Classical Utilitarianism allows for situations where you could theoretically justify universal drug addiction as a way to maximize happiness if you could find some magical drug that made people super happy all the time with no side effects. There's a book called Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, where this drug called Soma is used to sedate the entire population, making them docile and dependent and very, very happy. Now, John Stuart Mill does argue that some pleasures are of a higher quality than others, but how exactly do you define and compare that quality? What exactly makes Shakespeare better than Reality TV? Arguably a lot of people are bored by Shakespeare and made happier by Reality TV.

Enter Aristotle. Aristotle had his own definition of happiness, which he called Eudaimonia. Roughly translated, it means "Human Flourishing". It is a complex concept, but I like to think of it as "reaching your full potential as a human being", "being the best that you can be", "fulfilling your purpose in life", and “authentic happiness” (based on the existential notion of authenticity). I think a better way to explain it is like this. The Classical Utilitarian concept of happiness is subjective. It is just the happiness that you feel in your limited understanding of everything. The Eudaimonic Utilitarian concept of happiness is objective. It is the happiness you would have if you did know everything that was really happening. If you, from the perspective of God, knew the total truth, would you be happy with the situation? You would probably only be truly happy if you were in the process of being the best possible you, and if it was the best possible reality. The Christians have another name for this, and it is God's Will (See: Divine Benevolence, or an Attempt to Prove That the Principal End of the Divine Providence and Government is the Happiness of His Creatures (1731) by Thomas Bayes) (yes, that Bayes).

Looking at the metaphor of God, God wants everyone to be happy. But more than just happy as docile creatures, he wants them to fulfill their purpose and destiny and achieve their fullest potential for greatness because doing so allows them to contribute so much more to everything, and make the whole universe and His creation better. Now, it's quite possible that God does not exist. But His perspective, that of the impartial observer, is still a tremendously useful perspective to have to make the best moral decisions, and is essentially the one that Eudaimonic Utilitarianism would like to be able to reason from.

Eudaimonia would not be maximized by taking Soma. Eudaimonia would not be achieved by hooking up to the matrix if the matrix was a perfect utopia of happiness, because that utopia and happiness aren't real. They're a fantasy, a drug that prevents them from actually living and being who they're supposed to be, who they can be. They would be living a lie. Eudaimonia is based on the truth. It is based on reality and what can and should be done. It is an optimization given all the data. It is serving the Will of God, which is True Love for all Sentient Life, for all beings that feel and can be empathized with. Actually, if you believe in God, Eudaimonic Utilitarianism might better be described as Theistic Utilitarianism, because it assumes that if God exists, God, who by definition is omnibenevolent, is an active Utilitarian working in the Universe to create the Greatest Good.

I have begun by explaining how Eudaimonic Utilitarianism is superior to Classical Utilitarianism. I will now try to explain how Eudaimonic Utilitarianism is both superior and compatible to Preference Utilitarianism. Regular Preference Utilitarianism is arguably even more subjective than Classical Utilitarianism. With Preference Utilitarianism, you’re essentially saying that whatever people think is in their interests, is what should be maximized. But this assumes that their preferences are rational. In reality, most people’s preferences are strongly influenced by emotions and bounded rationality.

For instance, take the example of a suicidal and depressed man. Due to emotional factors, this man has the irrational desire to kill himself. Preference Utilitarianism would either have to accept this preference even though most would agree it is objectively “bad” for him, or do something like call this “manifest” preference to be inferior to the man’s “true” preferences. “Manifest” preferences are what a person’s actual behaviour would suggest, while “true” preferences are what they would have if they could view the situation with all relevant information and rational care. But how do we go about determining a person’s “true” preferences? Do we not have to resort to some kind of objective criterion of what is rational behaviour?

But where is this objective criterion coming from? Well a Classical Utilitarian would argue that suicide would lead to a negation of all the potential happiness that the person could feel in the future, and that rationality is what maximizes happiness. A Eudaimonic Utilitarian would go further and state that if the person knew everything, both their happiness and their preferences would be aligned towards rational activity and therefore not only would their objective happiness be maximized by not committing suicide, but their “true” preferences would also be maximized. Eudaimonia therefore is the objective criterion of rational behaviour. It is not merely subjective preference, but a kind of objective preference based on perfect information and perfect rationality.

Preference Utilitarianism only really works as a moral theory if the person’s preferences are based on rationality and complete knowledge of everything. Coincidentally, Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, assumes this position. It assumes that what should be maximized is the person’s preferences if they were completely rational and knew everything, because those preferences would naturally align with achieving Eudaimonia.

Therefore, Eudaimonic Utilitarianism can be seen as a merging of both Classical and Preference Utilitarianism because, from the perspective of an objective impartial observer, the state of Eudaimonia is simultaneously happiness and rational preference achieved through Arête, or rational activity, which is equivalent to “doing your best” or “maximizing your potential”.

Preference Utilitarianism is neutral as to whether or not to take Soma or plug into the Utopia Matrix. For Preference Utilitarianism, it’s up to the individual’s “rational” preference. Eudaimonic Utilitarianism on the other hand would argue that it is only rational to take Soma or plug into the Utopia Matrix if doing so still allows you to achieve Eudaimonia, which is unlikely, as doing so prevents one from performing Arête in the real world. At the very least, rather than basing it on a subjective preference, we are now using an objective evaluation function.

The main challenge of Eudaimonic Utilitarianism of course is that we as human beings with bounded rationality, do not have access to the position of God with regards to perfect information. Nevertheless, we can still apply Eudaimonic Utilitarianism in everyday scenarios.

For instance, consider the problem of Adultery. A common criticism of Classical Utilitarianism is that it doesn’t condemn acts like Adultery because at first glance, an act like Adultery seems like it would increase net happiness and therefore be condoned. This does not take into account the probabilities of being caught however. Given uncertainty, it is usually safe to assume a uniform distribution of probabilities, which means that getting caught has a 0.5 probability. We must then compare the utilities of not getting caught, and getting caught. It doesn’t really matter what the exact numbers are, so much as the relative relationship of the values. So for instance, we can say that Adultery in the not getting caught scenario has a +5 to each member of the Adultery, for a total of +10. However, in the getting caught scenario, there is a +5 to the uncoupled member, but a net loss of -20 to the coupled member, and -20 to the wronged partner, due to the potential falling out and loss of trust resulting from the discovered Adultery.



