Does a nonzero probability of plant sentience change the debate on whether there is a predominance of suffering in nature? Or what diets are most justifiable? Or even whether the continuation of the human species is justifiable?
Plant Pain?
55 posts
Plant Pain?
I know most who raise this topic are dismissed as silly or confused but I'd like ask what implications follow if you assign a nonzero probability to the existence of plant sentience? Even if it's extraordinarily unlikely - let's say one in a trillion odds - that plants feel pain, I'd think the expected value of their pain would be substantial due to their prevalence. You would have to know the "location" (for lack of a better word) of the subjective experience in order to do an expected value calculation (e.g., does each root feel pain? each leaf? or just the whole plant?) I know the usual criticisms of the notion of plant sentience (no known mechanisms could produce it; what evolved function would it serve?, etc) but I don't think we know enough about sentience or consciousness to say that it is impossible for any entity to have such subjective experiences (i.e., you have to assign a nonzero possibility).
Does a nonzero probability of plant sentience change the debate on whether there is a predominance of suffering in nature? Or what diets are most justifiable? Or even whether the continuation of the human species is justifiable?
Does a nonzero probability of plant sentience change the debate on whether there is a predominance of suffering in nature? Or what diets are most justifiable? Or even whether the continuation of the human species is justifiable?
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:let's say one in a trillion odds
It's considerably higher. All you need to make a low-probability case for plant pain is evidence of functional plant movement in response to integrity damage, and corresponding movement-controlling information processing of some sort. This movement doesn't have to rely on muscles, the controlling doesn't have to rely on neurons, and they don't have to be fast.
However, if you want to address high-stakes low-probability cases of natural suffering, studying insect suffering should take precedence.
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
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Re: Plant Pain?
Hedonic Treader wrote:LJM1979 wrote:let's say one in a trillion odds
It's considerably higher. All you need to make a low-probability case for plant pain is evidence of functional plant movement in response to integrity damage, and corresponding movement-controlling information processing of some sort. This movement doesn't have to rely on muscles, the controlling doesn't have to rely on neurons, and they don't have to be fast.
However, if you want to address high-stakes low-probability cases of natural suffering, studying insect suffering should take precedence.
Why? Aren't there far more plants than insects?
You mean considerably higher as in *more* probable than one in a trillion, right?
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:Why? Aren't there far more plants than insects?
Yes, but the probability of insect suffering is a lot higher than that of plant suffering, there are also very many insects, and it might be easier to study. OTOH, maybe identifying candidate functions for suffering in plants might be possible.
You mean considerably higher as in *more* probable than one in a trillion, right?
Yes, it's very low but not 10^-12.
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
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Re: Plant Pain?
Hedonic Treader wrote:LJM1979 wrote:Why? Aren't there far more plants than insects?
Yes, but the probability of insect suffering is a lot higher than that of plant suffering, there are also very many insects, and it might be easier to study. OTOH, maybe identifying candidate functions for suffering in plants might be possible.You mean considerably higher as in *more* probable than one in a trillion, right?
Yes, it's very low but not 10^-12.
Do you think we ever will know whether plants or insects suffer? I'm highly skeptical, but without knowing which forms of life are sentient, we'll never be able to maximize or even know how to maximize well-being. For example, several have argued compellingly (Oscar Horta, Brian Tomasik) that there is net suffering in nature. Robert Wiblin actually argues that destroying nature might be the most practical solution (http://robertwiblin.com/2010/01/21/just-destroy-nature/)
Yet, if plants can feel pain and if they on average have net positive lives, that changes all our thoughts about the utility of nature. Because plants are so numerous, if they have net positive existences in any meaningful psychological sense, it could be that more positive affect exists in nature than anywhere else. So we have two diametrically opposed implications depending on whether insects, plants, neither, or both are sentient (destroy nature vs. promote it everywhere). Without any way of knowing which forms of life are sentient, I don't see how we can ever know how to maximize utility, and it's not clear to me that we can ever have more than "educated guesses" about which forms of life are sentient.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:Do you think we ever will know whether plants or insects suffer?
Maybe the right way to do it is to scientifically analyze our own pain as accurately as humanly possible, and then look for crucial similarities and dissimilarities in those other information-processing systems.
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
- Joined: Sun Apr 17, 2011 11:06 am
Re: Plant Pain?
That's probably the closest we can come to answering the question. It assumes though that the same mechanisms that produce human consciousness are the only ones that could produce consciousness in other living beings.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
It doesn't have to assume it's the same mechanisms, just mechanisms similar enough that you can identify them. If you have no reason to assume consciousness in any other entity, then you shouldn't assume consciousness (principle of parsimony).
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
- Joined: Sun Apr 17, 2011 11:06 am
Re: Plant Pain?
If Strawsonian physicalism (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalis ... hysicalism ) is true, then fields of micro-experience may be ontologically fundamental. But this doesn't mean we need to start worrying about the subjective well-being of sticks, stones or plants. This is because such composite entities are mere structured aggregates - not unitary subjects of experience . (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereological_nihilism )
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the generation of a unitary subject of experience? In short, we don't know. No one really understands how the brain solves the binding problem. (cf. http://lafollejournee02.com/texts/body_ ... inding.pdf )
Why aren't 80 billion odd (apparently) discrete, membrane-bound classical nerve cells just interconnected patterns of "mind dust"? My own idiosyncratic conjecture combines Strawsonian physicalism with macroscopic quantum coherence, but on quantum mind sceptic's Max Tegmark's sub-picosecond decoherence timescales rather than Stuart Hameroff's milliseconds. True or false, the challenge of unifying membrane-bound nerve cells into bound phenomenal objects or a unitary subject of experience pales into triviality compared to the challenge of unifying cellulose-encased plant cells. For a plant mind hypothesis to work, we'd need to abandon reductive physicalism in favour of a pre-scientific animism. Recall too that we do know precisely how to switch off phenomenal pain altogether in humans, namely induce nonsense mutations of the SCN9A gene.
