Who agrees/disagrees?

I vote "maybe", because it depends on how you define "free will". Though, I personally take a compatibilist view of it.

I put yes. Everything you do is dictated by physics, but you're the subset of physics it's dictated by. I'm leaning towards maybe, though. I don't really understand what people generally mean by "free will".

DanielLC wrote:I put yes. Everything you do is dictated by physics, but you're the subset of physics it's dictated by. I'm leaning towards maybe, though. I don't really understand what people generally mean by "free will".

I agree with you completely despite having a different answer, which is indicative of the wonderful confusion of free will.

People with vastly different views on the free will issue usually disagree over nothing more than the definition of the term.

For now my best definition would be that free will is the ability to make a choice. If there are choices in life to be made you have free will.

@ peterhurford. I found this part a bit confusing: "It would be absolutely ridiculous to deny that choices exist. I could do this or do that. But all my choices are determined."

If choices are determined then it isn't a choice at all.
Why is it ridiculous to deny that choices exist?

Also the part about the Prediction Machine is just wrong. The number of mistakes made was absurd, I had to stop reading at that.

The best conclusion I came up with to this problem is that free will does not exist at all. To an omniscient entity there is no free will. If this is true then this means that no one is responsible for their actions. No one can be blamed for any thing they do because they had no choice in the matter. However omniscience is (at least currently) impossible, and being able to hold people accountable for their action is very practical i.e. putting felons in jail.

To most people this presents a problem. How can we knowingly decrease the happiness of a person because of some thing that happened threw no fault of their own. An example would be, a 10 year old boy repeatedly gets raped and beaten by his step father for several years and never has to "pay for his crimes", thus changing the boys brain chemistry to be (possibly) psychopathic. It isn't his fault this happened to him. So is it his fault if he grows up messed up and commits crimes of his own?

Ordinarily yes, because he has free will to not do those things, he is accountable for his actions. How ever, if there are no choices to be made and because reality is quantifiable, any one with his genetic makeup and memories (so only him) would make the EXACT same "choices".

If only one out come is possible how can we punish him? As utilitarians we don't have this moral problem in the same way others do. Even though he is not at fault, its for the best of every one that he be imprisoned and can not harm others. Because of this however we run into a new problem. No matter how evil a person may seem to us, we have a responsibility to make them happy if it does not effect the happiness of others.

I also came up with a solution for other people who are not utilitarians. Perceived free will is a concept I came up with that allows us to hold people accountable to their actions without ignoring the "truth" that free will in the metaphysical sense does not exist.

Since none of us are omniscient we are given an illusion of free will. I do not know for certain which choices I will make in the future for myself let alone which choices others will make. This gives us the illusion, however this don't not diminish the fact that every thing is already predetermined to an omniscient being.

A summery of what all this means to me is that most of the time we need to hold people accountable for their actions because it lets us do a few very useful things.
1. We can imprison people for the safety of the public.
2. Just having the knowledge that we ought to be accountable for our action will shape our minds to make the inevitable out come of choices people make one we want.

In a world were one is not accountable for what one does, a person would be probably more likely to commit crimes. This doesn't mean that in reality one is "accountable".

On top of all that there is another point to be made. There are practice reasons for why we shouldn't think free will exists. Again this doesn't make it true or untrue.

If free will does not exist and we keep trying to solve problems by holding people accountable instead of trying to find the real reason and solving that, the problem will be recurring.

Here is some thing I found interesting.

The part that deals with what I'm talking about is at 9:40, but starting from 6:07 is needed background information.

This seems to be a sociological problem and not a character flaw. This and many other sociological problems, for example the bystander effect, would be ignored if every one was completely responsible for all of their actions.

I think as our understanding of sociology and our technology increases we ought to admit more and more that people are not in control of themselves as we believe they are and instead of blaming individuals, find solutions for problems.

For example for the Penn State situation, create new procedures to prevent it from happening again in the future. This seems better than relying on the next group of people it happens to, to make the right decisions.

I don't get how a faulty perception of free will would solve the ethical problem punishment creates for non-utilitarians. I think it would allow people to be ignorant of the problem.

LJM1979 wrote:I don't get how a faulty perception of free will would solve the ethical problem punishment creates for non-utilitarians. I think it would allow people to be ignorant of the problem.

Ya, either way if you take a side you are likely to run into problems. It would seem the key is to act as if free will existed on a personal level, to your self, friends and family, but act as if it didn't exist in sociological settings.

With the Penn State situation you'd need to act as if its your fault if you are one of the people involved but from the rest of society's point of few another solution must be found other than simply blaming others.

Nap wrote:@ peterhurford.

Hey,

Thanks for taking the time to tear through my essay. It's also been brought to my attention by another person that it's terribly wrong in many respects, so it's definitely time I revise it. The things I learn in just a year...

I'd like to comment on your responses though, for hoping to better understand the concept of "free will".

Understanding Choice

Nap wrote:If choices are determined then it isn't a choice at all.

If a choice is undetermined, then it's completely random. The idea of something being *your* choice is that it's *your* personal volition that decides how something turns out. Thus choices for you are the ones that are specifically chosen by you.

The wrinkle is that you are not some dualistic, quasi-theistic "unmoved mover" who can summon choices out of your own volition from nothing -- your voilition is also determined, and it's contradictory to suggest otherwise (otherwise your volition is undetermined and thus random and thus also out of your control).

As Arthur Schopenhauer said, we can "do what we will", but we cannot "will what we will". I think that's the essence of compatibilism -- if you think free will consists in "doing what we will", then free will exists. If you think free will consists in "willing what we will" with undetermined choices and "choosing otherwise" in completely identical situations, then free will doesn't exist.

Free will is, I think, can be a useful concept if applied consistently to distinguish situations in which we did what we willed from situations in which we couldn't (coercion, alien hand syndrome, psychological insanity, cognitive biases, etc.). Indeed, this is how it's often used in courts of law.

~

Nap wrote:Since none of us are omniscient we are given an illusion of free will. I do not know for certain which choices I will make in the future for myself let alone which choices others will make.

In the case where we were omniscient and knew what action we would take in the future, I think we would be caught in an extensively odd feedback loop, because it seems like it would be an open choice for us to not do what we predict we would. Such oddness seems to ground many time travel paradoxes and arguments against omniscient gods.

Likewise, just because something is predetermined to an omniscient being doesn't mean it wasn't predetermined *by us*. As DanielLC mentioned (alluding to Eliezer Yudkowsky's work) we are personally part of physics, and thus have personal control part of what is predetermined.

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Understanding Blame and Fault

Nap wrote:No one can be blamed for anything they do because they had no choice in the matter.

I don't think that's the case, or at least that's not how I use the word "blame". We can't be blamed for who we are in some outside-view sense of having chosen our own path through life and the determinants of our actions, but we can be blamed for not acting in accord to a certain standard (moral, legal, etiquette, epistemic, etc.) -- it was an option for us to act in accord with it, and we still did not, and it was our deterministic cognitive algorithm that made that choice.

The goal of punishment is, at least on utilitarian standards, to most effectively make the world a better place. Thus, I aim to reduce the amount of crimes committed through incapacitation and hopefully rehabilitation of the prisoner herself and through a deterrent to other prisoners. I would never want to punish someone for the sake of retribution.

~

Nap wrote:Ordinarily yes, because he has free will to not do those things, he is accountable for his actions. How ever, if there are no choices to be made and because reality is quantifiable, any one with his genetic makeup and memories (so only him) would make the EXACT same "choices". If only one outcome is possible how can we punish him?

We punish him for having the genetic makeup that he does; indeed people are equivalent to their genetic makeups, so it's identical to punishing the person himself.