Thus the net total effect of Adultery in the caught scenario is -35. If we assign the probabilities to each scenario, +10 x 0.5 = +5, while -35 x 0.5 = -17.5. +5 – 17.5 = -12.5, therefore the probable net effect of Adultery is actually negative and therefore morally wrong.

But what if getting caught is very unlikely? Well, we can show that to a true agnostic at least, the probability of getting caught must be at least 0.5, because that is the most likely probability that God and/or an afterlife exist, which would lead eventually to the other partner finding out. But assuming a simplified atheistic view, there is the danger that hypothetically, if the probability of truth not discovered was 1, then this calculation would actually suggest that committing Adultery would be moral.

The previous example is based on the subjective happiness of Classical Utilitarianism, but what if we used a criterion of Eudaimonia, or the objective happiness we would feel if we knew everything? In that case the Adultery scenario looks even more negative.

In this instance, we can say that Adultery in the not getting caught scenario has a +5 to each member of the Adultery, but also a -20 to the partner who is being wronged because that is how much they would suffer if they knew, which is a net -10. In the getting caught scenario, there is a +5 to the uncoupled member, but a net loss of -20 to the coupled member and an additional -20 to the partner being wronged, due to the potential falling out and loss of trust resulting from the discovered Adultery.



As you can see, with a Eudaimonic Utilitarian criterion, even if the probability of truth not discovered was 1, it would still be negative and therefore morally wrong. Thus, whereas Classical Utilitarianism based on subjective happiness bases its case against Adultery on the probability of being caught and the potential negative consequences, Eudaimonic Utilitarianism takes a more solid case that Adultery would always be wrong because regardless of the probability of being caught, the consequences are inherently negative. It is therefore unnecessary to resort to traditional Preference Utilitarianism to achieve our moral intuitions about Adultery.

Consider another scenario. You are planning a surprise birthday party for your friend, and she asks you what you are doing. You can either tell the truth or lie. Classical Utilitarianism would say to lie because the happiness of the surprise birthday party outweighs the happiness of being told the truth. Preference Utilitarianism however would argue that it is rational for the friend to want to know the truth and not have her friends lie to her generally, that this would be her “true” preference. Thus, Preference Utilitarianism would argue in favour of telling the truth and spoiling the surprise. The happiness that the surprise would cause does not factor into Preference Utilitarianism at all, and the friend has no prior preference for a surprise party she doesn’t even know about.

What does Eudaimonic Utilitarianism say? Well, if the friend really knew everything that was going on, would she be happier and prefer to know the truth in this situation, or be happier and prefer not to know? I would suggest she would be happier and prefer not to know, in which case Eudaimonic Utilitarianism agrees with Classical Utilitarianism and says we should lie to protect the secret of the surprise birthday party.

Eudaimonic Utilitarianism thus does away with the unintuitive weaknesses of both Classical Hedonistic Utilitarianism, and Preference Utilitarianism. It validates our intuitions about the importance of authenticity and rationality in moral behaviour. I therefore offer it as an alternative to other existing forms of Utilitarianism for your consideration.

What's the difference between eudaimonia and preference-fulfillment?

DanielLC wrote:What's the difference between eudaimonia and preference-fulfillment?

Basically, preference-fulfillment is based on people's subjective preferences, while Eudaimonia is based on objective well-being, or as I like to explain, the happiness they would feel if they had perfect information.

The difference is somewhat subtle to the extent that a person's "true" preferences are supposed to be “the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice.” (Harsanyi 1982) Note that relevant factual information is not the same thing as perfect information.

For instance, take the classic criticism of Utilitarianism in the form of the scenario where you hang an innocent man to satisfy the desires for justice of the unruly mob. Under both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism, the hanging of the innocent man can be justified because hanging the innocent man satisfies both the happiness of the mob, and the preferences of the mob. However, hanging an innocent man does not satisfy the eudaimonia of the mob, because if the people in the mob knew that the man was innocent and were truly rational, they would not want to hang him after all. Note that in this case they only have this information under perfect information, as it is assumed that the man appears to all rational parties to be guilty even though he is actually innocent.

So, eudaimonia assumes that in a hypothetical state of perfect information and rationality (that is to say objectivity), a person's happiness would best be satisfied by actions that might differ from what they might prefer in their normal subjective state, and that we should commit to the actions that satisfy this objective happiness (or well-being), rather than satisfy subjective happiness or subjective preferences.

I guess there are different definitions of "preferences". Eudaimonia seems to be the definition used by Eliezer Yudkowski. Are you familiar with CEV?

I think it's definitely closer to preferences than happiness, and it would be better explained as such.

the happiness they would feel if they had perfect information.

I don't think that quite works. Soma doesn't work based on changing your beliefs. Taking soma would make you happy even with perfect information.

DanielLC wrote:I guess there are different definitions of "preferences". Eudaimonia seems to be the definition used by Eliezer Yudkowski. Are you familiar with CEV?

I was not familiar with CEV, as I've only made a few cursory efforts at reading through the rather extensive Less Wrong archives. CEV does show some similarities in thinking to my Eudaimonia concept though.

DanielLC wrote:I think it's definitely closer to preferences than happiness, and it would be better explained as such.

Well, the assumption I make is that happiness and preferences converge and unify at the perfect information and perfect rationality level. However, if this was not the case, I think that Eudaimonia would actually be closer to happiness than preferences, because Eudaimonia is an objective state of being, similar to how happiness is a subjective state of being. Conversely, preferences are a subjective set of interests that may or may not actually be conducive to a "best state of being".

For instance, we can take the example from John Rawls of the grass-counter. "Imagine a brilliant Harvard mathematician, fully informed about the options available to her, who develops an overriding desire to count the blades of grass on the lawns of Harvard." Under both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism, this would be acceptable. However, a Eudaimonic interpretation would argue that counting blades of grass would not maximize her objective happiness, that there is an objective state of being that would actually make her happier, even if it went against her personal preferences, and that this state of being is what should be maximized. Similarly, consider the rational philosopher who has come to the conclusion that life is meaningless and not worth living and therefore develops a preference to commit suicide. This would be his "true" preference, but it would not maximize his Eudaimonia. For this reason, we should try to persuade the suicidal philosopher not to commit suicide, rather than helping him do so.

DanielLC wrote:

the happiness they would feel if they had perfect information.

I don't think that quite works. Soma doesn't work based on changing your beliefs. Taking soma would make you happy even with perfect information.