( http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v4 ... 05413.html )
Plants lack a SCN9A gene - or any homologous (or indeed analogous) gene. So I think herbivores can eat cabbages and lettuces with a clear conscience!
From my experience, the "problem" of plant pain arises only because meat eaters seeking to rationalise their habit cast around for some sort of "We're-all-guilty-so-none-of-us-are" excuse and start feigning compassion for vegetables.
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the generation of a unitary subject of experience? In short, we don't know. No one really understands how the brain solves the binding problem. (cf. http://lafollejournee02.com/texts/body_ ... inding.pdf )
Why aren't 80 billion odd (apparently) discrete, membrane-bound classical nerve cells just interconnected patterns of "mind dust"? My own idiosyncratic conjecture combines Strawsonian physicalism with macroscopic quantum coherence, but on quantum mind sceptic's Max Tegmark's sub-picosecond decoherence timescales rather than Stuart Hameroff's milliseconds. True or false, the challenge of unifying membrane-bound nerve cells into bound phenomenal objects or a unitary subject of experience pales into triviality compared to the challenge of unifying cellulose-encased plant cells. For a plant mind hypothesis to work, we'd need to abandon reductive physicalism in favour of a pre-scientific animism. Recall too that we do know precisely how to switch off phenomenal pain altogether in humans, namely induce nonsense mutations of the SCN9A gene.
( http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v4 ... 05413.html )
Plants lack a SCN9A gene - or any homologous (or indeed analogous) gene. So I think herbivores can eat cabbages and lettuces with a clear conscience!
From my experience, the "problem" of plant pain arises only because meat eaters seeking to rationalise their habit cast around for some sort of "We're-all-guilty-so-none-of-us-are" excuse and start feigning compassion for vegetables.
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davidpearce - Posts: 45
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Re: Plant Pain?
Wow, thanks for all the detail. I am going to spend some time reading through those sources you've cited.
I agree that most people who raise the topic of plant pain do so because they want to continue eating meat but that argument is misguided on many levels. I probably shouldn't have even mentioned diet in the initial message.
I agree that most people who raise the topic of plant pain do so because they want to continue eating meat but that argument is misguided on many levels. I probably shouldn't have even mentioned diet in the initial message.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
My personal prior probability that plants suffer is less than an order of a magnitude higher than my probability that sand grains suffer or that bacteria suffers, so I'd sooner worry about them.
Felicifia Head Admin | Ruling Felicifia with an iron fist since 2012.
Personal Site: www.peterhurford.com
Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
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Personal Site: www.peterhurford.com
Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
Direct Influencer Scoreboard: 2 Meatless Monday-ers, 1 Vegetarian, and 2 Giving What We Can 10% pledges.
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peterhurford - Posts: 410
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Re: Plant Pain?
Good question, LJM1979! Coincidentally, I was thinking about this just a few days ago.
I haven't researched the number of plants in the world, though I would guess it's at least a few orders of magnitude more than the number of animals, especially if you count phytoplankton.
Hedonic Treader described well the case one might make for plant pain: "functional plant movement in response to integrity damage, and corresponding movement-controlling information processing of some sort." This seems like a far cry from consciousness, but given how little we know about these things, the probability is, as Hedonic Treader said, much bigger than 1 in a trillion.
Still, the probability is a lot lower than for insects. Whether the reduced probability of plant sentience is enough to make expected plant pain lower than expected insect/zooplankton pain is unclear. Another consideration, as Hedonic Treader pointed out, is that plants respond much slower than animals, so maybe the effective clock speed for plants is (orders of magnitude?) slower than for animals, which might be enough to dampen out their otherwise potentially massive expected value.
I don't know if plants would have net positive lives in the wild. Like with animals, most plant offspring probably die soon after pushing out of their seeds. Only a lucky few mature to adulthood, I would guess. Plants can also have stresses due to hostile weather, lack of food, drought, being eaten alive by herbivores, etc.
So I'm personally doubtful about LJM1979's suggestion that plant sentience could reverse the balance of pleasure/pain in nature. At least it would add more uncertainty, but even a priori, it's not clear why we'd assume that plant lives are net good (especially since the lives of the organisms we do know about -- small, short-lived animals -- are probably net bad). Sure, plants look peaceful, but who knows what kind of stress, fear, or deprivation of basic needs is going on inside their "heads" (internal communication systems). (Yes, that sentence was mainly tongue-in-cheek with wording, but the point was serious. )
If plant lives aren't worth living, a lot of the interventions that we would support to reduce short-lived r-selected wild-animal populations would also reduce plant populations. Putting up parking lots, reducing plankton populations, palliating climate change, desertification, and land salination are things that tend to reduce not only animal populations but also plant populations. In general, a first-order approximation for the amount of animal life in an ecosystem is the amount of plant life, although it's possible this isn't always true. For example, eutrophication may increase plant biomass while decreasing animal biomass, but this suggestion remains counterintuitive and hence speculative.
As far as diets, the standard reply is that most meat production requires killing many times more plants than eating plants directly, so even if plants feel pain, it's better to be veg. This is probably true even when we consider wild animals because global warming will probably increase plant abundance in the long term.
Whether plants suffer or not also doesn't change the thrust of my futurism concerns: Terraforming, panspermia, and sentient simulations will create at least as much plant life as animal life.
All in all, the things I'm working on aren't much affected if plants are sentient. Regardless, the issue doesn't keep me up at night, and I haven't formally included it in my calculations. The reason may be because I might decide that I just don't care about the computations that plants do as being conscious suffering. I'm allowed to do this if I want to. Now, if you show that the operations that plants do is really similar to operations done by animals that I care about, I may change my mind, but I think it's pretty unlikely the correspondence will be that strong.