~

The Rationale of Punishment

Nap wrote:An example would be, a 10 year old boy repeatedly gets raped and beaten by his step father for several years and never has to "pay for his crimes", thus changing the boys brain chemistry to be (possibly) psychopathic. It isn't his fault this happened to him. So is it his fault if he grows up messed up and commits crimes of his own?

Was it his deterministic cognitive algorithms that led to him getting raped? Of course not. Neither was it his algorithm that was responsible for the self-modification into psycopathy. Still, now that he is a psychopathic algorithm, it becomes his fault that he is committing crimes.

Of course, it might be the case that with psycopathy, the most effective way to stop the crimes from reoccurring and restore the criminal back to a productive, happy member of society is some sort of drug to change the brain chemistry. For other cases, it might require jail.

(Two notes here: Firstly, our jails are currently a great problem in underserving and mistreating society and the criminal population; they're definitely not ideal by utilitarian standards.

Secondly, I suppose it's possible that in the future this may be understood to be an effective response to all criminal motivations, not just psycopathy. Lots more research would be needed in this area.)

~

Nap wrote:To most people this presents a problem. How can we knowingly decrease the happiness of a person because of some thing that happened threw no fault of their own.

The crime was committed due to their deterministic cognitive algorithm, thus they are the person responsible, and thus I do take it to be their fault. Still, even if its someone's fault, this wouldn't mean we can decrease their happiness.

As a utilitarian, I agree with you that the only rationale for decreasing someone's happiness is that it increases the happiness of others elsewhere. Punishment often does that through incarceration and deterrence.

~

Nap wrote:If free will does not exist and we keep trying to solve problems by holding people accountable instead of trying to find the real reason and solving that, the problem will be recurring.

This is true even if there is free will -- it's hard to influence people to change their behavior, and it may be better to try to do so in systematic ways, like good institutional, social, and moral pressure, and good security.

Likewise, I agree with you that we may also want to analyze the determinants of that behavior -- what is going on in that deterministic cognitive algorithm that leads people to act the way they do.

Just because people can be meaningfully blamed and held responsible doesn't mean that using such strong language and accusing the individual is the optimal response for getting what we want. Likewise, even if people can't be meaningfully blamed or held responsible doesn't mean we can't get what we want by using such language anyway.

~

Stuff I Didn't Understand

Nap wrote:I also came up with a solution for other people who are not utilitarians. Perceived free will is a concept I came up with that allows us to hold people accountable to their actions without ignoring the "truth" that free will in the metaphysical sense does not exist.

Nap wrote:On top of all that there is another point to be made. There are practice reasons for why we shouldn't think free will exists. Again this doesn't make it true or untrue.

These two didn't make any sense to me. I couldn't figure out any other way to organize my response to highlight that.

Again, thanks.

If a choice is undetermined, then it's completely random.

I wouldn't think of it as being random but instead as being possible. If a choice is undetermined, than more out comes are completely possible. However if it is determined then only one out come is possible.

Place two cards in-front of a person. One green and one yellow, now ask the person to choose one. If choice is possible either card can be picked up, however if choice is not possible it would be as if only one card was on the table. How can a person be held accountable for choosing the wrong card if its the only one on the table and they must pick one?

A person doesn't choose to be who they are, not their memories or their DNA which are the only two things I know of that make a person themselves. Every person with the same DNA and same memories would "choose" (or lack their of) the same card in the same situation. There was never the possibility of the second card being picked up.

Again this is for none utilitarians only (we don't need to worry about this as much), punishing an innocent person is generally considered wrong. With that in-mind lets say in a fictional society picking the yellow card is considered a crime and not picking a card is an even greater crime. Now, lets pretend you are not a utilitarian. You believe that people who commit crimes are bad, and bad people must pay for their crimes in the name of justice. Does it make sense to punish a person for putting him/her in-front of one card and where choosing this card and not choosing that card are both crimes?

Free will is, I think, can be a useful concept if applied consistently to distinguish situations in which we did what we willed from situations in which we couldn't (coercion, alien hand syndrome, psychological insanity, cognitive biases, etc.). Indeed, this is how it's often used in courts of law.

I don't understand this part. ^^

In the case where we were omniscient and knew what action we would take in the future, I think we would be caught in an extensively odd feedback loop, because it seems like it would be an open choice for us to not do what we predict we would. Such oddness seems to ground many time travel paradoxes and arguments against omniscient gods.

I have put a lot of work into understanding time and free will and I think its impossible for this situation to happen. To predict that much information that accurately, it would be necessarily to have as much "power" working to predict the situation as the situation has, if you are running at 100% efficiency, this is only in a closed system of course.

So basically, if you wanted to make a machine that predicted the future with a 100% accuracy it could only predict as much information as is used in the machine.

Imagine you create 2 solar systems and replicate the speed, type and direction of every atom. Now you delay one solar system by a day from the other. Make sure you separate them from the rest of the universe (might as well be impossible but this is just a theoretical thought experiment) You have a probe in both that submit information to a position relativity equal from each solar system. Both will be completely equal and you can gather data from both with out affecting either one more than the other.

In theory you should be able to predict what will happen in the second solar system from the data you get from the first. You could also go into the second one and change what would have happened a day later thus changing the time line of the second one.

You can not have a machine predict the future 100% actually inside a system because that machine is part of that future the machine would need to be able to predict the system and its own future. That's like saying one of the solar systems would need to be calculating faster than its moving its self. It can't do that, it can only predict what will happen to the other solar system.

This is of course ignoring quantum mechanics, I don't not pretend to understand it very well but what the average person claims to understand of it is absurd to me. "You can't predict where certain particles will be, because they reappear in random locations." No, just because you (we) have not found of a way to predict it doesn't mean it can't be done, and even if we never will be able to, that doesn't mean its "random".

Likewise, just because something is predetermined to an omniscient being doesn't mean it wasn't predetermined *by us*. As DanielLC mentioned (alluding to Eliezer Yudkowsky's work) we are personally part of physics, and thus have personal control part of what is predetermined.

Its not personal control though. I guess you can see it as such but that view appears to be useless to me. If you drop a rock it has one choice, to fall, if it then follows this choice by falling would you call this control, choice or free will?

I don't really see the point is saying every atom has the free will to do exactly one thing. But if that's how you'd like to look at it I guess its not completely wrong. It just brings you back to square one; using only reason, accountability is illogical from a moral justice stand point. It might be reasonable from a practicality stand point, aka: "I need to think I'm accountable for my own good and the good of others", but this is then denying the truth that there is no free will.

This brings up a new question that I don't want to get into right now, should we ever lie?

But this is what my theory does, it presents a way out, a way to think of your self as being accountable for your action with out giving up the truth that you aren't.

but we can be blamed for not acting in accord to a certain standard (moral, legal, etiquette, epistemic, etc.) -- it was an option for us to act in accord with it, and we still did not, and it was our deterministic cognitive algorithm that made that choice.

But see that's the problem I have. Because of our deterministic cognitive algorithm there was only one choice, and that is to me no longer a choice. We were not given an option other than what happened/will happen.

The goal of punishment is, at least on utilitarian standards, to most effectively make the world a better place. Thus, I aim to reduce the amount of crimes committed through incapacitation and hopefully rehabilitation of the prisoner herself and through a deterrent to other prisoners. I would never want to punish someone for the sake of retribution.

Agreed.

We punish him for having the genetic makeup that he does; indeed people are equivalent to their genetic makeups, so it's identical to punishing the person himself.

I didn't choose to be me, I never asked for the good or bad in me, why should I be reworded or punished for either in a non-utilitarian world?