True, but you would not be fulfilling your potential as a human being, and from the objective viewpoint of perfect information, you would be aware of that, and would be unhappy with the state of affairs. Eudaimonia is not the happiness you actually feel in the subjective moment, but the hypothetical happiness you would have if you could evaluate your life from a perfectly informed and objective standpoint.

Note that I don't say the hypothetical preferences you would have if you could evaluate your life from a perfectly informed and objective standpoint. The reason for this is that even with perfect information, it may still be possible to have non-Eudaimonia maximizing preferences, such as a desire to destroy the world to eliminate all the suffering in it. Such a preference may well seem rational given certain conditions, but it is certainly not Eudaimonia maximizing.

True, but you would not be fulfilling your potential as a human being, and from the objective viewpoint of perfect information, you would be aware of that, and would be unhappy with the state of affairs.

You'd be happy. The soma would take care of that.

Note that I don't say the hypothetical preferences you would have if you could evaluate your life from a perfectly informed and objective standpoint. The reason for this is that even with perfect information, it may still be possible to have non-Eudaimonia maximizing preferences, such as a desire to destroy the world to eliminate all the suffering in it. Such a preference may well seem rational given certain conditions, but it is certainly not Eudaimonia maximizing.

So, you could desire to destroy the world, but destroying the world can't make you happy?

Are you talking about just eudaimonia for normal humans, or for agents in general? In the first case, I doubt they'd desire to destroy the world. In the second, there's nothing stopping you from creating an AI whose happiness is based on number of paperclips.

Please taboo "objective" and "subjective". I don't think you're using those words by the usual definitions, and the only effect they seem to have on your descriptions is connotation.

DanielLC wrote:You'd be happy. The soma would take care of that.

My argument is that it wouldn't. The Soma doesn't effect your hypothetical state as an impartial observer, because that state is separate from your subjective experience. Think of it as the state of a version of you who, not having taken Soma (we'll assume because Soma causes people to be happy regardless of the circumstances, which is not conducive to rational judgment), is now watching the you who has taken Soma, and is evaluating whether or not this version of you is desirable from the viewpoint of the impartial observer with perfect information and rationality.

DanielLC wrote:So, you could desire to destroy the world, but destroying the world can't make you happy?

No, because destroying the world destroys you, which eliminates the possibility of happiness.

DanielLC wrote:Are you talking about just eudaimonia for normal humans, or for agents in general? In the first case, I doubt they'd desire to destroy the world. In the second, there's nothing stopping you from creating an AI whose happiness is based on number of paperclips.

Agents in general. There's nothing stopping you from creating an AI whose preference is based on the number of paperclips either. That's why it's so important to create Friendly/Benevolent AI.

DanielLC wrote:Please taboo "objective" and "subjective". I don't think you're using those words by the usual definitions, and the only effect they seem to have on your descriptions is connotation.

Unfortunately, to taboo these terms would make it much more difficult for me to explain things. The whole difference between Eudaimonic and hedonistic happiness is in the difference between the objective and the subjective. As far as I know, I'm using the Wikipedia definitions of both. They shouldn't be causing confusion. If they are, I apologize, as it means I'm not being clear enough with my usage. The objective/subjective dichotomy is actually essential to understanding why Eudaimonia can be considered superior to hedonistic happiness, and I don't believe it is possible to even talk substantively about Eudaimonia without referring to these terms.

Though I suppose I could make an effort to "rationalist taboo" objective and subjective. But then basically all I'd be doing is replacing "objective" with "true with regard to underlying reality separate from our limited experience" or "mind-independent", and "subjective" with "based on the limited experience of the subject" or "mind-dependent".

It seems like a lot of extra typing for something I could just define explicitly somewhere, like say, the previous paragraph.

It's not mind-independent. Just knowledge-independent. A human and a paperclip maximizer would react very differently, even if they're both given all relevant knowledge.

Darklight wrote:Eudaimonia would not be maximized by taking Soma.

Neither would happiness (I think David Pearce has written something about Soma, and how it's far from a perfect pleasure drug).

For instance, take the example of a suicidal and depressed man. Due to emotional factors, this man has the irrational desire to kill himself.

How do you know it's irrational, and not based on expectation of his future total (un)pleasantness + externalities?

even though most would agree it is objectively “bad” for him

Most would also agree he has a soul, that there are gods or a God who wants people to behave in weird idiosyncratic ways, and so on. Most people agree on things that are not rationally defensible, it's one of the harms of democracy.

DanielLC wrote:It's not mind-independent. Just knowledge-independent. A human and a paperclip maximizer would react very differently, even if they're both given all relevant knowledge.

I'm using the definition of Objectivity that Wikipedia gives:

Wikipedia wrote:Objectivity is a central philosophical concept, related to reality and truth, which has been variously defined by sources. Generally, objectivity means the state or quality of being true even outside of a subject's individual feelings, imaginings, or interpretations. A proposition is generally considered objectively true (to have objective truth) when its truth conditions are met and are "mind-independent"—that is, existing freely or independently from a mind (from the thoughts, feelings, ideas, etc. of a sentient subject). A second, broader meaning of the term refers to the ability in any context to judge fairly, without bias or external influence (see journalistic objectivity); this second meaning of objectivity is sometimes used synonymously with neutrality.

As for human vs. paperclip maximizer, this arguably is a good reason why we should never allow the creation of paperclip maximizers, and that any particularly advanced A.I. that we do create should be seeking to maximize the happiness or Eudaimonia of all sentient beings.

Hedonic Treader wrote:

Darklight wrote:Eudaimonia would not be maximized by taking Soma.

Neither would happiness (I think David Pearce has written something about Soma, and how it's far from a perfect pleasure drug).

Good to know.

Hedonic Treader wrote:

For instance, take the example of a suicidal and depressed man. Due to emotional factors, this man has the irrational desire to kill himself.

How do you know it's irrational, and not based on expectation of his future total (un)pleasantness + externalities?

Because in this particular case, his desire to kill himself comes from emotional factors rather than reasoning. I think I answered the alternative by my scenario of the rational philosopher who comes to the conclusion that life is not worth living.

Darklight wrote: Similarly, consider the rational philosopher who has come to the conclusion that life is meaningless and not worth living and therefore develops a preference to commit suicide. This would be his "true" preference, but it would not maximize his Eudaimonia. For this reason, we should try to persuade the suicidal philosopher not to commit suicide, rather than helping him do so.

Hedonic Treader wrote:

even though most would agree it is objectively “bad” for him

Most would also agree he has a soul, that there are gods or a God who wants people to behave in weird idiosyncratic ways, and so on. Most people agree on things that are not rationally defensible, it's one of the harms of democracy.