As far as David Pearce's comments, I hold a very different view. I don't believe there is a "hard" binding problem or that quantum mechanics is at all relevant. But I still agree with David on many things and owe a great deal to him; this is just a friendly intellectual disagreement.
I haven't researched the number of plants in the world, though I would guess it's at least a few orders of magnitude more than the number of animals, especially if you count phytoplankton.
Hedonic Treader described well the case one might make for plant pain: "functional plant movement in response to integrity damage, and corresponding movement-controlling information processing of some sort." This seems like a far cry from consciousness, but given how little we know about these things, the probability is, as Hedonic Treader said, much bigger than 1 in a trillion.
Still, the probability is a lot lower than for insects. Whether the reduced probability of plant sentience is enough to make expected plant pain lower than expected insect/zooplankton pain is unclear. Another consideration, as Hedonic Treader pointed out, is that plants respond much slower than animals, so maybe the effective clock speed for plants is (orders of magnitude?) slower than for animals, which might be enough to dampen out their otherwise potentially massive expected value.
I don't know if plants would have net positive lives in the wild. Like with animals, most plant offspring probably die soon after pushing out of their seeds. Only a lucky few mature to adulthood, I would guess. Plants can also have stresses due to hostile weather, lack of food, drought, being eaten alive by herbivores, etc.
So I'm personally doubtful about LJM1979's suggestion that plant sentience could reverse the balance of pleasure/pain in nature. At least it would add more uncertainty, but even a priori, it's not clear why we'd assume that plant lives are net good (especially since the lives of the organisms we do know about -- small, short-lived animals -- are probably net bad). Sure, plants look peaceful, but who knows what kind of stress, fear, or deprivation of basic needs is going on inside their "heads" (internal communication systems). (Yes, that sentence was mainly tongue-in-cheek with wording, but the point was serious. )
If plant lives aren't worth living, a lot of the interventions that we would support to reduce short-lived r-selected wild-animal populations would also reduce plant populations. Putting up parking lots, reducing plankton populations, palliating climate change, desertification, and land salination are things that tend to reduce not only animal populations but also plant populations. In general, a first-order approximation for the amount of animal life in an ecosystem is the amount of plant life, although it's possible this isn't always true. For example, eutrophication may increase plant biomass while decreasing animal biomass, but this suggestion remains counterintuitive and hence speculative.
As far as diets, the standard reply is that most meat production requires killing many times more plants than eating plants directly, so even if plants feel pain, it's better to be veg. This is probably true even when we consider wild animals because global warming will probably increase plant abundance in the long term.
Whether plants suffer or not also doesn't change the thrust of my futurism concerns: Terraforming, panspermia, and sentient simulations will create at least as much plant life as animal life.
All in all, the things I'm working on aren't much affected if plants are sentient. Regardless, the issue doesn't keep me up at night, and I haven't formally included it in my calculations. The reason may be because I might decide that I just don't care about the computations that plants do as being conscious suffering. I'm allowed to do this if I want to. Now, if you show that the operations that plants do is really similar to operations done by animals that I care about, I may change my mind, but I think it's pretty unlikely the correspondence will be that strong.
As far as David Pearce's comments, I hold a very different view. I don't believe there is a "hard" binding problem or that quantum mechanics is at all relevant. But I still agree with David on many things and owe a great deal to him; this is just a friendly intellectual disagreement.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
Thanks; I think you do make a good point about plant sentience probably not reversing the balance of suffering/pleasure in nature. I probably was thinking of just the most salient plants (big, healthy ones) when I made that comment.
You're right that that is the standard reply to the diet question and I think it's a good enough reply to invalidate any "plant-pain" criticisms of veganism by meat-eaters.
You're right that that is the standard reply to the diet question and I think it's a good enough reply to invalidate any "plant-pain" criticisms of veganism by meat-eaters.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
"I don't know if plants would have net positive lives in the wild. Like with animals, most plant offspring probably die soon after pushing out of their seeds. Only a lucky few mature to adulthood, I would guess. Plants can also have stresses due to hostile weather, lack of food, drought, being eaten alive by herbivores, etc."
However plants are evolutionary winners when eaten so this would feel good for them if they felt? (probably)
"My personal prior probability that plants suffer is less than an order of a magnitude higher than my probability that sand grains suffer or that bacteria suffers, so I'd sooner worry about them."
*like* !
However plants are evolutionary winners when eaten so this would feel good for them if they felt? (probably)
"My personal prior probability that plants suffer is less than an order of a magnitude higher than my probability that sand grains suffer or that bacteria suffers, so I'd sooner worry about them."
*like* !
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Ruairi - Posts: 392
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Re: Plant Pain?
Ruairi wrote:0
"My personal prior probability that plants suffer is less than an order of a magnitude higher than my probability that sand grains suffer or that bacteria suffers, so I'd sooner worry about them."
*like* !
I don't think that quote takes the notion of expected value seriously. Like me, you and Peter appear to assign an extremely low but nonzero probability to plant sentience. I don't mean to be a jerk, but it's not clear to me that you're taking that belief to its logical conclusion - or at least it's not clear to me why the expected value of total plant suffering in nature is low. If you have a very low probability but multiple it by an inconceivably high number (the # of plants in existence), it's still possible to come out with a meaningful value. I think Brian's answer about it complicating issues but not necessarily reversing the conclusion about a predominance of suffering in nature is helpful though.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
Seemingly useless metaphysical debates can sometimes have profound ethical consequences. So I'm going to risk outlining my "philosophical" disagreements with Brian - even though ethically we agree on a lot!
