Hi
I'm pretty new to philosophy, so if this question seems like a pretty obvious one take pity on the newbie. Alright, as I understand consequentialism the moral value of any action is judged by the result, the outcome. From how I understand it 'intent' plays no part in judging whether the action is the right one or not.

If this is correct, then how would consequentialists form a distinction between these two hypothetical scenarios.

1. Terrorists take over a school and kill all of the kids before blowing themselves up. That was their plan. The families are distraught, the terrorists families are happy in that they believe that their siblings have achieved 'martydom', their terrorist organization is happy.

2. US troops accidentally, say through bad intelligence the same building is used at night-time for terrorist slide nights, but during the day it's a school, drop a bomb on a school. The Americans never planned or desired to blow up the kids, indeed they feel terrible about it. No matter of apologies or aid is going to help the families who are naturally distraught.

Now I understand that in scenario 1 far more people are made unhappy and fearful than scenario 2, and that both actions are bad things to have happened. Is this what it is that allows consequentialists to pass judgement after the fact to these types of scenario? That by people understanding that the US is far less likely to repeat this action tht it is a better of two evils?

If intent plays no part in the result, and resulting judgment then they would seem to be equally 'bad'. However this seems a bit morally brutal, leaving no room for error or unforeseen actions. The Americans in scenario 2 acted to the best of their ability with the best posible info they had at the time. Does that not count for anything?

You use consequentialism to tell you what you should do. How you judge them shouldn't be based on the effects of their actions. It should be based on the effects of your judgement.

The way some people put it, hedonistic utilitarianism (HU) which is basically what you're talking about here) entails two theories, 1) a theory of the good, and 2) the theory of the right.

1) A theory of the good is just a conclusion about what states of affairs are better than others. HU has it that happiness is better than not-happiness (or that nothing is demonstrably better/worse, but happiness is simply defined as our sense of betterness), and that it's meaningless to claim that anything else is better than anything else - what, when you try and pin it down, does 'better' mean?

To see if you agree with this, imagine a universe with only one inhabitant (who can't ever reproduce in any way). That person is a violent sociopath - or would be, if there were any other people for him to be violent towards. HU is just the claim that the only thing you can say about 'better' or 'worse' in this universe is that this person's life could be happier or more miserable - or, synonymously, that it could be better or worse for him.

The question of 'good' isn't necessarily whether you'd prefer him to be happy or miserable (since in this other universe you don't exist to have preference - besides, we all have feelings that we don't necessarily agree with intellectually), it's just whether you think that the preceding paragraphs sums is correct in its description of what could be better or worse about that universe. If you think it's comprehensive, you agree with HU's theory of the good. If you think there's something else to say, like it would be better - even though it wouldn't affect anything - if he was a pleasant person, then you're rejecting a pure HU theory of the good.

2) A theory of the right is about what you should and shouldn't do. HU, having said that happiness and only happiness is what's good, supposedly says that what's right is increasing happiness and preventing its decrease (though different versions of HU will say different things about how much you should do this).

I think 2) is completely pointless though, tbh. Not parsimonious (sorry, I know how much you love that word ), and not anything to do with the facts of the universe.

To me, 1) and a bit of honest metaethical nihilism is all you need - then you just say 'since nothing matters, the only things that matter are the things that matter to us'.

And 1) is all you need to make sense of the terrorists - as Daniel said, util entails nothing about your emotional reaction to the terrorists (since you don't choose your reactions anyway). It just entails that the terrorists feeling good is good for the terrorists, the victims feeling bad is bad for the victims, and that we can compare the intensity of their feelings. And, as you say, that there are all sorts of other bad feelings that arise from your first scenario that don't from your second.

Ramble over.

redcarded wrote:Hi
I'm pretty new to philosophy, so if this question seems like a pretty obvious one take pity on the newbie.

Understood

redcarded wrote: Alright, as I understand consequentialism the moral value of any action is judged by the result, the outcome. From how I understand it 'intent' plays no part in judging whether the action is the right one or not.

This is act-consequentialism, which, combined with a hedonistic utility comprises classical utilitarianism. "The right act is the one which maximizes happiness"

redcarded wrote:If this is correct, then how would consequentialists form a distinction between these two hypothetical scenarios.

There are different types of utilitarianism, modern utilitarianism is better contrasted with CU in that it has a) preference satisfaction as the utility and b) is rule-consequentialist."The right rule is the the one which overall maximises preference satisfaction". One can be a consequentialist without being a utilitarian such as an egoist or egalitarian.

The reason I bring this up is that I support a variant of MU (desire utilitarianism) but many people attempting to understand utilitarianism only become familiar with CU not MU and often by its critics. Many of the classical challenges have been answered by MU and those which have not have IMHO been answered by DU. (That is not to say there are no supporters of CU in this forum, but that is a different issue). Now motive-consequentialism does take into account intent, as indeed does DU but not necessarily MU.

Trying to be straightforward but cannot avoid the above clarifications. Hope this helps. Will try and answer your question below from a DU perspective - where intent does matter.

redcarded wrote:
1. Terrorists take over a school and kill all of the kids before blowing themselves up. That was their plan. The families are distraught, the terrorists families are happy in that they believe that their siblings have achieved 'martydom', their terrorist organization is happy.

2. US troops accidentally, say through bad intelligence the same building is used at night-time for terrorist slide nights, but during the day it's a school, drop a bomb on a school. The Americans never planned or desired to blow up the kids, indeed they feel terrible about it. No matter of apologies or aid is going to help the families who are naturally distraught.

Now I understand that in scenario 1 far more people are made unhappy and fearful than scenario 2, and that both actions are bad things to have happened. Is this what it is that allows consequentialists to pass judgement after the fact to these types of scenario? That by people understanding that the US is far less likely to repeat this action tht it is a better of two evils?

