by I have recently finished reading Volume One of Derek Parfit's "On What Matters".
I am interested in his Kantian argument for rule consequentialism.
He claims that the best (slightly revised) version of Kant's view is what he calls Kantian contractualism which says that everyone ought to follow those principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. At one point he indicates that this needs to be clarified as: everyone ought to follow those principles which are such that everyone could rationally will that any number of people follow them rather than none at all. He makes a claim that this form of contractualism can be used to defend a version of rule consequentialism, in which everyone ought to follow those principles which are optifimic, in the sense that any number of people following them, compared to none at all, will make the outcome best.
I have two questions about this.
First of all, when he discusses Kant's principle that we should only every treat people in ways to which they could rationally consent, he appears to be open to the possibility that it is a good objection that this principle would be too demanding for people who are well-off by global standards. The version of rule consequentialism which he advocates also seems to be quite demanding for such people. So I am not sure what he would make of the objection that this form of rule consequentialism is too demanding for those who are well-off by global standards.
Secondly, he claims that any set of principles which were significantly non-optimific would be such that at least one rational agent could not rationally consent to their universal acceptance. I wonder whether he thinks that that would still necessarily be the case if the set of principles were only significantly non-optimific in their consequences for non-human animals.
I have sent these questions to him by email and if he responds and gives his consent for me to post his response here then I will do so.
I am interested in his Kantian argument for rule consequentialism.
He claims that the best (slightly revised) version of Kant's view is what he calls Kantian contractualism which says that everyone ought to follow those principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. At one point he indicates that this needs to be clarified as: everyone ought to follow those principles which are such that everyone could rationally will that any number of people follow them rather than none at all. He makes a claim that this form of contractualism can be used to defend a version of rule consequentialism, in which everyone ought to follow those principles which are optifimic, in the sense that any number of people following them, compared to none at all, will make the outcome best.
I have two questions about this.
First of all, when he discusses Kant's principle that we should only every treat people in ways to which they could rationally consent, he appears to be open to the possibility that it is a good objection that this principle would be too demanding for people who are well-off by global standards. The version of rule consequentialism which he advocates also seems to be quite demanding for such people. So I am not sure what he would make of the objection that this form of rule consequentialism is too demanding for those who are well-off by global standards.
Secondly, he claims that any set of principles which were significantly non-optimific would be such that at least one rational agent could not rationally consent to their universal acceptance. I wonder whether he thinks that that would still necessarily be the case if the set of principles were only significantly non-optimific in their consequences for non-human animals.
I have sent these questions to him by email and if he responds and gives his consent for me to post his response here then I will do so.