IMO consciousness, for example a phenomenal pain, is concrete, possessing spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy; an algorithm is abstraction. I'm sceptical about any ultimate ontology of abstract objects (what might actually cause us to credit their existence?), even though, if we don't treat abstract objects as real for some purposes, we will miss many features of the real world. [Perhaps compare our understanding of functionalist / teleological explanations pre- and post-Darwin.] Thus natural selection has recruited e.g. pains to play, typically, an information-processing role in living organisms capable of self-propelled motion and capable of sustaining an energetically expensive nervous system. But neuropathic pain, for instance, that doesn't play any algorithmic or information-processing role in the organism is just as real as its "typical" counterpart. Consciousness, with or without any functional role, is not something mind/brains do: it's what they are.
Panpsychism? Presumably, we'll ultimately need rigorously to derive the phenomenology of our minds from the properties of the fundamental stuff of the world - a reductive physicalism with no strong emergence, i.e. no unexplained eruption into the world of something ontologically new, not expressible within the mathematical straightjacket of modern physics. I don't think panexperientialism / Strawsomoan physicalsm can do this, or rather not on its own. Hence the seemly intractable binding problem and the classically inexplicable existence of "bound" phenomenal objects and the (fleeting, synchronic) unity of consciousness - and the desperate-sounding proposals that quantum mind theorists have devised to overcome the problem. But I don't think any proposal to solve the binding problem consistent with reductive physicalism can even get off the ground unless we assume a pan-experientialist / Strawsonian physicalist ontology. Such an ontology is the precondition of a reductive explanation of phenomenal minds, not an explanation itself.
Two grounds for taking panexperientialism / Strawsonian physicalism seriously IMO are 1) the fundamental entities in theoretical l physics (fields / superstrings / branes ) are defined purely mathematically; their supposed insentience is an extra assumption, not integral to the physics. And (2) the only part of the world to which one had direct access, namely one's own mind/ brain , has precisely those attributes that the pan-experientiallost / Strawsonian physicalist claims - contrary to one's naive materialist or abstract pan-informationalist intuitions.
More to be said ? Yes, for sure.
IMO consciousness, for example a phenomenal pain, is concrete, possessing spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy; an algorithm is abstraction. I'm sceptical about any ultimate ontology of abstract objects (what might actually cause us to credit their existence?), even though, if we don't treat abstract objects as real for some purposes, we will miss many features of the real world. [Perhaps compare our understanding of functionalist / teleological explanations pre- and post-Darwin.] Thus natural selection has recruited e.g. pains to play, typically, an information-processing role in living organisms capable of self-propelled motion and capable of sustaining an energetically expensive nervous system. But neuropathic pain, for instance, that doesn't play any algorithmic or information-processing role in the organism is just as real as its "typical" counterpart. Consciousness, with or without any functional role, is not something mind/brains do: it's what they are.
Panpsychism? Presumably, we'll ultimately need rigorously to derive the phenomenology of our minds from the properties of the fundamental stuff of the world - a reductive physicalism with no strong emergence, i.e. no unexplained eruption into the world of something ontologically new, not expressible within the mathematical straightjacket of modern physics. I don't think panexperientialism / Strawsomoan physicalsm can do this, or rather not on its own. Hence the seemly intractable binding problem and the classically inexplicable existence of "bound" phenomenal objects and the (fleeting, synchronic) unity of consciousness - and the desperate-sounding proposals that quantum mind theorists have devised to overcome the problem. But I don't think any proposal to solve the binding problem consistent with reductive physicalism can even get off the ground unless we assume a pan-experientialist / Strawsonian physicalist ontology. Such an ontology is the precondition of a reductive explanation of phenomenal minds, not an explanation itself.
Two grounds for taking panexperientialism / Strawsonian physicalism seriously IMO are 1) the fundamental entities in theoretical l physics (fields / superstrings / branes ) are defined purely mathematically; their supposed insentience is an extra assumption, not integral to the physics. And (2) the only part of the world to which one had direct access, namely one's own mind/ brain , has precisely those attributes that the pan-experientiallost / Strawsonian physicalist claims - contrary to one's naive materialist or abstract pan-informationalist intuitions.
More to be said ? Yes, for sure.
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davidpearce - Posts: 45
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Re: Plant Pain?
Ruairi wrote:However plants are evolutionary winners when eaten so this would feel good for them if they felt? (probably)
Only for the fruit parts of plants. Most plants don't like it when their heads are chomped off -- they need to grow back, and if the damage is severe enough, they die. Many plants have toxins / thorns / etc. to try and prevent being eaten.
LJM1979 wrote:I don't mean to be a jerk, but it's not clear to me that you're taking that belief to its logical conclusion
Yeah, though there's a difference between plants/bacteria and sand grains. I mentioned it to Yew-Kwang Ng back in 2006, and he thought it was a good point. The idea is just that, for sand grains and other inanimate objects, we have no idea whether any given action would increase or decrease their welfare. For plants and bacteria, we could assume that harming them biologically might induce suffering (in the unlikely event they can suffer at all), but for sand grains, what would cause them to suffer? Does it hurt them if we step on them on the playground?
I may reply to good ol' David another day, but it's getting late for tonight.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
Also neuroscience will probably continue to explain sentience better and better without us taking action, but concern for sentients won't happen (as much) without us, and perhaps not at all for wild animals or artificial sentients (or perhaps for sand grains too! ).
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Ruairi - Posts: 392
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:I don't mean to be a jerk, but it's not clear to me that you're taking that belief to its logical conclusion - or at least it's not clear to me why the expected value of total plant suffering in nature is low. If you have a very low probability but multiple it by an inconceivably high number (the # of plants in existence), it's still possible to come out with a meaningful value.
There's also an inconceivably high number of sand grains or bacteria -- more so, I'd suggest, than plants. Thus, I'm more "concerned" about them.
Felicifia Head Admin | Ruling Felicifia with an iron fist since 2012.