If intent plays no part in the result, and resulting judgment then they would seem to be equally 'bad'. However this seems a bit morally brutal, leaving no room for error or unforeseen actions. The Americans in scenario 2 acted to the best of their ability with the best posible info they had at the time. Does that not count for anything?

DU can account for the legal concept of Mens Rea - guilty mind. These are four conditions that determine whether a claimed accident was really an accident. If analysis can show that the motive was intended, foreseen, reckless or negligent then it is not an accident. In DU terms one looks at desires and asks would a good person have acted this way. A good person is someone with good desires and so one is looking to see if they did have the relevant good desires. Of course this is more complicated in quasi war situations, still let us stipulate here that the prima facie wrong of the US bombing the terrorist base is justified to prevent greater harm. Granted this, if the US had acted in a way that this outcome was not intended, nor foreseen, nor were they reckless (taking unjustified risks that could harm others) nor negligent (not foreseeing what was foreseeable to a good person). So, it the USians acted in a way that a good person would not have - being reckless and so on, then this consequence is to be condemned. We do not want to encourage anyone (that is encouraging them to have such desires in the future and not encouraging aversions to being reckless or negligent), including the military in war time, for causing avoidable and unnecessary harm.

Let me ramble with your ramble.

Arepo wrote:The way some people put it, hedonistic utilitarianism (HU) which is basically what you're talking about here) entails two theories, 1) a theory of the good, and 2) the theory of the right.

1) A theory of the good is just a conclusion about what states of affairs are better than others. HU has it that happiness is better than not-happiness (or that nothing is demonstrably better/worse, but happiness is simply defined as our sense of betterness), and that it's meaningless to claim that anything else is better than anything else - what, when you try and pin it down, does 'better' mean?

DU looks at desires and their lack and is not looking to maximize desire fulfilment but to encourage desires that tend to fulfil other desires and discourage desires that tend to thwart other desires. This is a scalar comparison, one can be better than another in these terms. This is not a question of definition but empirical fact. Whether one wants to attach the label morality to this is optional - I use it for convenience below - these desires and their affects are still a matter of empirical facts. Note that DF is more about (1) and DU - encouragement etc, is your (2) below but I don't want this post to be more long winded than it is!.

Arepo wrote:To see if you agree with this, imagine a universe with only one inhabitant (who can't ever reproduce in any way). That person is a violent sociopath - or would be, if there were any other people for him to be violent towards. HU is just the claim that the only thing you can say about 'better' or 'worse' in this universe is that this person's life could be happier or more miserable - or, synonymously, that it could be better or worse for him.

Since there is no-one else then there is no moral value in this universe (in the interpersonal conflict resolution sense, not personal self-worth). If he fulfils his desires, then DF is increased, if not then no. (Many other factors apart from other people affect the capacity for someone to fulfil their desires).

Arepo wrote:The question of 'good' isn't necessarily whether you'd prefer him to be happy or miserable (since in this other universe you don't exist to have preference - besides, we all have feelings that we don't necessarily agree with intellectually), it's just whether you think that the preceding paragraphs sums is correct in its description of what could be better or worse about that universe. If you think it's comprehensive, you agree with HU's theory of the good. If you think there's something else to say, like it would be better - even though it wouldn't affect anything - if he was a pleasant person, then you're rejecting a pure HU theory of the good.

There is nothing more to say about that universe. We disagree on utility but that is irrelevant in that universe.

Arepo wrote:2) A theory of the right is about what you should and shouldn't do. HU, having said that happiness and only happiness is what's good, supposedly says that what's right is increasing happiness and preventing its decrease (though different versions of HU will say different things about how much you should do this).

I think 2) is completely pointless though, tbh. Not parsimonious (sorry, I know how much you love that word ), and not anything to do with the facts of the universe.

To me, 1) and a bit of honest metaethical nihilism is all you need - then you just say 'since nothing matters, the only things that matter are the things that matter to us'.

But this is not nihilism but morality! What else can it be but what matters to us. If there was no-one in this universe then there is no morality. Morality is a construct but that does not mean it is not real. A car is a construct and is real. A car gets you from A to B. Morality is a different type of vehicle to get you from worse to better - if you chose or are successfully encouraged, to drive it.

Arepo wrote:And 1) is all you need to make sense of the terrorists - as Daniel said, util entails nothing about your emotional reaction to the terrorists (since you don't choose your reactions anyway). It just entails that the terrorists feeling good is good for the terrorists, the victims feeling bad is bad for the victims, and that we can compare the intensity of their feelings. And, as you say, that there are all sorts of other bad feelings that arise from your first scenario that don't from your second.

I am sorry but I disagree. I think Red is talking about accidents and intent and that I have addressed in my previous response. It is nothing to do with ones emotional reactions to these events and nothing I read from Red implied that.

OTOH if you think this is the best response from HU, then this is an indictment of HU!!! Can it not handle Mens Rea???

faithlessgod wrote:The reason I bring this up is that I support a variant of MU (desire utilitarianism) but many people attempting to understand utilitarianism only become familiar with CU not MU and often by its critics.

Just to clarify, what are you referring to by 'MU'? I'm guessing either modern utilitarianism or motive utilitarianism, but I can't immediately tell which...

Arepo wrote:HU is just the claim that the only thing you can say about 'better' or 'worse' in this universe is that this person's life could be happier or more miserable - or, synonymously, that it could be better or worse for him.

I've just realised (possibly prompted by David Olivier's discussion) that this was a seriously inaccurate claim - the 'for him' element only applies if you ignore the non-identity problem, which I think is a serious mistake. In this context it doesn't make much difference, but I need to think of a better description that won't haunt me in future discussions.