Well then, I would argue that it is objectively bad for him on the basis that it is, in this particular situation, irrational because his depression is temporary, and that killing himself will lead to the loss of all possible future happiness. Perhaps I should have qualified the statement as "most rational people would agree that it is objectively "bad" for him".

I'm using the definition of Objectivity that Wikipedia gives:

I meant that eudaimonia isn't mind-independent.

If my eudaimonia differs from a paperclip maximizer's eudaimonia, that it probably also differs from your eudaimonia, albeit to a much lesser extent.

DanielLC wrote:

I'm using the definition of Objectivity that Wikipedia gives:

I meant that eudaimonia isn't mind-independent.

If my eudaimonia differs from a paperclip maximizer's eudaimonia, that it probably also differs from your eudaimonia, albeit to a much lesser extent.

Eudaimonia is mind-independent to the extent that as a function it is defined based on a view of the situation outside of the mind. It is mind-focused to the extent that Eudaimonia is about a mind, but it doesn't depend on that mind's inner perceptual experience. Rather, it looks at the state of overall well-being of the sentient, which is a function that can be determined separately from, and inclusively of, psychological preferences or psychological pleasure levels.

Of course, Eudaimonia differs from subject to subject. But it is not subjective in the sense that it is based merely on our sense experience. It is objective in the sense that it is a function of things about the subject and not merely part of the subject's inner life. My use of the notion of "the happiness you would feel if you had perfect information and were perfectly rational" is merely a heuristic way of understanding the evaluation function. In reality, it is "the happiness or preferences of anyone, including an impartial observer towards a subject, given that they have perfect information and are perfectly rational and benevolent". Eudaimonia is something that everyone who is rational and with the same perfect information should agree on, given a particular subject to evaluate the well-being of. In that sense it is objective and yet also subject-focused.

It's like, the difference between a subject's state of being alive, and that same subject's state of feeling alive. You can be sleeping and not feel anything, while still being alive. Similarly, you might feel happy, but not be in a state of Eudaimonia due to unknown harms to your being able to participate in rational activity, such as being connected to the experience machine.

Thought I'd finally get around to replying in this thread. Apologies for the long wait.

When you say "if this is not the case", you do mean that perfect information is not the case... right?
If you assume rationality level is not the case, then obviously his preference is not necessarily aligned with his "real" or "true" preference. so, eudaimonic utilitarianism is just preference utilitarianism with all the information? But from what I gather it is a little more. It's supposing you don't have a choice to not have all the information. Is that correct?

Actually, by "if this is not the case" I mean to say if happiness and preferences do not converge at the perfect information and rationality level. It differs from preference utilitarianism with all the information in that it is possible that someone with all the information might still decide to prefer something that is not actually in their Eudaimonic interests. For instance, someone might conclude that it is better off not to exist, and seek to end all life painlessly, due to strong negative utilitarian views. I would view this as not being Eudaimonically maximizing, even if it is a legitimate preference.

Why? I don't understand (or more precisely, I think you don't understand {no offence}). It would seem under both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism would say that counting the grass is not utility maximizing. This is because there is most probably something that could make both her and others happier.
Though when you say "personal preference", that implies that if she does not count the grass, she will be less happy than doing anything else. If that is the case, the only way to justify it, through both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism, would be to consider other people.
Obviously your not arguing that she should do what makes her less happy because she COULD be happy if her emotions were rational... are you? Also, I take it to be obvious that emotions are usually NOT rational. That is why we need rationality.

Okay, I'll admit the grass counter argument is weak. Which is probably a good thing, because Rawls used it as an attack on utilitarianism in general.

Essentially, the big difference I see between eudaimonic utilitarianism and "true" preference utilitarianism is that eudaimonic utilitarianism is NOT a consequentialism. But it still sounds like preference utilitarianism "with all the information".

I would argue that it is a consequentialism that has a very unique and difficult to practically calculate utility function. Eudaimonic utilitarianism essentially argues that there is an ideal, or perfect state called Eudaimonia that a fully rational and informed sentient being would desire to be in, and that maximizing the time or chances of being in such a state is morally good. The main point of this Eudaimonia is that it should unify both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism because it simultaneously is the state of greatest happiness or higher pleasure, and a state where one's rational preferences are most satisfied, because, I conjecture, the two states should coincide.

I see no reason why this "impartial observer" would choose not to commit suicide (perhaps this really is best), or condone adultery as long as it's secret (suppose that after finding out about it, the victim, with all the information and a rational mind, decides to take a pill to forget), or take a "happy pill" (even the impartial observer can be sad, information doesn't make you happy. If it doesn't effect your behavior, and it is "true" happiness, I don't see a down side).

I argue that it isn't true happiness because it affects your Eudaimonic state negatively. A simple example of the difference between Eudaimonic happiness and subjective happiness is the case where your friends secretly badmouth you in a way that doesn't actually hurt you and your children suffer without you knowing. In the first case, the action doesn't physically hurt you subjectively, but it does harm your Eudaimonia because in the ideal Eudaimonic state you would know about this action and it would hurt you. In the second case, your preferences to see your children not suffer are being thwarted, which again, would hurt you if you knew about it.

Finally (to lazy to quote right now), your argument against the matrix scenario has some hefty assumptions. You assume that the world we live in is "real". How do you know that we aren't in the matrix right now? This, I believe, is what true philosophers are supposed to think about.
Furthermore, in the sense that we could be in the matrix now, and assuming maximizing potential has to do only with sentient beings (if you argue otherwise, then I think you are approaching religious grounds), we could and should maximize potential in this world even if it is the matrix. Therefore, putting everybody in a matrix has no obvious negative effects.

If we don't know that we are in the matrix, it is reasonable to act as if we weren't and take our world seriously. I believe this is the usual response to the Simulation Argument. However, if one becomes aware that we are certainly in the matrix, I believe that the only morally correct response is to act on that knowledge. In practice, we do not know everything about the actual conditions of our world, so we can only act to the best of our ability with the knowledge we have. Once we are aware that we are in the matrix, then we should act in a manner that is utility maximizing given this information. If that means freeing everyone from the matrix to allow them to actually do something useful rather than be passive entities in a simulation, then so be it. On the other hand, if this matrix is actually somehow utility maximizing, then acting to destroy it may well be immoral. For instance, it may well be that the only way to solve a massive overpopulation problem on a barren planet is plug everyone into a simulation of the best period of human history.