Personal Site: www.peterhurford.com
Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
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Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
Direct Influencer Scoreboard: 2 Meatless Monday-ers, 1 Vegetarian, and 2 Giving What We Can 10% pledges.
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peterhurford - Posts: 410
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Re: Plant Pain?
peterhurford wrote:LJM1979 wrote:I don't mean to be a jerk, but it's not clear to me that you're taking that belief to its logical conclusion - or at least it's not clear to me why the expected value of total plant suffering in nature is low. If you have a very low probability but multiple it by an inconceivably high number (the # of plants in existence), it's still possible to come out with a meaningful value.
There's also an inconceivably high number of sand grains or bacteria -- more so, I'd suggest, than plants. Thus, I'm more "concerned" about them.
Actually I think open-mindedness requires having some concern for the possibility that panpsychism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism) is right and all matter has a meaningful psychological experience - even if we give it a very low probability. You've switched the topic from plants to nonliving matter but I don't think you've successfully addressed the concern of sentience in nature beyond the animal kingdom.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
If plants (or grains of sand) do feel pain despite having no evolutionary impetus to do so, it seems impossible to predict how, why, in what form etc. It could be that sitting unmolested in the soil is agonising for them, and we can only put them out of their misery by crushing them etc.
When we have no information on which to go, I think it's a good epistemic principle to assume equal expected value to your ignorances.
So the question isn't so much 'should we think plants might suffer?' as 'what effect would it have on our behaviour to contemplate the possibility? The answer, IMO, being none.
When we have no information on which to go, I think it's a good epistemic principle to assume equal expected value to your ignorances.
So the question isn't so much 'should we think plants might suffer?' as 'what effect would it have on our behaviour to contemplate the possibility? The answer, IMO, being none.
"These were my only good shoes."
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
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Arepo - Posts: 1065
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Re: Plant Pain?
Arepo wrote:If plants (or grains of sand) do feel pain despite having no evolutionary impetus to do so, it seems impossible to predict how, why, in what form etc.
Without evidence in biology, we should not assume that plants suffer any more than dead organic matter. But it isn't clear that there is no evolutionary impetus at all. A symbolic representation of integrity damage that shares some equivalent features to our own pain could have an evolutionary impetus.
A made-up example: Plants have chemical responses to parasite infection, these responses are evaluated in an internal heuristic that has a symbolic "integrity damage" or "threat" representation, this is chemically communicated with other plants (kin selection), who increase internal defense mechanisms after receiving the symbolic threat representation.
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
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Re: Plant Pain?
Ruairi wrote:Also neuroscience will probably continue to explain sentience better and better without us taking action, but concern for sentients won't happen (as much) without us, and perhaps not at all for wild animals or artificial sentients (or perhaps for sand grains too! ).
Yep! Arguably some of the biggest value in doing insect-sentience research isn't to influence our short-term decisions (even though we are really curious about the answer) but to set an example of showing that this question is one that people should care about. It frames the debate in a sentience-oriented way and suggests that it would matter morally if insects could suffer. These are notions that we're trying to make more common-sense in our culture.
I agree with Arepo that symmetry allows us not to worry about sand grains, but the same doesn't apply to plants for the reason Hedonic Treader explained. So yes, I do think plants are a problem that sand grains are not. (That said, I don't think plants are a big problem in practice for the reasons I explained earlier.)
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
davidpearce wrote:IMO consciousness, for example a phenomenal pain, is concrete, possessing spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy; an algorithm is abstraction. I'm sceptical about any ultimate ontology of abstract objects
Me too. However, I'm not concerned about the algorithm in the abstract. Like you, I'm concerned about particular physical things that embody the algorithm. A cat-lover doesn't have to be a Platonist to say that she likes cats.
davidpearce wrote:But neuropathic pain, for instance, that doesn't play any algorithmic or information-processing role in the organism is just as real as its "typical" counterpart.
Neuropathic pain still activates the algorithms we care about in the brain (i.e., algorithms of disliking, suffering, wanting to stop, etc.).
Animals masturbating are not fulfilling the purpose for which those inclinations evolved either. Sometimes things with one purpose are activated in other instances.
davidpearce wrote:But I don't think any proposal to solve the binding problem consistent with reductive physicalism can even get off the ground unless we assume a pan-experientialist / Strawsonian physicalist ontology. Such an ontology is the precondition of a reductive explanation of phenomenal minds, not an explanation itself.
I don't believe there is a "hard" binding problem. The sensation of unity of conscious experience is an interesting one, but can ultimately be explained just like the sensation of breathing fresh air or the sensation of cosmic oneness with all things. The ideas Dave discusses seem to me akin to proposed solutions to how it is that the tooth fairy avoids going bankrupt.
davidpearce wrote:the only part of the world to which one had direct access, namely one's own mind/ brain , has precisely those attributes that the pan-experientiallost / Strawsonian physicalist claims
We have access to our brains only through mechanical operations. There's no "ghost of perfect emptiness," as Eliezer calls it, that has instantaneous, magical access to thoughts without any algorithms going on underneath. This feeling of having direct access to your mind and experiences is produced by complex algorithms that your brain is running in the physical world. If there really were a mysterious true consciousness to nature, how would that cause your brain to run these algorithms sensing it? Is the consciousness stuff like an elf that rewires neurons during the night to ensure that they run the right algorithms to reflect upon being conscious? Why not dispense with the elves and hypothesize that your brain just runs those algorithms on its own?
davidpearce wrote:More to be said ? Yes, for sure.
Thanks for the conversation, David!
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
Brian Tomasik wrote:Ruairi wrote:Also neuroscience will probably continue to explain sentience better and better without us taking action, but concern for sentients won't happen (as much) without us, and perhaps not at all for wild animals or artificial sentients (or perhaps for sand grains too! ).
