So what do we do if some form of utilitarianism is true, and also panexperientialism is true? If this is true, then is there any more right way of making decisions, and if not, ought we cease to talk about the possibility?

How do you know that these quarks are better off destroyed?

It depends how certain you are that they are better off destroyed, and how easily they might be able to be destroyed later...

I think that pan-experientialism is probably true and that it's only real competition is metaphysical idealism or solipsism which is still unlikely but can't be dismissed on empirical grounds (as reductive materialism can be) and isn't fundamentally inconceivable because it violates causal laws (as emergent and substance forms of dualism are and do, besides the causal-interaction issues of substance dualism, a mind without an at least illusory body would have no sensory perception and couldn't move through space, being a mind without a body would be like being paralyzed, deaf and blind). I'd be interested in reading what other people think the normative or meta-ethical implications of pan-experientialism or any other mind-body stance are.

My optimism might be unwarranted but I think elementary particles are more likely to experience happiness than pain because they don't have the homeostasis requirements that animals and other motile biological organisms do (I don't think that trees, rocks or other things that don't appear to behave with agency have a unified experience of being those things, they're probably just comprised of elementary particles that are physically bonded but don't feel and act in unity the way the particles we're comprised of do). I'd think that their desires are more simple, they probably lack the complicated cognitive psychology that leads to a lot of suffering in humans and I'd even hope that they can feel love since they seem to be driven by a need to bond with other particles.

I just received a few books in the mail on pan-experientialism that I can't wait to to read.

How do you know that these quarks are better off destroyed?

I doubt that they can be destroyed. If pan-experientialism is true, phenomenonal consciousness is as old as time itself and will probably always exist in one form or another.