Eudaimonic Utilitarianism is something of an ideal case that in practice tends to collapse into classical utilitarianism. The difficulty is that Eudaimonia is not a state that can be easily determined. Nevertheless, I think we can approximate it by following classical hedonistic utilitarianism, with certain caveats where, when it is possible, we make the attempt to apply the notion of Eudaimonia rather than mere hedonistic happiness.

The reason why I think hedonistic utilitarianism fits better than preference utilitarianism can be shown in this thought experiment:

Consider a series of sentient robots who are produced with very particular features. One robot, we shall call Painbot, is incapable of feeling pleasure, and can only feel pain. Another robot, known as Pleasurebot, can only feel pleasure and not feel pain. A third robot, Preferencebot, can feel neither pain nor pleasure but has preferences. A fourth robot, Hedonbot, can feel both pleasure and pain, but has no preferences.

Painbot can only live a life of constant pain and suffering. Painbot is incapable of action and can do nothing to avoid this pain or produce utility for others. Most Painbots develop a preference to not exist, but some Painbots come to believe that their pain has meaning, and existence is worthwhile, even though they can't even feel any pleasure from this meaning. What should be done about Painbot? A hedonistic utilitarian would argue that Painbot should be painlessly put down, because its existence is purely negative in the hedonic calculus, while a preference utilitarian would argue that it depends on the Painbot's preferences. A Eudaimonic utilitarian asks the question, what is the potential of the Painbot? Ultimately, such beings have no useful purpose and can only be unhappy. They are incapable of achieving any sort of Eudaimonic state. A Eudaimonic utilitarian thus agrees with the hedonistic utilitarians.

Pleasurebot on the other hand, feels only pleasure and is also incapable of action. Most Pleasurebots like to exist, but some feel that due to their inability to do anything, their lives are without meaning, and want to cease to exist. The main concern with it is that if such Pleasurebots can exist and easily be mass produced, a hedonistic utilitarian might be forced to consider the idea that we should replace all other sentient life with Pleasurebots and expend the universe's resources perpetuating Pleasurebots. A preference utilitarian on the other hand, would not consider it important to do so. In fact, they would think that the Pleasurebots that don't want to exist, should be put down. To a Eudaimonic utilitarian, is a bit of a challenge, since they can't act or achieve goals. But they can feel happy, and thus achieve a shallow state of Eudaimonia.

Preferencebot feels no pleasure or pain, and cannot take actions either. However, it does have many preferences because it can sense the world and decide that it would prefer certain things happen in the world than other things, from a purely logical and intellectual reasoning. For instance, it would like for utility to be maximized, though it cannot, by itself help in this regard. To a hedonistic utilitarian, the existence of Preferencebot is undesireable because it consumes resources to continue existing, but does not contribute at all to hedonistic utility. To a preference utilitarian however, Preferencebot has many preferences that must be considered. For a Eudaimonic utilitarian, the Preferencebot is also a challenge. As it has preferences, it can be argued that it has passive goals that can be fulfilled. But the Preferencebot feels no happiness from this. It simply would prefer something things over others in a vague, intellectual sense. At the end of the day, these preferences are merely preferences and don't actually matter to the Preferencebot. Thus it cannot achieve Eudaimonia either.

Hedonbot can feel all sorts of pain and pleasure, but it has no ability to act or preferences of any sort. It just sort of exists and absorbs pain and pleasure. Hedonbot are a bit of an annoyance to hedonistic utilitarians, who might rather they be Pleasurebots, but they admit that Hedonbots deserve some consideration in the hedonic calculus. Preference utilitarians don't value Hedonbots at all, and would rather put them down. Eudaimonic utilitarians note that such entities can experience again a shallow Eudaimonic state and thus deserve some consideration.

Please taboo the phrase "true happiness". I'm fine with "Eudaimonia" which you defined and doesn't have much in the way of connotation. "True happiness" seems to exclusively be used as part of the No True Scotsman fallacy.

I can't help but feel that you're using "Eudaimonia" not to mean the state that the given agent would prefer if it had perfect knowledge, but rather the state you would prefer they had if you had perfect knowledge.

I know you decided the grass counting objection isn't that great, but I think critiquing it would still be a good way for me to explain my point.

It's possible that they have some sort of desire to be something more, but they lack the willpower, and they end up going back to counting grass. If that's true, I can see why you would argue that they are not maximizing Eudaimonia. The impression I have is more that they like to count grass, and they don't much care about anything else. Given perfect knowledge, they wouldn't see anything as more important than counting grass. They have perfect knowledge, and they know with absolute certainty that if they did anything but count grass, it would bore them to death. They could opt to be modified to enjoy something else, but they see no reason too. It just wouldn't be them, and counting grass is fun.

You see counting grass as boring, and thus, you think everyone else would also see it as boring. Sure, strictly speaking, but what's given in that example, perfect knowledge won't make the grass counter want to stop counting grass, but that must be that they just don't understand why it's boring. They must be irrational.

This is false. It's not irrational. It's just not what you want. The definition of irrational I use is being unable to implement your values. Perhaps you have a different definition, but I doubt you have one that both explains why wanting to count grass is irrational, and isn't dependant on your mind.

And one more thing:

What exactly makes Shakespeare better than Reality TV?

I'm pretty sure it's a simple reason. It's the same reason that makes you want to have a big house, even though there's no obvious reason why having a bigger house would be in any way helpful. It's high class. It's better to be rich, to have a big house, and to enjoy Shakespeare. Only a plebeian would prefer Reality TV to Shakespeare. You're not a plebeian, are you?

If we ever invent an AI, and tell it to do something more sophisticated than maximize happiness, I for one hope we're not just using "sophisticated" in the sense of "high class". I don't want to live in a utopia built around signalling how much better it is than anyone else's utopia.

Please taboo the phrase "true happiness". I'm fine with "Eudaimonia" which you defined and doesn't have much in the way of connotation. "True happiness" seems to exclusively be used as part of the No True Scotsman fallacy.

Fine.

I can't help but feel that you're using "Eudaimonia" not to mean the state that the given agent would prefer if it had perfect knowledge, but rather the state you would prefer they had if you had perfect knowledge.

Mmm, this is not my intention. But I would also argue that assuming perfect knowledge led necessarily to perfect moral knowledge, that the two cases are actually identical. If I had perfect moral knowledge, assuming that such knowledge was imperative, I would be intrinsically benevolent and want the best for the agent in question.