In a utilitarian world this is simple. I am reworded or punished so I keep doing good and stop doing bad, because good is the goal. If being punished for me doing good, made me do more good I should continue to be punished, if the good I do is better than the punishment on me. This seems to be counter-intuitive and luckily doesn't happen often in reality but this is what I think of when I think of the utilitarian way. The biggest problem with this is no ones probably smart enough to know all the effects this might have, but if you were certain it was that simple then, ya.

Secondly, I suppose it's possible that in the future this may be understood to be an effective response to all criminal motivations, not just psycopathy. Lots more research would be needed in this area.)

Agreed. I see no difference in a psychopath, or a "murderer" when it comes to who should be punished from a moral stand point. To me none of us asked to be who we are. The difference of the two is our understanding of what made them do these things and currently we are more sympathetic to the psychopath.

I also came up with a solution for other people who are not utilitarians. Perceived free will is a concept I came up with that allows us to hold people accountable to their actions without ignoring the "truth" that free will in the metaphysical sense does not exist.

I tried to explain this better again:

It just brings you back to square one; using only reason, accountability is illogical from a moral justice stand point. It might be reasonable from a practicality stand point, aka: "I need to think I'm accountable for my own good and the good of others", but this is then denying the truth that there is no free will.

But this is what my theory does, it presents a way out, a way to think of your self as being accountable for your action with out giving up the truth that you aren't.

On top of all that there is another point to be made. There are practice reasons for why we shouldn't think free will exists. Again this doesn't make it true or untrue.

Two typos in there, it should be:

There are practical reasons for why we should think free will does not exist.

I agree that it's just a matter of terminological distinctions, and I recommend reading Dan Dennett in favour of the idea of free will and Sam Harris against.

Here's my two cents (I'm too lazy to read through all of the posts ):

I don't believe in free will. The definitional issues come because no one knows eactly what they mean when they say that there is free will--kind of like how when someone says that they believe in god, it's sometimes hard to argue against it because in the end it's not clear exactly what they're arguing for. But, in the end, I don't think there's any extra-physical mechanism. That's not quite to say that the universe is deterministic--there may well be randomness (e.g. quantum mechanical randomness)--but that sort of randomness is extremely well controlled by physics; if you measure 1,000 electrons' spin you can't predict which will have what spin but there is nothing anyone can do to change the distribution of distributions of spins that you'll measure.

Hutch wrote:Here's my two cents (I'm too lazy to read through all of the posts ):

I don't believe in free will. The definitional issues come because no one knows eactly what they mean when they say that there is free will--kind of like how when someone says that they believe in god, it's sometimes hard to argue against it because in the end it's not clear exactly what they're arguing for. But, in the end, I don't think there's any extra-physical mechanism. That's not quite to say that the universe is deterministic--there may well be randomness (e.g. quantum mechanical randomness)--but that sort of randomness is extremely well controlled by physics; if you measure 1,000 electrons' spin you can't predict which will have what spin but there is nothing anyone can do to change the distribution of distributions of spins that you'll measure.

I'd agree with this. I think the terminological issues add confusion to the issue. However, I've never read an argument in support of free will where the definition and conceptualization of free will made sense to me. I come closest to bio-environmental determinism. If push came to shove, I'd be willing to ditch the bio part, though, because our biological features are just a result of prior environmental circumstances (i.e., the behavior of our ancestors).

Hutch wrote:I'm too lazy to read through all of the posts

I think my best argument against free will was in this part.

Likewise, just because something is predetermined to an omniscient being doesn't mean it wasn't predetermined *by us*. As DanielLC mentioned (alluding to Eliezer Yudkowsky's work) we are personally part of physics, and thus have personal control part of what is predetermined.

Its not personal control though. I guess you can see it as such but that view appears to be useless to me. If you drop a rock it has one choice, to fall, if it then follows this choice by falling would you call this control, choice or free will?

I don't really see the point is saying every atom has the free will to do exactly one thing. But if that's how you'd like to look at it I guess its not completely wrong. It just brings you back to square one; using only reason, accountability is illogical from a moral justice stand point. It might be reasonable from a practicality stand point, aka: "I need to think I'm accountable for my own good and the good of others", but this is then denying the truth that there is no free will.

What's the point in saying we have free will if inanimate (by this I mean rocks, dirt, planets, stars etc.) objects also have it?

I don't think its just a question of semantics/terminology, it does have real consequence. I.e. How can non-utilitarians support any type of punishment from a moral stand point?

A person that doesn't believe in free will is more likely to become a utilitarian I think.

Nap wrote:

Hutch wrote:I'm too lazy to read through all of the posts

I think my best argument against free will was in this part.

Likewise, just because something is predetermined to an omniscient being doesn't mean it wasn't predetermined *by us*. As DanielLC mentioned (alluding to Eliezer Yudkowsky's work) we are personally part of physics, and thus have personal control part of what is predetermined.

Its not personal control though. I guess you can see it as such but that view appears to be useless to me. If you drop a rock it has one choice, to fall, if it then follows this choice by falling would you call this control, choice or free will?

I don't really see the point is saying every atom has the free will to do exactly one thing. But if that's how you'd like to look at it I guess its not completely wrong. It just brings you back to square one; using only reason, accountability is illogical from a moral justice stand point. It might be reasonable from a practicality stand point, aka: "I need to think I'm accountable for my own good and the good of others", but this is then denying the truth that there is no free will.

What's the point in saying we have free will if inanimate (by this I mean rocks, dirt, planets, stars etc.) objects also have it?

I don't think its just a question of semantics/terminology, it does have real consequence. I.e. How can non-utilitarians support any type of punishment from a moral stand point?

A person that doesn't believe in free will is more likely to become a utilitarian I think.

Either that or a moral relativist

I just finished watching Sam Harris's lecture on free will (it's very good!), and now I really want to blog about free will, but I think I'll settle for typing more in response here, so I can see if my thoughts survive reflective equilibrium with some peers. I apologize for the length.

So here's my thinking on "free will", starting from the top.

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Free Will and Choices

What is a choice? For this analogy, I'd like to consider a chess playing computer program. This program is given the chess board as an input. The program than references the rules of chess and determines all possible moves. The computer will then make use of move trees to calculate possible futures of actions and then score them by how much the chess board position has changed into the program's favor. The computer will then choose to move the chess piece that it determines to be most likely to help win the game.

Now, the computer's choice is completely determined by the algorithm of the computer. Running it again with the same board will generate the same choice again*. No other choices are physically possible.

Humans are analogous to this chess playing computer -- we have conscious and unconscious algorithms that attempt to evaluate a bunch of possible choices and deterministically settle on the "best" choice, except (1) we are not nearly as rational or quick thinking in implementing them and (2) we play for far more possible goals than just winning at chess.

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Free Will and Who I Am

So people say "I don't have free will". For awhile, I thought the hang up was in the "free will" part -- there was some confusion where "no free will" was being conflated with "no choice". But now I see that the hang up is in "I" -- thinking that we, as people, are only our *conscious* algorithms, and not our unconscious ones -- hence the "the decision is made before you're aware of it" arguments.

So, there's you, and you are the sum of your deterministic cognitive algorithms. When you make a choice, it is completely determined by these algorithms and the situation you are in, and there is only one physically possible outcome, though there are multiple "open" choices, which are things I could do *had I wanted to do so* (if I were a slightly different person).

"Open" choices can be distinguished from "closed" choices, which are the kinds of things I can't do *even if I wanted to*, like jump fifty feet unaided by equipment. The feeling of "open" choices gives rise to a feeling of being able to choose otherwise, even though you didn't.

