving altruistically, I don't see why someone who behaves altruistically because 'humans need to cooperate to survive' or 'true happiness comes from compassion' (even if all of this is true) should do so. Virtue ethics can sometimes disregard the bad consequences of well- intentioned decisions because the concern is with with intention/character and not directly with other people.

It was wrong to say that promoting utilitarianism is completely pointless (although I'm not personally interested in doing so since I'm not a utilitarian), I'm just skeptical as to how much of a difference it could make even if you convince people to align themselves with utilitarianism intellectually. Many 'utilitarians' are actually under the impression that HU is concerned with *human* happiness, for example, and still eat factory farmed meat.

Arepo wrote:I understand it to mean you're vaguely reflective of their emotion, whereas one can sympathise with someone while feeling an emotion quite different to anything they're feeling.

I was always taught that empathy means understanding another person's situation, whereas sympathy means feeling it vicariously. e.g. as a doctor, it is important to empathise with your patients, but one would quickly become emotionally exhausted if one sympathised with all of them. Anyway, I'm sure people will seek to draw various related distinctions, and even to define them in various contradictory ways.

Thanks, Ubuntu.

Ubuntu wrote:If we could simulate the positive feeling that comes with altruistic behavior w/out behaving altruistically

Yes. I think scope insensitivity already hints in that direction.

Ubuntu wrote:Many 'utilitarians' are actually under the impression that HU is concerned with *human* happiness, for example, and still eat factory farmed meat.

Well, let's get to work changing those misunderstandings.

On that topic, I've always been disappointed with many welfare economists, because they have great utilitarian tools and are often utilitarians themselves, but they totally neglect animals. Yew-Kwang Ng is one exception, as can be seen from his exceptional "Towards Welfare Biology" paper.

MTGandP wrote:utilitarianism is the rational consequence of certain first principles (which I believe), and people can learn to overcome their objections to utilitarianism through rational analysis (which I also believe)

Is there a thread about this (particularly the first claim, and reasons to be a utilitarian)? I would search for one if the search worked :p

Here's my reason for being utilitarian: Suffering is really bad, and I want to prevent as much of it as I can. Pretty simple.

All of the mechanics of utilitarianism in terms of optimization, expected values, Bayesian probability, and the like come along with standard decision theory agreed upon by most rational people. See, e.g., Dutch Book arguments for Bayesianism.

I think utilitarianism would fall out of a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" scenario, although Rawls reached different conclusions because he maximized the minimum instead of maximizing the expected value. (Note: I am not a philosophy student and don't really know what I'm talking about here.) Actually, this only gives you average utilitarianism, whereas total utilitarianism is clearly correct, so the veil of ignorance should actually apply to all beings that could exist, or something like that.

For one attempt at rigorous axiomatic justification, see Harsanyi's "utilitarian theorem." And Yew-Kwang Ng has written some nice papers defending cardinal hedonistic utilitarianism (which is my preferred flavor).