This is false. It's not irrational. It's just not what you want. The definition of irrational I use is being unable to implement your values. Perhaps you have a different definition, but I doubt you have one that both explains why wanting to count grass is irrational, and isn't dependant on your mind.

If in the state of perfect information and rationality, the grass counter still sees grass counting as the best of all possible options, then I concede that it is a Eudaimonic state. I made the assumption that in a state of perfect information and rationality, that a normal human being who was a brilliant mathematician would have better more Eudaimonic states than merely grass counting, such as for instance, being a Nobel prize winning mathematician who provides enormous amounts of utility to everyone (while still perhaps leaving some time for his/her favourite hobby of grass counting). But arguably this does not require the notion of Eudaimonia, and applies equally to hedonistic and preference utilitarianism.

I'm pretty sure it's a simple reason. It's the same reason that makes you want to have a big house, even though there's no obvious reason why having a bigger house would be in any way helpful. It's high class. It's better to be rich, to have a big house, and to enjoy Shakespeare. Only a plebeian would prefer Reality TV to Shakespeare. You're not a plebeian, are you?

If we ever invent an AI, and tell it to do something more sophisticated than maximize happiness, I for one hope we're not just using "sophisticated" in the sense of "high class". I don't want to live in a utopia built around signalling how much better it is than anyone else's utopia.

Uh, the usual argument why Reality TV is inferior to Shakespeare is that Shakespeare can be appreciated at a higher intellectual level than most Reality TV, that some pleasures are deeper and superior to other pleasures because they affect us more. Reality TV is something that most people quickly consume and then forget about. Shakespeare tends to be something that we can absorb and analyze and think about and remember for decades because it affected us on an intellectual and emotional level. Admittedly, it's possible that Reality TV might affect some people in the same way that Shakespeare affects some people. To be honest, I was mostly borrowing from John Stuart Mill's notion of higher and lower pleasures, and I'm not particularly attached to this assertion.

The utility function is not up for grabs. Perfect knowledge and reasoning will give you perfect knowledge of your own utility function. You will have no need to hesitate when given the trolley problem. It will also give you perfect knowledge of everyone else's utility function. You know what they'd pick. What it doesn't do is in any way force you to have the same utility function.

I guess that's one of my broader disagreements with the Less Wrong community. I actually think that if moral realism is true, then given perfect knowledge you should be able to reason into the "correct" utility function, whatever it is, and that it would be persuasive enough to motivate you to adopt that particular function. I believe that the reason why there are disagreements about the utility function is because no one in practice has perfect knowledge. For a while I challenged the Orthogonality Thesis for these reasons, but now I realize that even a superintelligence may not be able to have perfect knowledge and therefore that the Orthogonality Thesis may very well be correct.

Note that when I say perfect knowledge, I don't mean perfect rationality. Perfect rationality will tell you exactly how to act given whatever your utility function happens to be, because as you implied, rationality is about being able to implement your values, whatever they are. Perfect knowledge on the other hand, is about knowing about objective truths regardless of your values.

Our values are often a result of our limited knowledge. Some people value for instance, serving some incorrect religion or ideology because their limited and mistaken knowledge lead them to rationally value the claims of that religion or ideology. If our knowledge changes, often we are motivated to change our values to conform with the new information. Thus, I believe that when we have perfect knowledge, we will be motivated to make our values consistent with the implications of the objective truth, whatever that may be.

It is possible that the objective truth is that moral realism is not true. In which case there is no perfect utility function that would be demanded by perfect knowledge, and you would be correct.

I would also just like to note that even if moral realism is false, that doesn't spell doom for Utilitarianism, because Utilitarianism only requires moral universalism.

I'm not sure even that's strictly necessary. I'm not entirely sure of the terminology, but Eliezer Yudkowsky seems to be a moral relativist. Nonetheless, he considers what is moral from his point of reference to be Utilitarianism.

Darklight wrote:I would also just like to note that even if moral realism is false, that doesn't spell doom for Utilitarianism, because Utilitarianism only requires moral universalism.

I spelt out an anti-realist Utilitarianism once.

I'm not sure even that's strictly necessary. I'm not entirely sure of the terminology, but Eliezer Yudkowsky seems to be a moral relativist. Nonetheless, he considers what is moral from his point of reference to be Utilitarianism.

Are you sure about that? Just from reading the meta-ethics sequence, I thought Eliezer Yudkowsky believed that morality was based on a complex value function that cannot be reduced to something as simple as "maximize utility".

I spelt out an anti-realist Utilitarianism once.

Interesting. I don't know that I completely agree with or for that matter understand your anti-realist meta-ethics, but it was an interesting read.

I think where I disagree with you is that I don't think that standards and goals are the source of moral judgments. Rather, I think that there are positive mental and existential states that are intrinsically good, and there are negative mental and existential states that are intrinsically bad. Goodness and badness are subjective judgments in the sense that they are made by a subject with regard to things. Given that the only things we can be absolutely sure of are that something exists, and whether we perceive our mental states to be positive or negative, I think that such things are the only things we can make absolute moral judgments about. Thus, happiness is good, and suffering is bad, even if we are just a brain in a jar being fed false perceptions and having no ability to actually realize any goals.

Goals are simply apparent world states that we value for some reason or another. Goals I think, can be described as good or bad only with reference to their consequences in terms of the goodness or badness of the world state that achieving a given goal would create. Achieving goals is not in and of itself, intrinsically good, although they are so often instrumentally good that many people could conceivably confuse themselves about it.

I think fundamentally you have to ask yourself, since goals are about achieving what we value, whether or not values are intrinsically good. I think it should be obvious that some values are not good. Someone might value torturing others to "save their souls". But I would say that there is something morally wrong with this value, and that this is not merely my opinion but an actual statement of fact, having to do with the suffering that torture causes and the falsehood of the "save their souls" part. If this is true, then values are not intrinsically good, because it is possible to hold bad values.

Just from reading the meta-ethics sequence, I thought Eliezer Yudkowsky believed that morality was based on a complex value function that cannot be reduced to something as simple as "maximize utility".

He has a complex utility function. It's still utilitarianism.

Darklight wrote:Eudaimonia would not be achieved by hooking up to the matrix if the matrix was a perfect utopia of happiness, because that utopia and happiness aren't real. They're a fantasy, a drug that prevents them from actually living and being who they're supposed to be, who they can be. They would be living a lie. Eudaimonia is based on the truth.