These algorithms can be explained as the movement of atoms following the laws of physics. This makes people feel like they are excluded. But again, that's because of the problem with "I" -- people aren't identifying as moving atoms, which is what people are. Instead, they identify with desires, motivations, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, etc. These are the cause of your action as well, but that's because they are also atoms in motion.

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The Meaning of "Free Will"

So I'm tempted to take "free will" very literally -- I am *free* to pursue my *will*, and my actions will unfold according to my deterministic algorithms for will pursuance, unhindered (free) by other factors. The alternative is either the actions are determined by someone who isn't me -- such as the result of threat or trickery of others to get me to act contrary to how I would ideally want to, or determined by randomness, and thus still not controlled by me.

There are no souls, "choosing otherwise", extra-physical "spooky stuff", only determinism, and my desires determining my actions.

In order to pursue my will, I need to know what my will is and be able to set out to do it -- mental illnesses can deprive me of either sufficient knowledge and deliberative reasoning (say insanity) or deprive me of my ability to consciously set my action (alien hand syndrome).

Fatalism would suggest that I'm helplessly trapped to watch my life unfold according to the laws of physics, with no personal input about it -- my future is "fated", and will unfold regardless of what I do. However, my personal input is part of physics, it's also represented in the atoms, and it is part of what determines my choice.

It's my personal ability to deliberate that gives me this "free will". It's the same thing the chess program has -- a program that condenses the open choice-options into one chosen-choice. Anything without a deliberative algorithm, like a rock, doesn't have this free will.

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Accountability and Blame

A large majority of this thread has to do with accountability and responsibility, which are closely related to free will. You guys have made the argument "I didn't choose to be me", etc.

Imagine we know someone who decided to steal, as in their deterministic cognitive deliberative algorithm implemented the stealing action because it was the action determined to be in most accord with the thief's will. The rationale behind the stealing was growing up in an abusive household where antisocial behaviors were rewarded.

Obviously the thief didn't choose to grow up in this abusive household -- the thief's algorithm never implemented that option over other potential households to grow up in. So is the thief not responsible for this stealing?

I still say yes. It was the thief himself who chose stealing from among other open options which included not stealing. Yes, it happened deterministically, but "Sorry, I wanted to not steal, but I had no choice but to follow determinism fated by my abusive childhood, so don't blame me" makes no sense. Saying the thief cannot be blamed is endorsing this "merely pulled along by determinism, contrary to any personal influence" fatalistic thinking.

The thief's algorithm is what lead to the stealing, and if that algorithm was different, then stealing would not have occurred. The thief may not have chosen his childhood, but the thief did choose to steal. So the thief is to blame, because we "blame" what lead to the action. That's just what "blame" means.

Now sure, the buck doesn't stop there. We can also blame previous cogs in the causal chain, so the abusive childhood is also to blame. So is the poor education that lead to the poor parenting and abuse. It all goes back to the Big Bang, and whatever caused that.

This is the difference between choosing between two cards on a table and just one -- in the first instance, there is an algorithm that rates the action to pick up one card or another according to unknown criteria, and does the picking, so we can blame the algorithm for the choice. In the second case, there is no picking, and thus no choosing, and thus no blame.

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Punishment and Desert

So why do we punish people? Well, to get them to stop the undesired actions, either by restraining them so those actions never become open choice-options, or by deterrence to make the algorithm re-rate those choice-options and become less likely to make them the chosen-choice.

So when something bad happens, it's the result of a choice, and the person can be blamed for that choice, because they did it, and had they had different desires or beliefs, they wouldn't have done it.

So we have x making a choice to y iff it was x's informed, uncoerced, and consciously deliberative algorithms that made the choice to y. x is to blame for z iff x's choice to y is what caused z. x is responsible for z and accountable for z iff x is to blame for z. x deserves w iff social standards require giving w to x.

So the thief would deserve punishment, just by virtue of social standards requiring punishment for those that steal (and utilitarianism would generally endorse these punishments).

~

*Plus or minus any psuedorandom number generators.

But this is what I think you don't understand. There are no algorithms, either that or, there is only one big one. But in the end it doesn't matter how you look at it.

If you hold a rock up, it has potential energy, if you let go, the rock now has a choice, to stay there or fall. The rocks algorithm makes it fall. So if you drop a rock on another person, does it make sense to blame the rock? No, so then why does it make sense to blame the person?

You say its because the rock had no open choices but the person does. This is wrong. There is only one path that reality can take. Me choosing to not steal if my "algorithm" (algorithms don't exist in the real world) tells me to is just as impossible as the rock choosing to hover in mid-air after you let go of it. Any and all choices must be closed choices.

though there are multiple "open" choices, which are things I could do *had I wanted to do so*

So what you are saying is if the rock had wanted to not use its energy to fall it would float? (See what I'm getting at? )

It's my personal ability to deliberate that gives me this "free will". It's the same thing the chess program has -- a program that condenses the open choice-options into one chosen-choice. Anything without a deliberative algorithm, like a rock, doesn't have this free will.

The rock has just as much of an algorithm as you. It is made of atoms just like you, and can have and use energy just like you.

If you want to blame people for stealing you need to place equal blame on the things for letting themselves be stolen. Its well in the realm of possibility for an object to not move, this makes it an open choice for objects right?

Fatalism would suggest that I'm helplessly trapped to watch my life unfold according to the laws of physics, with no personal input about it -- my future is "fated", and will unfold regardless of what I do. However, my personal input is part of physics, it's also represented in the atoms, and it is part of what determines my choice.

See this is the biggest mistake you make though.

"regardless of what I do" - This is the wrong way of looking at it.

It's not, "Things will happen regardless of what I do."
It should be, "Things will happen that will."

I'm not happy with how I wrote the first part of this post but I don't want to rewrite it so I'll just add some thing.

I'm assuming we both mean that an algorithm is a calculation with a replaceable variable (this is a bit wrong for what it really is in computing but it makes sense in our context, I think a better word for what we want is a function).

This can't exist in nature, in nature any and all variables are set.

s Is the situation, c is the choice and p is the person.

s = c

p is a part of s, for that reason alone I'd think one should not believe in freewill, but lets go on.

lets assume s is

s = p + o

o is an object to be stolen

You think p is an algorithm so then p might be

p = m - d

d is desire for the object and m is the morality the person has not to do some thing bad like stealing.

if p is + the person wont steal, if p is - the person will

This is a super simplified version that isn't any actual proof, this is only a metaphorical demonstration.

This isn't an algorithm though, in nature they can't exist. Algorithms need to have a variable. Variables don't exist in nature. A variable is just some thing humans use because we lack in understanding. In nature there is only one number for each of the qualities of an atom that can exist in that instance.

If m = 6 and d = 5 the possibility that you will steal the object is just as likely as jump fifty feet unaided by equipment, both are closed and impossible.

Now you can say well what is d was 7, then you are to blame because that variable is attributed to you. And again I say, a rock has the exact same free will you do. The rock also has preset variables (preset variables are not variables are all, they are just numbers).

The rocks might look like

p for position, s for speed, d for direction, t for time.

p is a set of 3 numbers, lets say 0,0,0.
d is a three number fraction, 1/1/0 means its direction is going in equal number in the length and height dimension and none in the depth dimension.
t is the current time (0) and s is the speed (1)

From this we can calculate where the rock will be with the rocks algorithm

Our units are meters and seconds

The rock will be at the 5/5/0 position at the 5 second mark. So if a person is standing there at that time do we blame the rock because its algorithm made it be there at that time? Or do we blame the person for being there because his/her's made him/her stand there at that time? Maybe we blame both?

I just can't rationalize any type of blame on a moral level knowing what I do. Blame is only a practical tool we need.

So if you drop a rock on another person, does it make sense to blame the rock? No, so then why does it make sense to blame the person?