(That said, I don't think plants are a big problem in practice for the reasons I explained earlier.)
I'm not sure I'd go that far. I'd agree with your argument that plant sentience probably wouldn't shift the balance to more pleasure than suffering in nature. However, if plants are sentient, then any RWA intervention that neglects their sentience could backfire - e.g., if the RWA intervention actually increased the number of animals that consume plants. If RWA leads to happy, healthy, active animals in nature who are burning lots of calories, they'd be eating lots of plants.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:However, if plants are sentient, then any RWA intervention that neglects their sentience could backfire - e.g., if the RWA intervention actually increased the number of animals that consume plants. If RWA leads to happy, healthy, active animals in nature who are burning lots of calories, they'd be eating lots of plants.
True. I suspect most practical RWAS measures would reduce plants along with reducing animals, but it is correct that some -- like replacing small, r-selected animals by bigger K-selected herbivores -- could at least keep the amount of plant eating constant.
My personal opinion (not shared by all of my colleagues) is that RWAS isn't primarily about helping animals on earth. It's about preventing the spread of life to other planets and in sentient simulations. Taking action on Earth has the primary value of making people realize that WAS is a problem and not something we should spread. Where possible, I'm going to nudge the RWAS movement to focus on the don't-spread-WAS-elsewhere side of the equation.
All of that said, you could take RWAS research findings and modify them to include consideration of potential plant suffering and see what kinds of conclusions pop out. A basic question is to ask how many plants there are compared with insects/zooplankton. If it's not orders of magnitude more, then maybe plants don't dominate the calculations after all.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
BTW, if you take plant pain seriously, I guess you need a new abbreviation: WS ("wild suffering") and RWS ("reducing wild suffering").
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
To some extent, I like simply "S" and "RS" (suffering and reducing suffering). I understand the point, though, that nature is neglected by most utilitarians - so I can go along with the W being included.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
Hedonic Treader wrote:Arepo wrote:If plants (or grains of sand) do feel pain despite having no evolutionary impetus to do so, it seems impossible to predict how, why, in what form etc.
Without evidence in biology, we should not assume that plants suffer any more than dead organic matter. But it isn't clear that there is no evolutionary impetus at all. A symbolic representation of integrity damage that shares some equivalent features to our own pain could have an evolutionary impetus.
A made-up example: Plants have chemical responses to parasite infection, these responses are evaluated in an internal heuristic that has a symbolic "integrity damage" or "threat" representation, this is chemically communicated with other plants (kin selection), who increase internal defense mechanisms after receiving the symbolic threat representation.
Well put. We don't know enough about evolution or consciousness to say there is "no evolutionary impetus..." It's much more accurate to say that based on our current understanding, there is only a weak evolutionary argument for plant sentience.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
Hedonic Treader wrote:A made-up example: Plants have chemical responses to parasite infection, these responses are evaluated in an internal heuristic that has a symbolic "integrity damage" or "threat" representation, this is chemically communicated with other plants (kin selection), who increase internal defense mechanisms after receiving the symbolic threat representation.
Not sure I follow what you mean about communication via kin selection. Can you elaborate?
"These were my only good shoes."
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
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Arepo - Posts: 1065
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Re: Plant Pain?
Arepo wrote:Hedonic Treader wrote:A made-up example: Plants have chemical responses to parasite infection, these responses are evaluated in an internal heuristic that has a symbolic "integrity damage" or "threat" representation, this is chemically communicated with other plants (kin selection), who increase internal defense mechanisms after receiving the symbolic threat representation.
Not sure I follow what you mean about communication via kin selection. Can you elaborate?
The wording was a little awkward but I think HT is referring to research findings like this (http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/070614-plants.html)
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:The wording was a little awkward but I think HT is referring to research findings like this (http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/070614-plants.html)
Yes, thanks! Kin selection provides a causal mechanism why communication of internal states with other plants can be fitness maximizing. Of course, having an abstract representation of internal states within one plant could be fitness maximizing in itself (analogy: our human pain is an abstract representation of integrity damage that affects our behavior).
The crucial question is whether such tokens exist and whether they are similar enough to our own pleasantness/unpleasantness tokens that we would count them in a hedonistic utilitarian calculus.
"The abolishment of pain in surgery is a chimera. It is absurd to go on seeking it... Knife and pain are two words in surgery that must forever be associated in the consciousness of the patient."
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
- Dr. Alfred Velpeau (1839), French surgeon
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Hedonic Treader - Posts: 342
- Joined: Sun Apr 17, 2011 11:06 am
Re: Plant Pain?
Just yesterday a friend mentioned CODIT, Compartmentalization Of Decay In Trees.
I personally don't believe this would entail anything I care about as being conscious suffering, but yes, the chance is nonzero.
when trees are wounded, many organisms, not just fungi, infect the wood at different times and in different ways; trees respond to these infections with both chemical and physical changes; discolored and decayed wood results, but is limited by compartmentalization.
I personally don't believe this would entail anything I care about as being conscious suffering, but yes, the chance is nonzero.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
Along similar lines, I wonder how our extensively low probabilities of some of the following things might impact our utilitarian plans:
a.) Some sort of solipsism is true, and the death of you entails the death of everyone and the end of all consciousness (happiness and suffering).
b.) Some sort of moral realism is true in a way that it actually is a universally binding, rationally inescapable categorical imperative, and it's an imperative along the lines of some sort of Kantianism and not utilitarianism.
c.) The Christian God exists and Hell and Heaven are for real.
a.) Some sort of solipsism is true, and the death of you entails the death of everyone and the end of all consciousness (happiness and suffering).
b.) Some sort of moral realism is true in a way that it actually is a universally binding, rationally inescapable categorical imperative, and it's an imperative along the lines of some sort of Kantianism and not utilitarianism.
c.) The Christian God exists and Hell and Heaven are for real.