This seems the Nozick's machine dilemma, and shows to me a big quantity of errors. First of all, on cartesian or humean paradox, if I'm not mistaken, we cannot know if our reality is... real, so possibly we are, or I am, in a matrix. Answering to Morpheus and weighing whether take the pill, I would accuse Morpheus to not proves me the reality of his world (a much more painfull world, of course). Therefore, pragmatic approach!

The ancient view that says: "If there's knowledge, therefore is happiness" seems to me for few, and an uncertain form of utilitarianism. For I don't see such a close connection between these two elements, under any circumstances. What means "(total) knowledge"? something like an enormous mental encyclopedia? or a constant perception of all world's experencies? (You says not.) What degree of first type of knowledge? an high level, true? is it possible? I see it when we say that: "If we'll God, therefore we'll happy", 'cause the philosophical notion of God is, especially, of a Being whose happiness is infinite. But there is an evident analogy: 'cause knowing many things in the exact circumstances (ever knowing what's going on) it's a nearly divine (im)possibility.

Rather, I see that if one is sage, he has more probabilities to find some way to maximaze his happiness. This is an instrumental (an utilitarian, I suppose) view of knowledge. I don't know what utility may has the knowledge if its result is not an increase of happiness, I don't know what's utility of an human "perfection" if it doesn't give happiness; on the other hand, the "soma" or the Nozick's machine would give us an high degree (and, I hope, certainty) of pleasure, so that the end is reached. (I agree with user Daniel), you make a wider turn to the end, I think.

It seems to me that your E-Utilitarian response to the party-scenario was obviously uncorrect. However, in more relevant scenarios, if we know that knowing the truth is a real concern for our friends – that is, if we're sure that will produce an increase of happiness in them – then we'll say the truth by duty. Finally, I don't see (thus, a priori, without read it because it's very difficult to me) how Bayes could overcome the Epicurus' old questions; with regard to free will, I see it grim.

Darklight wrote:For instance, take the example of a suicidal and depressed man. Due to emotional factors, this man has the irrational desire to kill himself.

Uhmm... I don't think so (still see Hume, Of Suicide). Well, other matter.

The part of your benthamite calculus about adultery is too complex for me, so I'm droping it. This is my really first comment here, in english, for a real (english) discussion, so forgive me if I did some error and miss out some comment. It's hard to maintain an even attention on english textes.

First, thanks for replying despite your difficulties with the English language. I really appreciate it!

This seems the Nozick's machine dilemma, and shows me a big quantity of errors. First of all, on cartesian or humean paradox, if I'm not mistaken, we cannot know if our reality is... real, so possibly we are, or I am, in a matrix. Answering to Morpheus and weighing whether take the pill, I would accuse Morpheus to not proves me the reality of his world (a much more painfull world, of course). Therefore, pragmatic approach!

I admit that we can't be certain about our reality. But I think that it is reasonable to assume that our senses can be trusted, because otherwise there is nothing we can do.

The ancient view that says: "If there's knowledge, therefore is happiness" seems to me for few, and an uncertain form of utilitarianism. For I don't see such a close connection between these two elements, under any circumstances. What means "(total) knowledge"? something like an enormous mental encyclopedia? or a constant perception of all world's experencies? (You says not.) What degree of first type of knowledge? an high level, true? is it possible? I see it when we say that: "If we'll God, therefore we'll happy", 'cause the philosophical notion of God is, especially, of a Being whose happiness is infinite. But there is an evident analogy: 'cause knowing many things in the exact circumstances (ever knowing what's going on) it's a nearly divine (im)possibility.

Perfect knowledge is an ideal concept. It is admittedly in practice, not feasible short of being God or god-like. However, I still think that we should try to maximize our knowledge, because it will be useful. And I'm not saying that knowledge necessarily leads to happiness. It is possible that knowledge of the truth can bring unhappiness. Eudaimonia is about more than just our emotional state of happiness though. It is about being in the best possible state of actual existence, whatever that is.

Rather, I see that if one is sage, he has more probabilities to find some way to maximaze his happiness. This is an instrumental (an utilitarian, I suppouse) view of knowledge. I don't know what utility may has the knowledge if its result is not an increase of happiness, I don't know what's utility of an human "perfection" if it doesn't give happiness; on the other hand, the "soma" or the Nozick's machine would give us an high degree (and, I hope, certainty) of pleasure, so that the end is reached. (I agree with user Daniel), you make a wider turn to the end, I think.

Indeed, lately, I have been moving away from my earlier view of Eudaimonia, and admitting the possibility that John Stuart Mill was right, and that classical hedonistic utilitarianism is right. I am still uncertain as to whether Eudaimonia as an ideal does capture something that happiness by itself doesn't.

It seems to me that your E-Utilitarian response to the party-scenario was obviously uncorrect. However, in more relevant scenarios, if we know that knowing the truth is a real concern for our friends – that is, if we're sure that will produce an increase of happiness in them – then we'll say the truth by duty. Finally, I don't see (thus, a priori, without read it because it's very difficult to me) how Bayes could overcome the Epicurus' old questions; with regard to free will, I see it grim.

Mmm... I still think that a white lie to protect the secret of a surprise birthday party will produce more happiness at the surprise party, so I think it is still correct. We have to weigh the relative happiness of learning the truth, and getting surprised.

I'm not sure what you're referring to with Bayes and Epicurus and free will.

Uhmm... I don't think so (still see Hume, Of Suicide). Well, other matter.

The part of your benthamite calculus about adultery is too complex for me, so I'm droping it. This is my really first comment here, in english, for a real (english) discussion, so forgive me if I did some error and miss out some comment. It's hard to maintain an even attention on english textes.

I believe I read "Of Suicide" a while back, but I don't remember much except that I disagreed with it at the time.

Yeah, the calculus about adultery was just an attempt to see what kind of calculations would be suggested by the various theories. The numbers are rather arbitrary, so I don't fault anyone for not taking it seriously.

Thanks for giving this discussion a serious effort! I really appreciate that you would spend time on my silly little theory.

Thank you! to endure my mistakes.
In knowing (b.t.w.) the Utilitarian Philosophy, I'm surely inferior to you all, because you anglophones have an huge digital bibliography/library here on Internet in order to learn it. So, these aren't silly discussions for me I answer to you all according to my reason and little knowledge.

Unlike the Bayes' title, he cannot prove God's benevolence and, at same time, save the christian view, because Epicurus (see still Hume, DNR, X: 25) doesn't allow him to do it; then, the free will, an usual christian way-out, is a problem, 'cause either it doesn't exist or it's literally useless for human happiness. But this is a marginal matter, just a note.