Because if you blame a person, they'll stop doing it. If you blame the rock, it will not stop doing it.

I think I lost you.

Nap wrote:But this is what I think you don't understand. There are no algorithms, either that or, there is only one big one. But in the end it doesn't matter how you look at it.

Your denial of algorithms seems ridiculous to me. I think you're denying that reductionism is a thing. It's like saying "Don't you see?! [url]There is no sandwich[/url], only bread, lettuce, and cheese!" Or you probably don't even acknowledge the existence of bread, lettuce, and cheese, because they're made of atoms.

Yes, only atoms exist, but different arrangements of atoms have different names. Some of these atoms arrange themselves into algorithms; that's why it's possible to program computers.

~

Nap wrote:The rocks algorithm makes it fall. So if you drop a rock on another person, does it make sense to blame the rock? No, so then why does it make sense to blame the person?

The difference between a rock and a human is the presence of a deliberation algorithm. Rocks don't have such algorithms; they don't deliberate.

~

Nap wrote:This is wrong. There is only one path that reality can take. Me choosing to not steal if my "algorithm" (algorithms don't exist in the real world) tells me to is just as impossible as the rock choosing to hover in mid-air after you let go of it. Any and all choices must be closed choices.

You are your algorithms, so there's no such thing as trying to "defy" your algorithm, because that would be a choice not made by what makes choices. And I never did anything but affirm the determinism of these algorithms, so you're right that they will always produce the same result when given the same inputs. The entirety of my essay was explaining how free will can make sense in spite of this determinism, and you haven't interacted with any of that.

The difference between "open" choices and "closed" choices is that deliberative algorithms deliberate between multiple options that are possible to implement counterfactually if the algorithm wanted to. But the algorithm deterministically doesn't want to. I made that distinction clear, I think, and you didn't respond to it.

DanielLC wrote:

So if you drop a rock on another person, does it make sense to blame the rock? No, so then why does it make sense to blame the person?

Because if you blame a person, they'll stop doing it. If you blame the rock, it will not stop doing it.

Agreed, the practicality of being able to blame some one is why we should blame them, not because they are immoral.

So the thief would deserve punishment, just by virtue of social standards requiring punishment for those that steal (and utilitarianism would generally endorse these punishments).

Most of those social standards should not be endorsed, they are logical. It would produce even more good if the people learn to not want retribution than if the thief was punished.

Edit: Sorry for the double post, my second post is about what you said peterhurford.

Yes, only atoms exist, but different arrangements of atoms have different names. Some of these atoms arrange themselves into algorithms; that's why it's possible to program computers.

Nope, I'm not saying that arrangements of atoms can't have names. I'm saying they can't arrange into algorithms. Algorithms require variables. Variables do not exist in nature.

A computer program is not an algorithm in nature, it can be to us humans, because we're smart enough to know every thing at once. We don't know what variables will be put into the program so to us it seems like an algorithm.

Is this an algorithm?

5 + 6 = 11

There are no variables. It's not just that I could have acted differently if my algorithm was different its that my algorithm can't be different, that's no longer an algorithm, its just a calculation.

Just like the rock, its no longer an algorithm, just a calculation.

The difference between a rock and a human is the presence of a deliberation algorithm. Rocks don't have such algorithms; they don't deliberate.

Humans have no deliberation algorithm either.

so you're right that they will always produce the same result when given the same inputs.

There is no input. Input implies there is a possibility of some thing else being input from an external source, but in all of reality there is no external source.

Humans have no deliberation algorithm any more than a rock does.

Nap wrote:Nope, I'm not saying that arrangements of atoms can't have names. [...] Algorithms require variables. Variables do not exist in nature.

You're right. You're denying abstractions. Yes, 5+6=11 is a calculation, not an algorithm. But algorithms are abstractions of calculations, like a rule that a+b=c. When this algorithm is in the situation 5,6, it does 11. When it's in the situation of 10,3 it does 13. This is perfectly deterministic. I can't make sense of your objection. I think we may be at an impasse.

The computer plays chess. It does so deterministically by taking in the board state (predetermined) and making calculations (predetermined) to output a move (predetermined). This is deliberation, the weighing of possible choices (predetermined weighing algorithm) to come to a final choice (predetermined).

~

Nap wrote:Humans have no deliberation algorithm either.

I don't know how you can deny that deliberation takes place. It's not just that the human says "Oh, I'm going to do what I'm determined to do" or "I'm just going to make the choice I'm predetermined to make". It has to go through a deterministic deliberation process.

~

Nap wrote:There is no input. Input implies there is a possibility of some thing else being input from an external source, but in all of reality there is no external source.

Unless you're a solipsist, there's an external source. This is input for your deliberation algorithms.

Not all abstractions, just this one, in the real world, on the highest level of philosophy.

What's the point of saying a+b=c when a MUST = 5 and b MUST = 6 and the outcome MUST = 11?

"When it's in the situation of 10,3 it does 13."

But (a) being 10 is impossible, just as jumping 50 feet is impossible this makes every thing a closed choice.

If every thing is predetermined there are no variables and that means there are no algorithms.

a = 5 and b = 6 isn't deliberation, I don't see how deliberation is possible. Deliberation means that all the choices were possible to begin with. This isn't true.

a = 10 was never an option so how can you deliberate between a = 5 and a = 10.

Humans don't know what they are going to pick, this gives the illusion of free will. This doesn't mean the other option was ever even in the question though.

Whether you think you know what you are determined to do, or whether you even think things are determined doesn't change that they are.

I don't understand how some thing can be determined and deliberated at the same time. If you deliberate it, more than once choice is open. If it's determined there is only one open choice.

Unless you're a solipsist, there's an external source. This is input for your deliberation algorithms.

I don't mean input into you, I mean into "the every thing", "truth", the cosmos, the universe, whatever you want to call reality.

Nothing is imputed into reality, there are no variables in reality, nothing can be this or that, there is only one way things are or can be and that is the way things are and will be. And since there is only one way and no variables this means there are no algorithms. No algorithms, no open choices, no open choices, no free will, no free will and morality does not exist (without goals). Things like guilt, and freedom make no sense, and neither does justice. Without justice punishment for the sake of morality (aka making bad people pay) is illogical.

Solipsism, weird. I've been think about and talking about this to almost every one I met for the past 10 years, and I didn't know its name.

Are you a solipsist? I've never met a person that claimed not to be one.

Nap wrote:What's the point of saying a+b=c when a MUST = 5 and b MUST = 6 and the outcome MUST = 11?

Because you may encounter additional situations where a was 5 last time, but this time is 10. Things change over time, and algorithms respond to this change in a way non-algorithms do not.

It's the difference between this program:



and this program:



Sure, if a and b are 5 and 6, the output is the same. But the process was clearly different. An algorithm is the name given to the first process, but not the second.

~

Nap wrote:But (a) being 10 is impossible, just as jumping 50 feet is impossible this makes every thing a closed choice.

Yes, but you still ignore my distinction between "could be done if (counterfactually) I wanted to" and "couldn't be done despite wanting to (counterfactually)".

~

Nap wrote:Deliberation means that all the choices were possible to begin with. This isn't true.

I'm not sure how you understand "deliberation". Deliberation means that choices are weighed according to a deterministic process, outputting one outcome (the only outcome that ever could have been outputted, given the circumstances). But there still was this deterministic weighing process that took place, and you seem to insist this process doesn't exist, which confuses me.

I never said anything about the other options that weren't chosen to be somehow still possible in anything other than a counterfactual sense. I invite you to clarify your understanding of "deliberation" in light of this.

~

Nap wrote:Whether you think you know what you are determined to do, or whether you even think things are determined doesn't change that they are.