Felicifia Head Admin | Ruling Felicifia with an iron fist since 2012.
Personal Site: www.peterhurford.com
Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
Direct Influencer Scoreboard: 2 Meatless Monday-ers, 1 Vegetarian, and 2 Giving What We Can 10% pledges.
Personal Site: www.peterhurford.com
Utilitarian Blog: Everyday Utilitarian
Direct Influencer Scoreboard: 2 Meatless Monday-ers, 1 Vegetarian, and 2 Giving What We Can 10% pledges.
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peterhurford - Posts: 410
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Re: Plant Pain?
When you take on moral uncertainty, things seem to get taken over by claims of 'absolute' goodness. eg never lie and infinite or near-infinite utility claims e.g. heaven and hell or combinations of the two eg always produce happiness, in any increment, of which there is a (near) infinite amount in heaven.
You can read my personal blog here: CareyRyan.com
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RyanCarey - Posts: 682
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Re: Plant Pain?
(a) Pure solipsism basically doesn't matter in the calculations, because if you're the only mind that exists, the universe isn't very important. Solipsism where your brain somehow runs all the other brains doesn't seem like a hypothesis worth picking out as special. If those minds are really being run, then you should be equally likely to be any of them, not the single one that's crucial for the continued survival of all of them.
(b) This is along the lines of 2+2=5. See here for more of my thoughts. Perhaps I misunderstand the idea, though.
(c) I've shared this essay with you already.
(b) This is along the lines of 2+2=5. See here for more of my thoughts. Perhaps I misunderstand the idea, though.
(c) I've shared this essay with you already.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
Elijah,
How is pain intensity related to physical size and complexity on the panpsychist view you defend? Presumably, an atom cannot suffer as much as a brain, or even a cell or a molecule. An answer to this question will help me understand why you think that taking supplements is expected to cause less suffering than eating plants.
How is pain intensity related to physical size and complexity on the panpsychist view you defend? Presumably, an atom cannot suffer as much as a brain, or even a cell or a molecule. An answer to this question will help me understand why you think that taking supplements is expected to cause less suffering than eating plants.
"‘Méchanique Sociale’ may one day take her place along with ‘Mécanique Celeste’, throned each upon the double-sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of physical science." -- Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
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Pablo Stafforini - Posts: 177
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Re: Plant Pain?
I mentioned this on the wild animal suffering FB page.
Michael Marder (University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz) has recently been making the (deontological) case for consideration of plant welfare in -- of all places -- the NYT.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -eat-them/
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -the-menu/
He debates Gary Francione about it here: http://www.cup.columbia.edu/static/mard ... one-debate
Michael Marder (University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz) has recently been making the (deontological) case for consideration of plant welfare in -- of all places -- the NYT.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -eat-them/
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -the-menu/
He debates Gary Francione about it here: http://www.cup.columbia.edu/static/mard ... one-debate
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spindoctor - Posts: 81
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Re: Plant Pain?
spindoctor wrote:I mentioned this on the wild animal suffering FB page.
Michael Marder (University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz) has recently been making the (deontological) case for consideration of plant welfare in -- of all places -- the NYT.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -eat-them/
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 ... -the-menu/
He debates Gary Francione about it here: http://www.cup.columbia.edu/static/mard ... one-debate
Thanks for posting this. The Marder-Francione debate was very interesting. I'll make a few notes.
A) Both generally argue their positions very well, although they are stuck in a deontological framework that I and most others here would object to. It is a shame that neither talks at all about total utility.
B) Francione comes off as a bit close-minded to the mere possibility that plants are sentient. I wish Marder had asked him whether he would assign any nonzero probability (even one in a trillion!) to plant sentience. Even if plants are sentient, he says that "assuming that we concluded we were not obligated to commit suicide, we would still be morally obligated to consume plants rather than consume flesh or animal products" but I'm not convinced his deontological framework permits such an assumption. If plants are sentient, can his framework justify that each sentient human violate the right to life of an infinite number of sentient plants over his or her lifetime?
C) Marder seems to push aside the issue of pain and suffering. He doesn't seem to believe there is a morally relevant difference between merely reacting to the environment without ever feeling pain and pleasure on the one hand and both reacting and feeling pain and pleasure on the other.
D) Despite the above, it is good to see the moral philosophy community discuss plants.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
If plants are sentient, can his framework justify that each sentient human violate the right to life of an infinite number of sentient plants over his or her lifetime?
A friend of mine and sometime contributor to Felicifia (who wishes to remain anonymous) once wrote a paper arguing that animal-friendly deontologists should commit suicide. His argument, if I recall correctly, was that even vegans cause many animals to be killed, and that, for this reason, they could only meet the deontological requirement not to violate the rights of others by ceasing to exist. Since only by not existing could these folks do what they believe morality requires of them, they should conclude that morality requires them to kill themselves.
"‘Méchanique Sociale’ may one day take her place along with ‘Mécanique Celeste’, throned each upon the double-sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of physical science." -- Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
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Pablo Stafforini - Posts: 177
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Re: Plant Pain?
Do his wishes to remain anonymous prohibit you from citing the paper? It sounds like an entertaining read...
"These were my only good shoes."
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
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Arepo - Posts: 1065
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Re: Plant Pain?
Pablo Stafforini wrote:If plants are sentient, can his framework justify that each sentient human violate the right to life of an infinite number of sentient plants over his or her lifetime?
A friend of mine and sometime contributor to Felicifia (who wishes to remain anonymous) once wrote a paper arguing that animal-friendly deontologists should commit suicide. His argument, if I recall correctly, was that even vegans cause many animals to be killed, and that, for this reason, they could only meet the deontological requirement not to violate the rights of others by ceasing to exist. Since only by not existing could these folks do what they believe morality requires of them, they should conclude that morality requires them to kill themselves.