For the first point, in brief: the objective existence of external things is uncertain; what is certain is the perception of pleasure and pain when we perceive it. It seems to me that these perceptions are whitout-doubt, since in their case reality and appearance concur. Don't they? Thankfully, for utilitarians the utility is better then truth.

Now I've a confused idea of your "Eudaimonia" concept, so I should read with more attention your later messages.

Verrian wrote:Unlike the Bayes' title, he cannot prove God's benevolence and, at same time, save the christian view, because Epicurus (see still Hume, DNR, X: 25) doesn't allow him to do it; then, the free will, an usual christian way-out, is a problem, 'cause either it doesn't exist or it's literally useless for human happiness. But this is a marginal matter, just a note.

This appears to be what you're referring to:

Hume wrote:Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

Free will is the usual Christian response to the Problem of Evil, but I would actually make a different argument. If God exists, and is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then the reason why there is all this apparent evil in this world is that for reasons that are currently beyond our knowledge, the evil in this world is necessary evil, required to achieve the Greatest Good in the long run. For instance, perhaps it is possible that all the suffering in the universe is required to motivate humanity towards the Technological Singularity as quickly as possible, or perhaps our suffering makes sense because we are drastically outnumbered by future humans who will benefit from our efforts to minimize suffering and maximize happiness.

Perhaps we as the early Earthlings, with our privileged position as being able to influence the future so much, are allowed to suffer for the sake of the future.

For the first point, in brief: the objective existence of external things is uncertain; what is certain is the perception of pleasure and pain when we perceive it. It seems to me that these perceptions are whitout-doubt, since in their case reality and appearance concur. Don't they? Thankfully, for utilitarians the utility is better then truth.

I agree with you. This is one of the major reasons I'm leaning towards classical hedonistic utilitarianism these days, more than my pet theory of Eudaimonic Utilitarianism.

Now I've a confused idea of your "Eudaimonia" concept, so I should read with more attention your later messages.

Eudaimonia is probably best described with the word "flourishing". It incorporates subjective feelings of happiness, but also includes the objective state of fulfilling one's purpose, both being and doing well. To be honest, I may not have explained the idea clearly enough (as it is a complicated idea), so I apologize if my various attempts have caused confusion.

Exactly, those questions!

Darklight wrote:If God exists, and is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then the reason why there is all this apparent evil in this world is that for reasons that are currently beyond our knowledge, the evil in this world is necessary evil, required to achieve the Greatest Good in the long run.

There's a self-evident contradiction between the perfect nature of this God, and the sole existence of a problem for this God. His supposed infinite power would prevent any "necessary" evil.

Darklight wrote:For instance, perhaps it is possible that all the suffering in the universe is required to motivate humanity towards the Technological Singularity as quickly as possible, or perhaps our suffering makes sense because we are drastically outnumbered by future humans who will benefit from our efforts to minimize suffering and maximize happiness.

If the God's aim is the human happiness, this strange kind of game is counter-productive. Why to leave humans in pursuit of Merit? I see no one escape-route from this contradiction... maybe except your long and intricate linked paper

There's a self-evident contradiction between the perfect nature of this God, and the sole existence of a problem for this God. His supposed infinite power would prevent any "necessary" evil.

Well, the argument is that omnipotence is not the same as infinite power. Maybe there are absolute, law of the universe type limits to what power a god can have. Omnipotence is simply the power to do what is possible, not what is strictly impossible. It's possible then that there is no way to maximize the good without also having some necessary evil in the universe.

If the God's aim is the human happiness, this strange kind of game is counter-productive. Why to leave humans in pursuit of Merit? I see no one escape-route from this contradiction... maybe except your long and intricate linked paper

The hand wavy argument is that we don't know what God knows. Perhaps this just is the best way to go about doing things compared to all the possible alternatives. Admittedly this can be hard to reconcile with reality from our perspective. The hope is that perhaps all the suffering on Earth will be more than offset by the eternal happiness of heaven (if you accept the the Universalist view that everyone will eventually go to heaven). Maybe our short lives on this Earth are all a test designed to determine where to place us in God's heavenly utopia.

For that matter, I recently had the very weird idea that maybe all the religions with their "End Times prophecies" and expectations of the eventual arrival or return of a Messiah, might actually be the work of time travellers who implanted these memes in order to make large numbers of humans more willing to accept the Singularity once it arrives.

Darklight wrote:Omnipotence is simply the power to do what is possible, not what is strictly impossible.

So, the Creator, the all-creating Being, would have limits? I heard some christians saying that God limitated Himself (in order to guarantee the Free Will), therefore He is limited in powers; besides, some theologians say that God is inferior to a Logos, an Universal Logic or something like that. Too nonsensical for me, too contradictory - in the christian view of a perfect metaphysical being.

Ok, let's consider someone like... if I well understood... a god as supposed by Sidgwick in the end of his masterpiece: maybe there is a god non-enough powerful to give us the Happiness here and now. Ok, it's possible, it's comfortable under some lights. It's very kind and altruistic to have these hopes, it must be sign of a truly altruistic heart; but isn't it just metaphysics?

Talking of atheism, I want recommend you an easy reading (since it's all english) by an indignant and perhaps little-known atheist: P.-H.T. Holbach, The Good Sense, with the GoogleBooks scans. (Also, there's something to do with Kirkegaard in I-don't-know-what podcast or lecture.)

Uh, thanks for the links!

When it comes to matters of religion, I call myself a Christian Agnostic. The reason for that is that while I lean towards Christianity as the faith system that I would take a "leap of faith" towards if I had to choose one, to be intellectually honest my intellectual viewpoint is actually more Agnostic. I would like very much for there to be an all-loving God out there who divinely ordained the universe and ensures eventual eternal happiness for all sentient life. But to be honest, I don't know that. Where I differ from the atheist is mostly that I have experienced in my own life, peculiar coincidences that make me wonder whether or not there is a God. Synchronicities that really make me wonder if the universe is more than mere coincidence. But I admit that these could be just coincidences.

The other thing is that my understanding of what God could be is somewhat different from the traditional theological view. I can conceive of God as being scientifically possible, and so I cannot confidently assert that there is no God, any more than I can confidently assert that there is a God. I admit my ignorance, and my openness to possibilities.

But if you're interested in some of the reasons why I think there -could- be a God, consider reading the short story The Last Question by Isaac Asimov.

Thank you