This still seems to give rise to silly things like "I really don't want to steal from you, but I have to because I've been determined to". This is the kind of thing that makes no sense in light of our desires having a role in determining our actions via this deliberative process.

~

Nap wrote:I don't mean input into you, I mean into "the every thing", "truth", the cosmos, the universe, whatever you want to call reality.

I don't see how that's relevant. As a personal subsystem, part of the "reality", I receive inputs. I deliberate on them deterministically to produce outputs. Where in this chain do you see something wrong?

~

Nap wrote:Are you a solipsist? I've never met a person that claimed not to be one.

I am not a solipsist -- I think other people have internal mental processes like I do. The vast majority of people also think this way.

I think you are using Solipsism wrongly.

Solipsism (i/ˈsɒlɨpsɪzəm/) is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist.

I think the key word is "sure", I've never meat a person that after a more in-depth conversation claimed to know any thing with a 100% certainty.

Anyway,

I think this needs to be simplified.

What makes you different from a rock? (from a conversation about free will perspective)

You say people have algorithms, okay fine, why doesn't a rock have one?

Again, if you let go of a rock it can chose between falling and floating. This is an algorithm too right? Under different circumstances the rock might chose to float, or maybe a different rock would chose to float under the same circumstances.

Take a rock that is less dense than air, and one that is more dense than air.

Now expose both to a circumstance (you letting go of them), one "chooses" to float, one to fall, each because of its algorithm. One rock happens to be a = 5, and the other a = 10. So the one where a = 10 should be punished for being bad.

I see no difference between the free will of a rock, a computer, or my self. All are faced with "choices" and all can only follow the one path that physics lets them, which I would no longer call a choice.

Reality has no algorithms because everything (that I understand about reality) is certain to some one that knows every thing.If its certain that a = 5, a can never be 10 in another situation because that situation is impossible, there is only one possible situation, and that's the one that happens.

Put a coin in front of you. You can chose to pick it up or leave it there for 5minutes, it doesn't matter what you do, your algorithm will make you pick one and only that one is possible. Same as the two rocks, they are faced with a choice too, and only one of their choices is possible.

This still seems to give rise to silly things like "I really don't want to steal from you, but I have to because I've been determined to". This is the kind of thing that makes no sense in light of our desires having a role in determining our actions via this deliberative process.

It doesn't matter what it gives rise to, truth is truth. Any one that would say that before the fact obviously doesn't understand the concept thought. It makes sense after the "decision" is made from the standpoint of an Omnipotent being, but not from a human one, not yet at least, but maybe soon.

It is possible, in principle, to figure out what someone will do based on what happened before. In order to do this, you generally must simulate them. As a computationalist, I would consider a simulation of a person the same as an actual person. Your simulation of them is them. The only way to predict what they do is to watch them do it, whether you use the original "them", a simulation, a clone, etc.

Nap wrote:What makes you different from a rock? (from a conversation about free will perspective)

Rocks don't acknowledge options, consciously weigh them according to criteria, and then implement one. Just like there is nothing within the composition of a rock that is considered an "arm" or a "brain", there is nothing within the composition of a rock that is considered a "deliberation algorithm". Rocks simply don't have desires, will, or consciousness in the way humans do, just like they don't have arms or brains.

~

Nap wrote:if you let go of a rock it can chose between falling and floating. This is an algorithm too right? Under different circumstances the rock might chose to float, or maybe a different rock would chose to float under the same circumstances.

This is not an algorithm, because the rock doesn't have desires. Floating is not something the rock could do if the rock counterfactually desired to float, because rocks don't desire things. While different physical laws would lead to floating rocks, it would require rocks to have desires for them to have deliberation algorithms.

~

Nap wrote:it doesn't matter what you do, your algorithm will make you pick one and only that one is possible.

This is wrong semantically. I am identical to my algorithms, so it's not that my algorithm makes *me* pick one, but that *I* pick one. Likewise, it does matter what I do, because if I had (counterfactually) done something differently, a different outcome would result.

~

I feel like we're just repeating ourselves now, so I invite you to clarify what you mean by "deliberation" and "algorithm" to see where what our differences are, and why you think rocks have algorithms.

And yes, I do think computer programs that rank choices have free will in the same way humans do, though I might modify my decision to require the program also be capable of modifying its own programming in order to have "free will". The definition or use of the phrase "free will" is probably just needlessly confusing anyway.

Lastly, I'd like to note that I agree with DanielLC on computationalism.

~

The Sidenote on Solipsism

Nap wrote:I think the key word [in Solipsism] is "sure", I've never meat a person that after a more in-depth conversation claimed to know any thing with a 100% certainty.

Right. But solipsism is about actually denying the existence of mental states in others, which no one actually does, even if they can't rule it out. Given materialism of the mind, being sure someone has mental states requires no more effort than being sure other people have functioning brains and are currently conscious.

Algorithm have variables that could be replaced.

A = 5 or A = 10

Deliberation is making a choice.

Algorithms don't exist in nature to an all knowing creature because there would be no variables.

Either rocks can deliberate or humans can't.

If you let go of a rock, at the exact point you let go of it the rock has two choices, fall or stay. It checks its "algorithm" to see which to do.

Rock() {
if (onGround) {
rockspeed = 0
} else {
rockspeed --;
}
}

That seems like an algorithm to me.

At this time, all I can really say is that further response would just be repeating myself. In my previous response, I already talked about how rocks don't have desires, so obeying the laws of physics may be algorithmic, but isn't an algorithm that actually takes place within the rock. I also already mentioned how variables come from abstracting from changes in situations over time. You didn't respond to either point.

So I thank you for your time and what was still an interesting discussion.

Steven Pinker nails it at explaining my view on "free will" (two minute video)

peterhurford wrote:Steven Pinker nails it at explaining my view on "free will" (two minute video)

I don't think the distinction between reflexive and planned actions says anything useful about free will, if the way the planning unfolds is solely the result of factors beyond the person's control (environmental and biological factors). I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

LJM1979 wrote:I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

I don't think it's necessary to argue against bioenvironmental determinism for "free will". Basically, in so far as your planned actions derive from your personal desires, I think you can be held responsible for your actions, regardless of whether they also originated in bioenvironmental factors "beyond your control". I don't think that works as an excuse.

I'm fine with this not being called "free will" if the phrase is supposed to automatically presuppose a total freedom from external causes -- I've already said that's nonsense. I don't really even need to use the term, but I think denying "free will" scares people into thinking implications that the "no free will" proponents typically don't intend -- fatalism, choices don't exist, etc.

Anyways, I've already said my bit, if it's not persuasive to you and the things you guys have said aren't persuasive to me, then we'll just have to forge ahead with disagreement on this. I don't think it will matter much practically.

peterhurford wrote:

LJM1979 wrote:I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

I don't think it's necessary to argue against bioenvironmental determinism for "free will". Basically, in so far as your planned actions derive from your personal desires, I think you can be held responsible for your actions, regardless of whether they also originated in bioenvironmental factors "beyond your control". I don't think that works as an excuse.

I'm fine with this not being called "free will" if the phrase is supposed to automatically presuppose a total freedom from external causes -- I've already said that's nonsense. I don't really even need to use the term, but I think denying "free will" scares people into thinking implications that the "no free will" proponents typically don't intend -- fatalism, choices don't exist, etc.

Anyways, I've already said my bit, if it's not persuasive to you and the things you guys have said aren't persuasive to me, then we'll just have to forge ahead with disagreement on this. I don't think it will matter much practically.

