With the advance of neuroscience, how will we ultimately find out whether or not insects are sentient? If you were at some far future conference were all possible evidence for this question was being presented, what would that evidence be? How could things turn out?

Brian has argued that this will come down judgement call of some sort, because insect pain would have some degree of similarity but would not be exactly the same and so we have to decide on the relevant points of similarity. I agree, but I don't have much of an idea at all what this judgement call would look like.

If there was a distinct type or family of processes that were present in both humans and other insects then it might be straightforward. But, for example, octopuses do not have visual cortices but they can see, so if pain is instantiated in very different ways I'm not sure what I would decide.



P. S. Hopefully that was an okay summary of your position Brian!

http://www.utilitarian-essays.com/consciousness.html

I think we'll always have a philosophical problem about whether pain is actually suffering, but advanced neuroscience might show analagous pain processing and pathways as currently known in humans and other nonhuman animals.

The issue I have with the whole judgment call thing is that it undermines my entire being as a rationalist. I cannot reject the materialist possibility, however, I don't think moral value, if it exists, could be arbitrary. I might say something like "the value of a given operation is assigned by the operation's owner (i.e. the software/program)", this might be the value I go by.


I never really understood why some people think that invertebrates are not conscious. There is always the philosophical problem that we cannot prove that anyone but ourselves is conscious; it seems to me that, if assuming consciousness in many people and animals is reasonable, assuming invertebrates to be conscious seems pretty reasonable.

Surely I have observed spider fear (when trying to take them outside).

Here is a recent argument I have come up with:
1. invertebrates engage in sexual intercourse
2. sexual intercourse exists only as a pleasurable experience created by evolution
'.' 3. invertebrates experience at least one one form of pleasure (I take it to be obvious that pleasure automatically implies consciousness)

I also have some arguments for invertebrate pain, perhaps I will post one later. Though perception of sexual pleasure itself seems to imply evolutionary capability for the tactile sensation pain.

I would like opinions on my argument above. I think it is a very strong argument, yet I have not seen it made before. This is a very important topic to us utilitarians, naturally.
Do you think this is a good argument?

inQuestion wrote:Here is a recent argument I have come up with:
1. invertebrates engage in sexual intercourse
2. sexual intercourse exists only as a pleasurable experience created by evolution
'.' 3. invertebrates experience at least one one form of pleasure (I take it to be obvious that pleasure automatically implies consciousness)

2 could be false. It could exist without pleasure, e.g. as a stimulus-response mechanism without any emotional representation. Hypothetically it could even exist as the joyless resolution of unpleasant craving.