True, although this could simply fall within the "demandingness objection" (an objection to which utilitarians are vulnerable also, albeit for different reasons). At the very least, I would say that most deontologists do not adequately discuss what happens when different beings' rights conflict and do not truly take an antispeciesist, impartial stance.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
Pablo Stafforini wrote:If plants are sentient, can his framework justify that each sentient human violate the right to life of an infinite number of sentient plants over his or her lifetime?
A friend of mine and sometime contributor to Felicifia (who wishes to remain anonymous) once wrote a paper arguing that animal-friendly deontologists should commit suicide. His argument, if I recall correctly, was that even vegans cause many animals to be killed, and that, for this reason, they could only meet the deontological requirement not to violate the rights of others by ceasing to exist. Since only by not existing could these folks do what they believe morality requires of them, they should conclude that morality requires them to kill themselves.
I know Oscar Horta has cited a couple of environmentalists who made the same argument but I don't remember their names off-hand.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
If anyone does find out who it is, can they keep it to themselves? If he wants to retain such privacy as the above details afford him, I don't see any reason not to let him. (though maybe it's just the link between his real name and his Felicifia handle that he wants to keep under wraps)
"These were my only good shoes."
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
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Arepo - Posts: 1065
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:it is god to see the moral philosophy community discuss pants.
And it is mortal to see the moral-philosophy community discuss shirts!
I've also read the paper that Pablo mentions. It goes on to say that utilitarians are justified in not killing themselves because they can prevent (orders of magnitude) more suffering than they cause. Probably best not to name the author without permission.
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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Re: Plant Pain?
I suppose the argument might work for a non-scalar utilitarian - he'd never be able to achieve perfection, so he'd always be acting wrongly.
I have yet to find an actual utilitarian who hasn't always implicitly understood their ideas to be what we now call scalar...
I have yet to find an actual utilitarian who hasn't always implicitly understood their ideas to be what we now call scalar...
"These were my only good shoes."
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
"You ought to have put on an old pair, if you wished to go a-diving," said Professor Graham, who had not studied moral philosophy in vain.
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Arepo - Posts: 1065
- Joined: Sun Oct 05, 2008 10:49 am
Re: Plant Pain?
Brian Tomasik wrote:LJM1979 wrote:it is god to see the moral philosophy community discuss pants.
And it is mortal to see the moral-philosophy community discuss shirts!
I've also read the paper that Pablo mentions. It goes on to say that utilitarians are justified in not killing themselves because they can prevent (orders of magnitude) more suffering than they cause. Probably best not to name the author without permission.
LOL! Ooooooops!
My keyboard is not working great.
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
LJM1979 wrote:Pablo Stafforini wrote:If plants are sentient, can his framework justify that each sentient human violate the right to life of an infinite number of sentient plants over his or her lifetime?
A friend of mine and sometime contributor to Felicifia (who wishes to remain anonymous) once wrote a paper arguing that animal-friendly deontologists should commit suicide. His argument, if I recall correctly, was that even vegans cause many animals to be killed, and that, for this reason, they could only meet the deontological requirement not to violate the rights of others by ceasing to exist. Since only by not existing could these folks do what they believe morality requires of them, they should conclude that morality requires them to kill themselves.
I know Oscar Horta has cited a couple of environmentalists who made the same argument but I don't remember their names off-hand.
I dunno either, I remember him talking about Linkola? Is that who you mean?
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Ruairi - Posts: 392
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Re: Plant Pain?
What I could follow from this talk was interesting, although the speaker's accent made it hard to follow a lot of it.
http://www.ted.com/talks/stefano_mancuso_the_roots_of_plant_intelligence.html
http://www.ted.com/talks/stefano_mancuso_the_roots_of_plant_intelligence.html
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LJM1979 - Posts: 165
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Re: Plant Pain?
If he's published the paper, it probably won't be too hard to track him down. HAS he published it?
No, he hasn't.
"‘Méchanique Sociale’ may one day take her place along with ‘Mécanique Celeste’, throned each upon the double-sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme pinnacle of moral as of physical science." -- Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
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Pablo Stafforini - Posts: 177
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Re: Plant Pain?
Perhaps relevant: http://mil-labs.blogspot.in/2012/12/pla ... brain.html
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Ruairi - Posts: 392
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- Location: Ireland
Re: Plant Pain?
Ruairi wrote:Perhaps relevant: http://mil-labs.blogspot.in/2012/12/pla ... brain.html
Interesting article. I don't dispute that plants are in some ways intelligent, but of course, this isn't the same as being sentient. Even a thermostat is kind of "intelligent." None of the evidence presented seemed to suggest that sentience was involved, although it would be imprudent to put the probability too low -- say, lower than 0.0001.
The article takes a non-utilitarian ethical stance when it suggests that plants might deserve protection based on their abilities:
But the novel indications concerning the responsiveness of plants, their interactions with the environment and with one another, are sufficient to undermine all simple, axiomatic solutions to eating in good conscience. When it comes to a plant, it turns out to be not only a what but also a who — an agent in its milieu, with its own intrinsic value or version of the good.
Well, by this definition, a Roomba might also be a "who." Your laptop would almost certainly be a "who." But I don't think these electronic items actually deserve ethical consideration.
I'm curious what the article meant by this:
Plants are also capable of refined recognition of self and non-self
I'm guessing it was an anthropomorphic way to describe some very basic process.
This passage highlights what I said before about clock speed:
Plants, it is claimed by plant physiologists, are as sophisticated in behaviour as animals but this sophistication has been masked by the time scales of plants' response to stimuli, many orders of magnitude slower than animals'.
Methinks "as sophisticated in behaviour as animals" is a wee bit of exaggeration!
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Brian Tomasik - Posts: 1130
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55 posts