It's odd because I think any definition of free will that allows your decisions to be determined by factors beyond your control is conceptually incoherent (or "nonsense" to use your word). Every behavior stems from (internal) cognitive factors like from personal desires and thus every behavior derives from free will based on your definition. Unless all brain activity could be frozen and the person could somehow still engage in behavior, the proximal cause of all behavior is internal, cognitive processes. Even if someone holds a gun to your head and demands that you do something, your "personal desire" not to get shot is operating. In other cases, like career choices, eating decisions, etc., external factors are similarly causal (as you appear to acknowledge) but just less salient.

LJM1979 wrote:It's odd because I think any definition of free will that allows your decisions to be determined by factors beyond your control is conceptually incoherent (or "nonsense" to use your word).

Like I said, I don't demand it to be called "free will" if you think that level of control is necessary for the concept. I'm fine not determining what I want, because I do determine what I do to get what I want.

~

LJM1979 wrote:Every behavior stems from (internal) cognitive factors like from personal desires and thus every behavior derives from free will based on your definition.

Not every behavior stems from deliberative processes (like personal desires), though. This is the distinction that Stephen Pinker and I were making.

~

LJM1979 wrote:Even if someone holds a gun to your head and demands that you do something, your "personal desire" not to get shot is operating.

Yes. Now I suppose you're wondering how to make sense of coercion? I think there can be a sense where you clearly instrumentally desire to go along with the guy with the gun, but don't approve of it, and wouldn't go along with it absent the intervention.

~

LJM1979 wrote:In other cases, like career choices, eating decisions, etc., external factors are similarly causal (as you appear to acknowledge) but just less salient.

Yes, we're pretty easily influenced by marketing, etc. I'm not quite sure what the implications are here for "free will" as a concept. A perhaps even better example is that of priming.

Not every behavior stems from deliberative processes (like personal desires), though. This is the distinction that Stephen Pinker and I were making.

You could distinguish reflexive from deliberative processes, although I do not believe the distinction relevant to free will.

Like I said, I don't demand it to be called "free will" if you think that level of control is necessary for the concept. I'm fine not determining what I want, because I do determine what I do to get what I want.

I think we can agree then that free will is not the right term for the concept under debate. I think "perceived free will," which is unrelated to actual free will, is probably closer to what you're discussing. Perceived free will is highest when biological and environmental factors are not salient and conscious deliberation occurs. Perceived free will is a fascinating psychological topic - likely with critical evolutionary functions - but I am not convinced it is relevant to applied ethics.

LJM1979 wrote:I think we can agree then that free will is not the right term for the concept under debate.

I can agree with that begrudgingly, only because we assign different meanings to the phrase "free will". I think that what I mean by the topic is the concept under debate, but what you mean by the topic is not. I can, however, agree earnestly that it's best we set aside the phrase, lest we not further confuse ourselves. I don't find there frequently to be much need to debate definitions.

While I'm passing along links, I'd also like to put in an honorable mention for Eliezer Yudkowsky's "Possibility and Couldness" and "The Ultimate Source".

~

LJM1979 wrote:Perceived free will is a fascinating psychological topic - likely with critical evolutionary functions - but I am not convinced it is relevant to applied ethics.

I think the act of deliberating and making intentional choices is relevant to applied ethics in the sense that it makes sense from a utilitarian standpoint to punish people for the choices they made if and only if those choices were intentional, such that punishment makes them less likely to intentionally arrive on those choices either by deterrence, restraint, and/or reformation. It makes no sense to punish you for having a gag reflex, but it does make sense to punish you for stealing, no matter how biological-cultural-situational-psychological-whatever determined the act.

I think that what I mean by the topic is the concept under debate, but what you mean by the topic is not.

You can find many definitions by academics including mine.

I think the act of deliberating and making intentional choices is relevant to applied ethics in the sense that it makes sense from a utilitarian standpoint to punish people for the choices they made if and only if those choices were intentional, such that punishment makes them less likely to intentionally arrive on those choices either by deterrence, restraint, and/or reformation. It makes no sense to punish you for having a gag reflex, but it does make sense to punish you for stealing, no matter how biological-cultural-situational-psychological-whatever determined the act.

That does not fit with any conceptualization of utilitarianism I've read. It makes sense to punish when doing so will have a better effect on utility than any other response will have. If punishing people for having a gag reflex increased utility, by definition it would be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective, although I cannot think of any argument that it would increase utility.

LJM1979 wrote:You can find many definitions by academics including mine.

I know. Are you suggesting that there's a mainstream definition of which I'm unaware?

~

If punishing people for having a gag reflex increased utility, by definition it would be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective, although I cannot think of any argument that it would increase utility.

No disagreement from me. But I think you'll find that punishing people for intentional things increases utility whereas punishing people for unintentional things usually doesn't. It's not some grand theory of justice, just a distinction that I thought was useful for utilitarian reasons.

I know. Are you suggesting that there's a mainstream definition of which I'm unaware?

Well I don't know every definition that you're aware of! I think my view, that free will requires that one's behavior stems from factors within one's control, is the view that virtually everyone who's argued against free will has used. It may be that the disagreement is actually about the word "control"

LJM1979 wrote:I think my view, that free will requires that one's behavior stems from factors within one's control, is the view that virtually everyone who's argued against free will has used.

Behavior does stem from factors within your control. The problem is that it doesn't stem *exclusively* from factors with your control; and the factors aren't *ultimately* in your control. But I, and the compatibilist school of thought, has seen requirements of exclusivity and ultimacy as needlessly demanding on the definition.

If I may be permitted to link once more, Russel Blackford does a good job of entertainingly discussing the successes and problems of compatibilist free will.

~

LJM1979 wrote:It may be that the disagreement is actually about the word "control"

That's interesting, but I don't follow. Could you elaborate? I personally think a lot of the problem is not seeing the external determinants of one's will as a "part of them", such that if the determinants were different, the person in question would have been different.

peterhurford wrote:

LJM1979 wrote:I think my view, that free will requires that one's behavior stems from factors within one's control, is the view that virtually everyone who's argued against free will has used.

Behavior does stem from factors within your control. The problem is that it doesn't stem *exclusively* from factors with your control; and the factors aren't *ultimately* in your control. But I, and the compatibilist school of thought, has seen requirements of exclusivity and ultimacy as needlessly demanding on the definition.

If I may be permitted to link once more, Russel Blackford does a good job of entertainingly discussing the successes and problems of compatibilist free will.

~

LJM1979 wrote:It may be that the disagreement is actually about the word "control"

That's interesting, but I don't follow. Could you elaborate? I personally think a lot of the problem is not seeing the external determinants of one's will as a "part of them", such that if the determinants were different, the person in question would have been different.

I believe there is no such thing as behavior being under your control if it is not ultimately under your control. I believe it is no different than the gun example. What you call "control" I call "faulty perceived control"

peterhurford wrote:I don't know how you can deny that deliberation takes place. It's not just that the human says "Oh, I'm going to do what I'm determined to do" or "I'm just going to make the choice I'm predetermined to make". It has to go through a deterministic deliberation process.

The hard part is clearly defining what those deliberations really are and who, or what, is causing them. This statement is tricky: "Oh, I'm going to do what I'm determined to do," because it seems to presuppose that there is a "me" that is outside a causal chain of events that can reflect upon the decision--- maybe there is such a thing, maybe there isn't, but if you start with that assumption you are 99% of the way toward your conclusion. Scientists avoid asserting that something exists without evidence that it exists. Asserting that there is a "me" that exists outside the laws of physics and controls your actions is mighty strong claim up there with the millions of mutually incompatible religious claims. Keep in mind, I am a fence-sitter on the free-will issue because I have found no scientific evidence of the type of free will that people have but I act as if I have it.

I don't claim to understand all the philosophical arguments on free will, but I know enough to know that my knowledge is limited. One claim that has stuck in my head is something that Patricia Churchland repeats like a broken record: "there are no uncaused events." In other words, there has been no evidence that something has happened that demonstrates that it has happened outside the realm of causal events from the physical universe. Claims that events arise from the complex organization that underlie it but are independent of it are claims that the event is epiphenomenal. These are interesting and challenging for psychologists (who work with mental constructs that are not directly observable), but troubling. Buried in the classic work by Hempel and Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," is an attack against epiphenomenalism. It is a difficult article, but it addresses what we mean by a scientific explanation and how the process of scientific explanation relates to claims of epiphenomenalism. They demonstrate how a claim of epiphenominalism is a claim that such an event occurs outside the scope of a SPECIFIC theory. When people do not understand something, it means that they lack a theory (scientific explanation) to explain it, but lack of a scientific explanation to explain something is not evidence that the thing pops outside the realm of the laws of physics!

rehoot wrote:Asserting that there is a "me" that exists outside the laws of physics and controls your actions is mighty strong claim up there with the millions of mutually incompatible religious claims.

Free will, at least by my definition, does not involve someone outside the laws of physics. Such an entity almost certainly does not exist.

peterhurford wrote:

rehoot wrote:Asserting that there is a "me" that exists outside the laws of physics and controls your actions is mighty strong claim up there with the millions of mutually incompatible religious claims.

Free will, at least by my definition, does not involve someone outside the laws of physics. Such an entity almost certainly does not exist.

What is your definition of free will?

LJM1979 wrote:

peterhurford wrote:

rehoot wrote:Asserting that there is a "me" that exists outside the laws of physics and controls your actions is mighty strong claim up there with the millions of mutually incompatible religious claims.

Free will, at least by my definition, does not involve someone outside the laws of physics. Such an entity almost certainly does not exist.

What is your definition of free will?

I ask because I've thought a lot about your comments. I think your view could be expressed as follows:

A --> B --> C

Where C = Behavior
B = cognitive processes and
A = all of the causes of B (genes, neurotransmitter systems, environmental influences, etc.)

You appear to argue that because B is internal to the organism and influences C, C is chosen freely.

Let's drop C from the equation from a moment and just focus on the relationship between A and B. Does it make sense to say the individual has control over B? If so, why? What factors that fall in A does the individual have control over? You said your view does not require something nonphysical or outside the laws of physics. So there should be some physical factor that falls in part A that the individual has control over. Alternatively, we could say that the individual has no control over B, in which case I can see no possible justification for free will. The equation simply reduces to two factors the individual has no control over (A and B) causing behavior.

LJM1979 wrote:Let's drop C from the equation from a moment and just focus on the relationship between A and B. Does it make sense to say the individual has control over B?

That's a good way to describe it. Somehow it is easy to agree that the laws of physics control everything and at the same time imagine something that controls B that was not 100% dictated by all of the the things in A. Maybe the compatibalist view is that there is some "thing" ("me") that considers information, weighs costs and benefits, identifies (correctly or incorrectly) principle of reasoning, etc., but all of that is controlled by the law of physics. The feeling that we control all these things with our reason is just an illusion (among many illusions).

Here is one thing that makes the idea of "me" seem real. Haidt's social intuitionist view of moral judgment( from "The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment"). He says that when we think we are formulating moral reasons for our actions, we are really just conjuring justifications for what we already believe (so it is an illusion that our actions follow sound moral reasoning). When people talk to each other or otherwise communicate about these moral reasons, the process of social influence does affect the behavior of other people (which is easy to demonstrate experimentally). Now consider how the "me" fits into that story. Maybe my act of trying to convert another person using my (possibly/probably faulty) reasoning is entirely dictated by the laws of physics, but without the "me" the outcome (conversion of the other person) would have never happened. If "me" is the sum total of all my experiences, biology, etc., then there is nothing wrong with saying that "I" influenced that other person. Maybe there was a tiny bit of true reason or decision-making in here--from biology or whatever--but whatever it is and however it got there, it is part of "me."

Given the indisputable observation that information can change behavior (when the information comes from others), the next question is about the effect of self-talk. The decision to scrutinize an idea, theory, sequence of events, etc., could lead to a new understanding and profoundly change my behavior due to what I tell myself about how the world works. Biology would certainly affect the decision or ability to scrutinize information as would the *act* of exploring new ideas and integrating all those beliefs---however those processes happen. The person who wants to believe in "me" might focus on the *events* that influenced actions and seem to lead to behaviors that are less dictated by biology and more driven by reason or ideas (even if they are, in turn, explained by the laws of physics). Such events could not happen without biology, but seem to be one step removed from biology. I don't see anything wrong with thinking of "me" as the sum of the biology, environment, developmental factors, social influence, and events that shape my tendency to do things a certain way or believe some things to be true. Ultimately, (as far as I know) they all track back to the laws of physics, but they leave room for true decision-making (even if it rarely occurs).

The "events" part is so difficult to predict that leads people to think of themselves as somehow "beyond" their biology--and that is true because the biology is only the vehicle that stores information, some of which comes from outside biology (like social influence that comes to me in the form of sound waves or light waves/photons that I interpret as the behavior of others). The "beyond biology" does not mean "outside the laws of physics," so I still have not identified anything that says that my actions are my own in a way that is different from the laws of physics. As I "choose" to type the next word, I am simply acting out the inescapable, immutable laws of physics, even though I am not a slave to biological programming.

As I understand it free will would entail that some aspects of our behaviour are not in accordance with (deterministic or stochastic) natural law.

Sorry I have not replied in a while some stuff came up and I was busy.

First I want to talk about a part of that video that I didn't like

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQxJi0COTBo#t=0m45s

This part confuses me for a few reasons.

I don't understand what simplicity has to do with any of this. It doesn't matter if predicting a human is simple or not, it just matter if it can be done, the only gray area I see here is if it is possibly but we just have not done it yet. (But we have, are and will, making this point less valid too)

So since landing on the moon isn't exactly easy we should ignore that its possible? It's all about perspective too. To a cave man landing on the moon would seem so complex he would think it is impossible? But to us, its far from it, I wouldn't call it simple ether but that should not matter. So I don't know why he mentioned that as if it did matter.

In the end from the stand point of a bug your iris retracting is just as much free will as choosing what ice cream to eat, and much in the same way to an omniscient creature your iris retracting and you choosing what ice cream to eat have the same lack of free will.

I'll try to paraphrase you, but if I get it wrong correct me.

What gives us algorithms that separate us from rocks is desire?

Nap wrote:I don't understand what simplicity has to do with any of this.

Some people have claimed that the existence of unpredictable behavior constitutes evidence for a spirit/soul/consciousness that is separate from the laws of physics. If your actions were controlled by pulleys and levers and somebody pulls a lever, the outcome (behavior) is known with great precision. Basically, the predictability argument is a straw man fallacy of determinism.

rehoot wrote:

Nap wrote:I don't understand what simplicity has to do with any of this.

Some people have claimed that the existence of unpredictable behavior constitutes evidence for a spirit/soul/consciousness that is separate from the laws of physics. If your actions were controlled by pulleys and levers and somebody pulls a lever, the outcome (behavior) is known with great precision. Basically, the predictability argument is a straw man fallacy of determinism.

This is what I was addressing with the moon comparison, it doesn't matter if its very complicated, some thing being complicated doesn't make it any more or less unpredictable in the end. It might make it harder to predict right now, but this isn't a good reason to say it will always remain that way.


Edit:

Nap wrote:I don't understand what simplicity has to do with any of this.

Aka, this was rhetorical.